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Introduction 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. Why must criminal law writing be clear and specific? 
2. How do you use the statute to understand what it is that has to be proven at trial, and how 
does that affect how you draft documents for criminal legal issues? 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223–34 (2018) (Gorsuch concurrence). 
Vague laws invite arbitrary power. Before the Revolution, the crime of treason in English 
law was so capaciously construed that the mere expression of disfavored opinions could invite 
transportation or death. The founders cited the crown's abuse of “pretended” crimes like this as 
one of their reasons for revolution. See Declaration of Independence ¶ 21. Today's vague laws 
may not be as invidious, but they can invite the exercise of arbitrary power all the same—by 
leaving the people in the dark about what the law demands and allowing prosecutors and courts 
to make it up. 
The law before us today is such a law. Before holding a lawful permanent resident alien 
like James Dimaya subject to removal for having committed a crime, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act requires a judge to determine that the ordinary case of the alien's crime of 
conviction involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used. But what does that mean? 
Just take the crime at issue in this case, California burglary, which applies to everyone from 
armed home intruders to door-to-door salesmen peddling shady products. How, on that vast 
spectrum, is anyone supposed to locate the ordinary case and say whether it includes a 
substantial risk of physical force? The truth is, no one knows. The law's silence leaves judges to 
their intuitions and the people to their fate. In my judgment, the Constitution demands more. 
*** 
Consider first the doctrine's due process underpinnings. The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee that “life, liberty, or property” may not be taken “without due process of 
law.” That means the government generally may not deprive a person of those rights without 
affording him the benefit of (at least) those “customary procedures to which freemen were 
entitled by the old law of England.” Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Admittedly, some have 
suggested that the Due Process Clause does less work than this, allowing the government to 
deprive people of their liberty through whatever procedures (or lack of them) the government's 
current laws may tolerate. But in my view the weight of the historical evidence shows that the 
clause sought to ensure that the people's rights are never any less secure against governmental 
invasion than they were at common law. And many more students of the Constitution besides—
from Justice Story to Justice Scalia—have agreed that this view best represents the original 
understanding of our own Due Process Clause.  
Perhaps the most basic of due process's customary protections is the demand of fair 
notice. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Note, 
Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 543 (2009) (“From the inception of Western 
culture, fair notice has been recognized as an essential element of the rule of law”). Criminal 
indictments at common law had to provide “precise and sufficient certainty” about the charges 
involved. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 301 (1769) (Blackstone). 
Unless an “offence [was] set forth with clearness and certainty,” the indictment risked being held 
void in court. Id., at 302 (emphasis deleted); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 25, §§ 99, 
100, pp. 244–245 (2d ed. 1726) (“[I]t seems to have been anciently the common practice, where 
an indictment appeared to be [in]sufficient, either for its uncertainty or the want of proper legal 
words, not to put the defendant to answer it”). 
*** 
The requirement of fair notice applied to statutes too. Blackstone illustrated the point 
with a case involving a statute that made “stealing sheep, or other cattle” a felony. 1 Blackstone 
88 (emphasis deleted). Because the term “cattle” embraced a good deal more then than it does 
now (including wild animals, no less), the court held the statute failed to provide adequate notice 
about what it did and did not cover—and so the court treated the term “cattle” as a nullity. Ibid. 
All of which, Blackstone added, had the salutary effect of inducing the legislature to reenter the 
field and make itself clear by passing a new law extending the statute to “bulls, cows, oxen,” and 
more “by name.” Ibid. 
This tradition of courts refusing to apply vague statutes finds parallels in early American 
practice as well. In The Enterprise, 8 F.Cas. 732 (No. 4,499) (C.C.N.Y. 1810), for example, 
Justice Livingston found that a statute setting the circumstances in which a ship may enter a port 
during an embargo was too vague to be applied, concluding that “the court had better pass” the 
statutory terms by “as unintelligible and useless” rather than “put on them, at great uncertainty, a 
very harsh signification, and one which the legislature may never have designed.” Id., at 735. In 
United States v. Sharp, 27 F.Cas. 1041 (No. 16,264) (C.C.Pa.1815), Justice Washington 
confronted a statute which prohibited seamen from making a “revolt.” Id., at 1043. But he was 
unable to determine the meaning of this provision “by any authority ... either in the common, 
admiralty, or civil law.” Ibid. As a result, he declined to “recommend to the jury, to find the 
prisoners guilty of making, or endeavouring to make a revolt, however strong the evidence may 
be.” Ibid. 
Nor was the concern with vague laws confined to the most serious offenses like capital 
crimes. Courts refused to apply vague laws in criminal cases involving relatively modest 
penalties. See, e.g., McJunkins v. State, 10 Ind. 140, 145 (1858). They applied the doctrine in 
civil cases too. See, e.g., Drake v. Drake, 15 N.C. 110, 115 (1833); Commonwealth v. Bank of 
Pennsylvania, 3 Watts & Serg. 173, 177 (Pa.1842). As one court put it, “all laws” “ought to be 
expressed in such a manner as that its meaning may be unambiguous, and in such language as 
may be readily understood by those upon whom it is to operate.” McConvill v. Mayor and 
Aldermen of Jersey City, 39 N.J.L. 38, 42 (1876). “ ‘It is impossible ... to dissent from the 
doctrine of Lord Coke, that acts of parliament ought to be plainly and clearly, and not cunningly 
and darkly penned, especially in penal matters.’ ” Id., at 42–43. 
 
Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179 (2019). 
Appellant Lawrence Daddario challenges his conviction and sentence of life in prison for 
aggravated child molestation for having sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old daughter, which 
resulted in a very painful and potentially life-threatening childbirth approximately nine months 
later. Appellant does not dispute having sexual intercourse with his daughter but claims that he 
committed only child molestation, not aggravated child molestation, because aggravated child 
molestation requires an act that “physically injures” the child, OCGA § 16-6-4 (c), and 
pregnancy and childbirth usually are not considered to be physical injuries. He also claims that 
his aggravated child molestation conviction violates due process, because the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague regarding whether an act of child molestation that causes a child under 
the age of 16 to endure childbirth can “physically injure[ ]” the child.  
*** 
As explained below, in every prosecution for aggravated child molestation based on 
physical injury to the child, the State must present evidence sufficient to enable a rational jury to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an act of child molestation and that 
the act proximately caused physical injury to the child. Appellant asks this Court to hold that 
evidence related to a resulting pregnancy or childbirth is never legally sufficient under Georgia 
law to support a jury finding that an act of child molestation caused physical injury to the child, 
while the State asks us to hold that evidence of a pregnancy or childbirth alone is always 
sufficient to support such a finding. We instead hold that whether an act of molestation 
proximately caused physical injury to the child victim is a question of fact to be decided by the 
jury based on the evidence presented at trial and is not dictated by per se rules like the ones 
sought by Appellant and the State, which do not appear in the text of the aggravated child 
molestation statute. And we hold that the evidence here – which showed that Appellant’s act of 
child molestation proximately caused his daughter to endure a very painful and physically 
traumatic childbirth nine months later – is legally sufficient to support a jury finding of the 
physical injury element of aggravated child molestation. We also reject Appellant’s claim that 
the aggravated child molestation statute violates due process because it is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to his conduct with his 14-year-old daughter...Accordingly, we affirm 
Appellant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated child molestation. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed as 
follows regarding Appellant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation. Appellant’s daughter, 
S.D., was born in April 2000, and she lived with Appellant and her two brothers, who were 
around her same age. 
When S.D. was in the fifth grade, an elementary school teacher saw Appellant kiss S.D. 
on the lips in a manner that the teacher had never seen between a parent and child and that 
“[f]reaked out” and “[d]isgusted” the teacher. In September 2014, at the beginning of eighth 
grade, Appellant pulled S.D. out of school, ostensibly for homeschooling. By then, S.D. could 
not remember how long her father had been having sexual intercourse with her, but she said it 
seemed like it had been “[e]very day” for her “whole life.” Appellant did not wear a condom 
when he had sexual intercourse with S.D. He told her that it was right for them to have sex with 
each other, that no one would think that it was “weird,” and that she should have sex with him 
because she was too “ugly” ever to have a boyfriend. 
In early November 2014, Appellant impregnated S.D. He threatened to kill her if she told 
anyone that he was the father. S.D. wanted to get an abortion, but Appellant said no. In mid-
January 2015, Appellant took S.D. to a faith-based pregnancy resource center that did not 
provide abortion services. A week later, a sonographer at the resource center performed an 
ultrasound on S.D. and determined that S.D. was around 12 weeks pregnant. 
The resource center notified the sheriff’s office, because S.D. was only 14 years old. The 
ensuing investigation uncovered evidence that Appellant neglected S.D. and her brothers, and in 
March 2015, Appellant was arrested for second degree cruelty to children. The local Department 
of Family and Children Services took S.D. and her brothers into custody, and the juvenile court 
appointed a CASA volunteer for the children. 
S.D. was put into foster care, and in mid-May 2015, she finally broke down and told her 
foster mother that Appellant was the baby’s father. The CASA volunteer talked to S.D. several 
times about the disclosure, but it was very hard for S.D. to share anything about what had 
happened to her. In June 2015, the CASA visited Appellant at the jail to get more information 
from him about what happened to S.D. so that the CASA could better help S.D. During the 
course of the conversation, which the jail recorded, Appellant admitted to the CASA that he had 
sexual intercourse with S.D. more than once. 
In early August 2015, S.D. started having contractions, and her foster mother took her to 
the hospital. After several hours, they were sent home, because S.D.’s contractions were starting 
and stopping too far apart for her to be admitted to the hospital. That evening, S.D. awoke in the 
middle of the night and told her foster mother that the baby was coming. S.D. sat down in a 
recliner, and the baby suddenly emerged still enclosed in the amniotic sac. S.D.’s foster mother 
called 911, and an ambulance soon arrived to take S.D. and the baby to the hospital. 
According to S.D.’s foster mother, the doctor later told her that the reason the baby emerged so 
quickly was because it was born inside an intact amniotic sac. S.D.’s foster mother explained: “If 
the sac doesn’t break, they more or less just come out. The downside to that is, it tears you all 
apart.” When asked if she saw any kind of injury to S.D., S.D.’s foster mother said, “You 
couldn’t help but see it,” because S.D.’s vaginal area was severely torn, and S.D. was bleeding 
profusely. S.D.’s foster mother described the scene as “traumatic,” stating that she “had never 
seen so much blood,” and she was told that if she had tried to drive S.D. to the hospital instead of 
calling an ambulance, S.D. “would have bled to death.” S.D. was asked at trial if she had any 
tearing or needed any stitches after the baby was born, and she replied, “The lady at the hospital 
said it was like plastic surgery.” She also testified that she experienced a great deal of pain for 
weeks after the birth. S.D.’s foster mother confirmed that S.D. had to have numerous stitches, 
and that S.D. “had pain for about six weeks” after the birth, for which S.D. was given 
prescription pain medication. 
DNA samples were taken from the baby at the hospital. DNA testing later confirmed that 
Appellant was the baby’s father. 
On August 12, 2015, Appellant was indicted for aggravated child molestation, incest, 
statutory rape, and two counts of second degree cruelty to children. The aggravated child 
molestation count alleged that in early November 2014, Appellant 
did perform an immoral and indecent act with [S.D.], a child under the age of 16 
years, in that said accused did have sex with [S.D.] with the intent to arouse and 
satisfy the sexual desires of said accused and said child, said act resulting in 
physical injury to said child in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4. 
Appellant filed a combined motion to quash and special demurrer, asserting among other 
things that the aggravated child molestation count was defective due to a lack of specificity. The 
trial court held a hearing, but before the court issued a ruling, the State obtained a superseding 
indictment. The superseding indictment contained identical charges, except that the aggravated 
child molestation count specified that the “sex” was “sexual intercourse,” which resulted in 
“physical injury to said child by impregnating her causing said child to endure childbirth.” 
Appellant filed a second motion to quash and special demurrer. The trial court held a hearing, 
and Appellant argued “on statutory interpretation grounds ... that the injury element of 
aggravated child molestation cannot be proven through pregnancy and childbirth.” He also 
argued that the aggravated child molestation statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
him, because a person of ordinary intelligence who read the aggravated child molestation statute 
“would not have thought at that time that childbirth or pregnancy would constitute an injury 
under the ... statute.” The trial court denied the motion to quash and special demurrer. 
*** 
Appellant was tried from August 15 to 19, 2016. At the close of the evidence, the trial 
court instructed the jury on the statutory elements of child molestation and aggravated child 
molestation as well as the language of the aggravated child molestation charge in the indictment. 
The court told the jury that the State had the burden to prove “every material allegation of the 
criminal charges and every essential element of the crimes charged,” and that the jury must 
decide whether the State proved that Appellant committed the charged offenses in the manner 
specified in the indictment. The court also told the jury that for the offense of aggravated child 
molestation, the State “must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged child victim was 
physically injured by the act of child molestation,” and that “[t]he element of injury required for 
aggravated child molestation can be proven through evidence that the child experienced pain 
during the crime, even without corroborating medical evidence.” The court further instructed the 
jury that “[p]regnancy and childbirth may constitute the physical injury required as an element of 
aggravated child molestation provided you, the jury, find it to be sufficient by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convince you that the alleged victim suffered physical injury caused by an 
act of child molestation.” (Emphasis supplied.) 
The jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 
serve life in prison for aggravated child molestation and a total of 20 years consecutive for the 
two cruelty to children convictions. The court merged the incest and statutory rape counts into 
the aggravated child molestation conviction. 
Appellant claims that his conviction for aggravated child molestation is invalid as a 
matter of law, because a pregnancy or childbirth – no matter how painful, and no matter how 
much damage it does to the child victim’s body – is not a physical injury within the meaning of 
Georgia’s aggravated child molestation statute. In a related argument, he claims that the 
aggravated child molestation statute is unconstitutionally vague regarding whether an act of child 
molestation that causes a child under the age of 16 to endure childbirth can “physically injure[ ]” 
her. OCGA § 16-6-4 (c). Both claims lack merit, as they erroneously conflate a statutory element 
of aggravated child molestation with specific mechanisms of injury. 
In Georgia, all crimes are defined by statute, see OCGA § 16-1-4, and every crime has as 
elements an actus reus and a mens rea, see OCGA § 16-2-1 (a) (“A ‘crime’ is a violation of a 
statute of this state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or 
criminal negligence.”). See also In re Jefferson, 283 Ga. 216, 218 (2008) (“‘Like all crimes, 
[criminal] contempt has an act requirement (actus reus) and a mental component (mens rea).’” 
(citation omitted)). In addition, crimes are often defined to include as elements the presence or 
absence of certain “attendant circumstances.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 
1.2 (c), 6.3 (b) (3d ed. Oct. 2018 update) (hereinafter “LaFave”). See Bowman v. State, 258 Ga. 
829, 831 & n.4 (1989). For instance, “bigamy requires a previous marriage, [and] statutory rape 
that the girl be under age.” 1 LaFave § 1.2 (c). See OCGA §§ 16-6-3 (defining statutory rape), 
16-6-20 (defining bigamy). Crimes are sometimes defined to require, as an additional element, 
that the conduct produce some “particular result.” 1 LaFave § 1.2 (b). The most obvious example 
is murder, which requires that the conduct result in death. See id. § 1.2 (c); Baker v. State, 250 
Ga. 671, 672 (1983) (“[I]t is an essential element of the crime of murder to show that a death 
occurred ....”). “The totality of these various items – conduct, mental fault, plus attendant 
circumstances and specified result when required by the definition of a crime – may be said to 
constitute the ‘elements’ of the crime.” 1 LaFave § 1.2 (c). 
OCGA § 16-6-4 defines the elements of both child molestation and aggravated child 
molestation. OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) says in relevant part: “A person commits the offense of 
child molestation when such person ... [d]oes any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of 
or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires 
of either the child or the person ....” And OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) says: “A person commits the 
offense of aggravated child molestation when such person commits an offense of child 
molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy.” 
Thus, for both crimes, OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) identifies the actus reus as “any immoral or 
indecent act” and the mens rea as a specific “intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of 
either the child or the person.” See Hill v. Williams, 296 Ga. 753, 757 n.4 (2015) (discussing 
actus reus and mens rea elements of child molestation and aggravated child molestation); 
McCord v. State, 248 Ga. 765, 766 (1982) (same for child molestation). OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) 
also specifies the presence of two attendant circumstances as required elements of both child 
molestation and aggravated child molestation: that the immoral or indecent act be done “to or in 
the presence of or with any child,” and that the child be “under the age of 16 years.” See Hill, 
296 Ga. at 757 (describing these attendant circumstances as “essential elements” of both crimes). 
Appellant does not dispute that his having sexual intercourse with his daughter amounts to child 
molestation. 
Child molestation does not require as an element that any particular result flow from the 
immoral or indecent act. Aggravated child molestation, by contrast, requires as an additional 
element that the immoral or indecent act produce a particular result. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (c). 
Specifically, the act of molestation must “physically injure[ ] the child.” Id. See also Hill, 296 
Ga. at 757 n.4 (noting this element of aggravated child molestation). In other words, an act of 
child molestation becomes aggravated child molestation when it “physically injures the child.” 
OCGA § 16-6-4 (c). 
Appellant argues here, as he did in the trial court, that as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the physical injury element of aggravated child molestation cannot be established 
through proof regarding childbirth. But by its terms, OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) requires only an act of 
child molestation that “physically injures” the child; the statute does not specify all the possible 
mechanisms of injury. And the phrase “physically injures” is synonymous with the phrase 
“causes physical injury.” See Hall v. Wheeling, 282 Ga. 86, 86 (2007) (equating phrase 
“physically injures” in aggravated child molestation statute with phrase “causing physical 
injury”). See also, e.g., Holloway v. State, 278 Ga. App. 709, 714 (2006) (same). Thus, the only 
question presented here is whether the State offered evidence at trial that Appellant’s act of 
sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old daughter caused her to endure circumstances of childbirth 
so painful and traumatic to her body that a jury could conclude that she was physically injured. 
To answer that question, we look to the evidence the State offered to show that S.D. suffered 
pain and physical trauma, and we ask whether Appellant’s criminal conduct caused it. 
The commission of a crime requires the joint operation of the actus reus and the mens 
rea, see OCGA § 16-2-1 (a), as well as the concurrence of any attendant circumstances that are 
defined as elements of the crime. See 1 LaFave § 6.3 (b). But the same is not true for elements 
that require a particular result. Where a crime is defined in terms of the outcome, there can be “a 
time lag between the conduct and the result.” Id. The connection that criminal law requires 
between the conduct and the result is proximate cause. 
Georgia is a proximate cause state. When another meaning is not indicated by specific 
definition or context, the term “cause” is customarily interpreted in almost all legal 
contexts to mean “proximate cause” – “[t]hat which, in a natural and continuous 
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred.” 
State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 648 (2010) (citation omitted). See also 1 LaFave § 1.2 (b) 
(describing as one of the “basic premises which underlie the whole of the Anglo-American 
substantive criminal law” the proposition that “as to those crimes which require not only some 
forbidden conduct but also some particular result of that conduct, the conduct must be the ‘legal 
cause’ (often called ‘proximate cause’) of the result”). Thus, it is not necessary for a criminal 
statute to set out every possible way in which the prohibited conduct can cause the specified 
result. 
Here, the indictment charged Appellant with aggravated child molestation by alleging 
that he had sexual intercourse with his underage daughter, which resulted in physical injury to 
his daughter related to the delivery of her child. The evidence the State offered at trial was 
sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the physical injury element of the 
charge. Specifically, the State presented evidence that Appellant’s act of sexual intercourse with 
his 14-year-old daughter proximately caused her physical injury by showing that S.D. suffered 
severe tearing of her vaginal area and life-threatening blood loss during childbirth, that S.D. 
required so many stitches afterward that it looked like “plastic surgery,” and that S.D. suffered a 
great deal of pain not only during the delivery itself, but for the next six weeks, for which she 
was given prescription pain medication. See Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4, 8 (2004) (explaining that 
under OCGA § 16-6-4 (c), evidence of pain is sufficient to support a jury finding that an act of 
child molestation physically injured the victim); Massey v. State, 346 Ga. App. 233, 235 (2018) 
(holding same). 
Appellant’s act of unprotected sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old daughter S.D., “in 
a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produce[d] 
injury” to S.D. in the form of a childbirth with severe tearing and potentially life-threatening 
blood loss, as well as pain during the delivery and for the next six weeks that was serious enough 
to warrant treatment with prescription pain medication, none of which would have occurred but 
for Appellant’s immoral and indecent act of molestation. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 646 (citation and 
punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that his conviction and sentence for 
aggravated child molestation are invalid as a matter of statutory interpretation fails. See id. at 
654 (“Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal 
(or, in the civil context, tortious) conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen 
intervening cause.”). 
Appellant also claims that his conviction for aggravated child molestation violates due 
process, because OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) is unconstitutionally vague regarding whether an act of 
child molestation that causes a child under the age of 16 to endure childbirth can “physically 
injure[ ]” her. We disagree. 
The constitutional guarantee of due process prohibits the government from “taking away 
someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary 
people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 578 U.S (2015).  
As explained above, it is a basic premise of American criminal law that when a criminal 
statute defines a particular result as an element of a crime, the connection required between the 
prohibited conduct and the specified result is proximate cause. Thus, the statute need not set out 
every step in the chain of causation between the conduct and the result. Moreover, a person of 
common intelligence would understand that an act of child molestation that results in the 
pregnancy of a 14-year-old girl could, at the least, cause her to sustain physical injury in the 
event of a painful and traumatic childbirth such as the one discussed above in Division 2 (a), as 
contemplated by the physical injury requirement of the aggravated child molestation statute. 
Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that his aggravated child molestation conviction violates due 
process because OCGA § 16-6-4 (c) is void for vagueness as applied to him also fails. 
 
Entry of Appearance 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. What is an Entry of Appearance? 
2. What must go in it? 
3. What is the signature block? 
4. What  must go in it? 
5. What happens if you do not file an Entry of Appearance? 
6. In what time frame should you file an Entry of Appearance? 
 
Ga. R. Unif. Super. Ct. Rule 4.2 
No attorney shall appear in that capacity before a superior court until the attorney has entered an 
appearance by filing a signed entry of appearance form or by filing a signed pleading in a 
pending action. An entry of appearance and all pleadings shall state: 
(1) the style and number of the case; 
(2) the identity of the party for whom the appearance is made; and 
(3) the name, assigned state bar number, current office address, telephone number, fax 
number, and e-mail address of the attorney (the attorney's e-mail address shall be the e-mail 
address registered with the State Bar of Georgia). 
The filing of any pleading shall contain the information required by this paragraph and shall 
constitute an appearance by the person(s) signing such pleading, unless otherwise specified by 
the court. The filing of a signed entry of appearance alone shall not be a substitute for the filing 
of an answer or any other required pleading. The filing of an indictment or accusation shall 
constitute an entry of appearance by the district attorney. 
Any attorney who has been admitted to practice in this state but who fails to maintain active 
membership in good standing in the State Bar of Georgia and who makes or files any appearance 
or pleading in a superior court of this state while not in good standing shall be subject to the 
contempt powers of the court. 
Within forty-eight hours after being retained, an attorney shall mail to the court and opposing 
counsel or file with the court the entry of his appearance in the pending matter. Failure to timely 




Weeks v. State, 260 Ga. App. 129 (2003). 
Kevin Weeks appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to armed 
robbery and aggravated assault, arguing that the plea was not valid because... his 
attorney...lacked the authority to represent him because he never formally entered an appearance. 
Finding that ... Weeks was legitimately represented by competent counsel, we affirm. 
After sentence is pronounced, whether to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea lies within the 
trial court's sound discretion, and we review the trial court's decision for manifest abuse of that 
discretion.  
*** 
Weeks pled guilty to two counts of a four-count indictment and received concurrent ten-
year sentences. In exchange for pleading guilty, the State nolle prossed the other charges. Shortly 
after the court imposed sentence, Weeks moved pro se to withdraw his plea...Weeks also argued 
that, based on procedural irregularities in the appointment of his counsel, he was technically 
unrepresented. At the hearing, the trial court ruled against Weeks. 
*** 
Weeks argues that because (attorney) never filed a written entry of appearance, (attorney) 
lacked the authority to represent him and, therefore, Weeks was not actually represented by 
counsel during his guilty plea, rendering it invalid. This contention is wholly without merit. 
USCR 4.2 states that no attorney can represent his client in court until he “has entered an 
appearance by filing a signed entry of appearance form or by filing a signed pleading in a 
pending action.” (Emphasis supplied.) As (attorney) filed several signed, pre-trial motions on 
behalf of Weeks, he satisfied the requirements of USCR 4.2. A formal written entry of 
appearance was unnecessary. The trial court did not err in its ruling on this issue. 
 
Certificate of Service 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. What is a certificate of service? 
2. When do you have to use one? 
3. What information should be provided in a certificate of service? 
4. In what ways does a certificate of service help you as an attorney? 
5. When you sign a certificate of service, what are you representing you have done? 
 
OCGA § 17-1-1 
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law or by order of the court, every pleading subsequent to the 
entry of the initial indictment or accusation upon which the defendant is to be tried; every order 
not entered in open court; every written motion, unless it is one as to which a hearing ex parte is 
authorized; and every written notice, demand, and similar paper shall be served upon each party. 
 
(b) 
(1) Where service is required to be made, the service shall be made upon the party's 
attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him 
at his last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the 
court. 
(2) As used in this subsection, delivering a copy means: 
(A) Handing it to the attorney or to the party; 
(B) Leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or 
(C) If the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then residing therein. 
(3) Service by mail shall be deemed complete upon mailing. 
(c) All original papers, copies of which are required to be served upon parties, shall be filed with 
the court either before service or immediately thereafter. 
(d) The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court shall be made by filing them with the 
clerk of the court unless the judge permits the papers to be filed with him, in which event he shall 
note thereon the filing date and transmit them to the office of the clerk. 
(e)  
(1) Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of his employee, written 
admission, affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of 
service shall not affect the validity of service. 
(2) When an attorney executes a certificate, which shall be attached to the original of the 
paper to be served, certifying as to the service thereof, the certificate shall be taken as 
prima-facie proof of such service. 
(3) The certificate of service provided for in this subsection shall read substantially as 
follows: 
--Certificate of Service-- 
 
I do certify that (copy) (copies) hereof have been furnished to (here insert name or names) by 
(delivery) (mail) this _____ day of _____, _____. 
Attorney 
 
Hudson v. State, 311 Ga. App. 206 (2011). 
A Fulton County grand jury indicted David Hudson for two counts of aggravated sodomy 
(OCGA § 16–6–2(a)(2)), one count of sexual battery (OCGA § 16–6–22.1(b)), one count of 
battery (OCGA § 16–5–23.1(a)), and one count of reckless conduct (OCGA § 16–5–60). Hudson 
appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal, arguing that the 
trial court erroneously found that his speedy trial demand did not satisfy the statutory pleading 
requirements of OCGA § 17–7–170. We agree and conclude that Hudson's demand for speedy 
trial was properly pled as a separate, distinct, and individual document. Accordingly, we reverse 
the trial court's order and remand this case for further proceedings. 
This appeal presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Snow v. State, 229 Ga.App. 
532 (1997). 
The record shows that on June 23, 2009, Hudson was indicted in the Superior Court of 
Fulton County. On August 6, 2009, Hudson filed his demand for a speedy trial, together with ten 
other pleadings and motions upon a single form certificate of service. On September 17, 2009, 
the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss Hudson's demand for failure to comply with 
the pleading requirements of OCGA § 17–7–170. Thereafter, on December 30, 2009, Hudson 
filed a motion for discharge and acquittal for failure to be tried within the time frame set forth in 
OCGA § 17–7–170. The trial court denied Hudson's motion on April 16, 2010, finding that it 
was meritless in light of the prior dismissal of Hudson's speedy trial demand. The instant appeal 
followed. 
Hudson challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal, as 
well as the underlying dismissal of his speedy trial demand, arguing that his demand satisfied the 
pleading requirements of OCGA § 17–7–170(a) and that the trial court's prior ruling to the 
contrary was error. We agree. 
OCGA § 17–7–170(a) pertinently sets forth the required form of a statutory speedy trial 
demand: 
...A demand for speedy trial filed pursuant to this Code section shall be filed as a 
separate, distinct, and individual document and shall not be a part of any other 
pleading or document. Such demand shall clearly be titled “Demand for Speedy 
Trial”; reference this Code section within the pleading; and identify the indictment 
number or accusation number for which such demand is being made.... 
As noted above, the record reflects that Hudson filed 11 different documents on August 
6, 2009, all of which were listed upon a single certificate of service. One of the eleven 
documents filed included Hudson's statutory demand for a speedy trial. Notwithstanding the 
absence of a separate certificate of service attached directly to Hudson's speedy trial demand 
filing, see generally OCGA § 17–1–1(e)(2), Hudson's demand was otherwise its own separate, 
distinct, and individual document that was not a part of any of the ten additional documents filed 
on August 6, 2009. See OCGA § 17–7–170(a). Compare Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 445, 
449(2)(b) (2010) (concluding defendant's speedy trial demand was not a separate, distinct, and 
individual document where it was contained within the defendant's motion to dismiss).  
Moreover, Hudson's speedy trial demand complied with the additional pleading 
requirements of OCGA § 17–7–170(a) insofar as the self-contained document clearly bears the 
title “DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL,” references OCGA § 17–7–170(a), and identifies 
the indictment number for which such demand is being made. 
We therefore conclude that, contrary to the trial court's ruling otherwise, Hudson's speedy 
trial demand complied with the pleading requirements as contemplated by OCGA § 17–7–
170(a). Consequently, the trial court erred in dismissing Hudson's speedy trial demand. In light 
of this error, we hereby reverse the trial court's order denying Hudson's motion for discharge and 
acquittal and remand this case for further proceedings to determine whether Hudson's statutory 
speedy trial demand satisfied all the remaining requirements of OCGA § 17–7–170. 
 
Matter of Moore, 300 Ga. 407 (2016). 
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Review Panel's report, recommending 
that Alvis Melvin Moore (State Bar No. 518375) be suspended for six months, with conditions 
on reinstatement. 
This matter stems from a grievance filed by a superior court judge after discovering that 
Moore, who was representing a criminal defendant in her court, had failed to serve the District 
Attorney with defensive pleadings, had falsely stated in certificates of service that the District 
Attorney had been served, and had misrepresented his communications with the District 
Attorney. After an investigation, the State Bar filed a Formal Complaint, alleging that Moore, 
who was admitted to the Bar in 1994, violated Bar Rules 3.3 (a) (1), 4.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the 
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4–102 (d). The Formal Complaint did 
not set forth a recommendation of discipline, but asked that Moore be “appropriately 
disciplined.” Moore filed an answer and denied that he had failed to serve the District Attorney. 
Instead, he explained his belief that he was entitled to rely on the word of the Clerk of Court that 
a copy of his filings would be hand delivered to the District Attorney by the clerk's office, and 
thus his certificates of service were accurate. Moore also denied making any misrepresentation to 
the trial court. 
Following an evidentiary hearing at which Moore was the only witness, Moore filed a 
petition for voluntary discipline in which he admitted the facts he had previously denied. 
However, the special master, Shelby Outlaw, rejected the petition for voluntary discipline, which 
sought only a reprimand by either the Investigative Panel or the Review Panel. Instead, the 
special master issued her report and recommendation, finding the following facts: Moore was 
retained to represent a defendant in a felony drug case in Hall County Superior Court. During his 
representation, Moore filed an entry of appearance and several motions, but failed to serve the 
District Attorney's office. On one of his motions he failed to attach a certificate of service and on 
the others he attached certificates of service that falsely represented that he had served the 
District Attorney. Even after the trial court judge admonished Moore at a hearing that his filings 
were not proper because he failed to serve the District Attorney, Moore filed another pleading 
with a certificate of service falsely stating that he had served the District Attorney by hand. 
Additionally, Moore informed the trial court at a hearing that the District Attorney's office had 
told him that a confidential informant would not be made available, despite the fact that Moore 
had no communications with the District Attorney's office about the informant's availability. The 
special master found that Moore's actions were detrimental to his client's interests, that Moore 
adamantly and unreasonably maintained throughout the hearing that he had done nothing wrong, 
and that he never expressed remorse or accepted any responsibility for the consequences of his 
actions. The special master recommended an indefinite suspension and that, as a condition of 
reinstatement, Moore undergo a physical and mental evaluation and be certified as fit to practice 
law. 
Moore sought review by the Review Panel, but the Review Panel adopted the special 
master's factual findings and conclusions that Moore violated Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 8.4 (a) (4), and 
recommended a six-month suspension with reinstatement conditioned on Moore's participation 
in the Bar's law practice management program and on his providing a detailed psychological 
evaluation showing that he is competent to practice law. 
Moore has filed exceptions to the Review Panel's report and continues to assert that he 
made no false statements regarding service on the District Attorney, but that he reasonably relied 
on the clerk to place a service copy in the District Attorney's box and argues that he did not 
knowingly violate any rules. 
We agree with the Review Panel that Moore's refusal to express remorse or acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his conduct is an aggravating factor, but also note that Moore's conduct 
does not appear to be reflective of a pattern of disregard for the legal system. Compare In the 
Matter of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737 (2016). Rather, we find that his lack of any prior disciplinary 
history is a mitigating factor. 
Having carefully considered the record and prior case law, we do not believe that a six-
month suspension is the appropriate sanction. Instead, we believe that a one-year suspension is 
warranted. See In the Matter of Nowell, 297 Ga. 785 (2015) (two-month suspension where 
lawyer intentionally, and with dishonest motive, gave false testimony in two depositions, but 
self-reported misconduct and corrected false testimony); In the Matter of Lang, 292 Ga. 894 
(2013) (one-year suspension for misuse of trust account and for prolonged effort to deceive client 
and opposing counsel, but where substantial mitigating circumstances were present); In the 
Matter of Wright, 291 Ga. 841 (2012) (public reprimand and six-month suspension where 
attorney made false statements to two tribunals and refused to admit wrongdoing). 
Accordingly, we hereby direct that Alvis Melvin Moore be suspended from the practice 
of law in the State of Georgia for one year, effective as of the date of this opinion. Moore's 
reinstatement shall be conditioned upon his providing a detailed, written evaluation by a licensed 
psychologist or psychiatrist certifying that he is mentally competent to practice law. 
Additionally, he must arrange for an evaluation by the State Bar's Law Practice Management 
Program, and, within six months of reinstatement, implement its recommendations. Moore is 
reminded of his duties under Rule 4–219 (c). 
At the conclusion of the suspension imposed in this matter, if Moore wishes to seek 
reinstatement, he must submit a petition for reinstatement to the Review Panel showing 
compliance with the conditions for reinstatement imposed in connection with the one-year 
suspension. Upon receipt of the petition for reinstatement, the Review Panel will review it and 
any objections by the State Bar's Office of General Counsel, and make a recommendation to the 
Supreme Court, and this Court will issue an order granting or denying reinstatement. 
One-year suspension with conditions. 
 
Williams v. State, 201 Ga. App. 384 (1991). 
Defendant Michael W. Williams appeals his conviction for selling cocaine. This case arises from 
the alleged sale of cocaine to an undercover Chatham County police officer. The officer to whom 
the drugs were allegedly sold testified that on the night of July 5, 1989, he was working 
undercover when he was waved down by Bobby V. Weathers, who was originally a co-
defendant, who asked him what he needed. When the officer responded that he was looking for a 
20, referring to $20.00 worth of cocaine, Weathers told him to pull over. The officer parked his 
automobile almost directly across from a red Chevrolet, in which the defendant was seated. 
Weathers talked to the defendant and returned to the officer and asked “are you the man,” that is, 
are you a police officer, which the officer denied. The defendant was then waved over to the 
officer's car by Weathers, and the defendant looked at the officer and said “[t]hat's the man,” at 
which point he backed away from the officer's car. The officer again assured Weathers that he 
was not “the man.” Weathers obtained an object from the defendant. After further deliberations, 
Weathers told the officer he would lay the object on the curb and the officer could put his money 
down beside it. The officer testified he laid down a $20 bill, the serial number of which had been 
recorded for later identification, and took the object, which was later determined to be cocaine. 
The officer left the scene and the “take down” team moved into the area and arrested the 
defendant and Weathers. The officer who arrested the defendant testified the defendant had 
$1,100 in his left front pocket, including the $20 bill the first officer had left in exchange for the 
cocaine. 
*** 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a 
continuance based upon the failure of the State to comply with the mandate of OCGA § 17-7-211 
and supply him with a copy of scientific reports identifying the substance defendant was charged 
with selling.  
The question remains whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying the 
defendant's motion for continuance and by allowing the crime lab report and testimony relating 
thereto to be admitted at trial. Error must be shown to be harmful before it will be deemed to be 
reversible error. Rutledge v. State, 152 Ga.App. 755(1)(a) (1979). Defendant filed a motion 
seeking a copy of all scientific tests on December 10, 1989. On February 9, 1990, a certificate of 
service was filed by the State in which the State certifies that a copy of the indictment, the crime 
lab reports in question, and all Brady material were mailed to defendant on that same day. The 
trial of this case began on August 29, 1990. Defense counsel stated that he did not receive a copy 
of the crime lab reports until the day trial began. 
OCGA § 17-7-211 provides in pertinent part: “(b) In all criminal trials, felony and misdemeanor, 
the defendant shall be entitled to have a complete copy of any written scientific reports in the 
possession of the prosecution which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant 
by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal.... If the scientific report is in the possession 
of or available to the prosecuting attorney, he must comply with this Code section at least ten 
days prior to the trial of the case. (c) Failure by the prosecution to furnish the defendant with a 
copy of any written scientific report, when a proper and timely written demand has been made by 
the defendant, shall result in such report being excluded and suppressed from evidence in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief or in rebuttal.” (Indentions omitted.) 
In Rodriguez v. State, 180 Ga.App. 272(2) (1986), this court had an opportunity to rule upon a 
case involving a factual situation similar to the one presented by this case. In that case the 
defendant contended that the trial court had erred in allowing testimony concerning a crime lab 
report because that report had not been provided to defendant as required by OCGA § 17-7-211. 
The record in that case contained a certificate of service by the assistant district attorney 
indicating that service of the report had been made on defendant's counsel on October 8, 1984. 
The trial in that case commenced on December 3, 1984. Id. at 272(2). We held that “[p]roof of 
service may be made by certificate of service of an attorney or other proof satisfactory to the 
court, and when an attorney executes a certificate of service, it shall be prima facie proof of such 
service. OCGA § 17-1-1(e)(1) and (2). In this case, as in Rodriguez, the assistant district 
attorney's certificate of service establishes prima facie proof that a scientific report was 
furnished. Furthermore, because defense counsel stated that he had seen the crime lab reports 
when he was invited to review the State's file in this case, there was no resulting surprise or 
prejudice to defendant from the introduction of this evidence. Hence, the trial court did not 
commit reversible error by denying defendant's motion for a continuance and allowing the crime 
reports and testimony concerning those reports to be admitted at trial.  
 
Ferguson v. Freeman, 282 Ga. 180 (2007). 
Charles E. Ferguson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to contest his pre-trial 
confinement. The habeas corpus court denied relief in an order entered August 9, 2006. The 
record contains a notice of appeal from that order with a certificate of service dated August 25, 
2006, but the notice was marked filed on September 25, 2006. The notice of appeal from the 
August 9 order had been returned to Ferguson by the habeas corpus court clerk with an undated 
form stating that the notice of appeal was not filed because it lacked a designation of the 
appellate court to which the appeal was directed and did not indicate whether there would be 
transcripts filed with the record. Ferguson returned that notice of appeal to the habeas corpus 
court clerk with a cover letter dated September 7, 2006, pointing out that the notice of appeal he 
had originally sent was adequate. The habeas corpus court clerk filed the returned notice of 
appeal on September 25, 2006.  
If the notice of appeal marked filed on September 25, 2006, were to be considered as 
filed on that date, it would be untimely since it would have been filed outside the 30-day period 
prescribed by OCGA § 5-6-37, and the appeal from the August 9 order denying habeas corpus 
relief would have to be dismissed because a proper and timely-filed notice of appeal is an 
absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court. Gulledge v. State, 276 Ga. 
740, 741 (2003). However, the peculiar circumstances of this case lead us to the conclusion that 
the notice of appeal must be considered timely filed. We first note that the habeas corpus court 
clerk's action in returning the notice of appeal unfiled violated this Court's holding in Hughes v. 
Sikes, 273 Ga. 804(1) (2001), that a habeas corpus court clerk's duty to file a notice of appeal is 
ministerial in nature, and it is beyond the clerk's duty or power to be concerned with the legal 
viability of a notice presented for filing. Notwithstanding the habeas corpus court clerk's 
unauthorized action, the “ mailbox rule” enunciated by this Court in Massaline v. Williams, 274 
Ga. 552 (2001), prevents the unfiled notice of appeal from being rendered untimely. We held in 
Massaline that when a prisoner who is proceeding pro se appeals from a decision on his habeas 
corpus petition, his notice of appeal will be deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison 
authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the superior court, and the date on the certificate of 
service will give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the prisoner handed his filing to the prison 
officials on that date. Id. at 555. In the present case, the certificate of service attached to 
Ferguson's notice of appeal shows a date of August 25, and there is nothing in the record to rebut 
the presumption that he delivered it on that date to the authorities in whose custody he was. 
Accordingly, pursuant to our holding in Massaline v. Williams, supra, we will consider 
Ferguson's notice of appeal dated August 25 to have been filed on that date. That being so, the 
notice of appeal was timely and invoked this Court's appellate jurisdiction.  
 
Bond Motion 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. What is the purpose of a bond motion? 
2. What factors do judges consider when giving or denying bond? 
3. Who has the initial burden? 
4. What is the initial burden? 
5. When does the burden shift? 
6. What does the burden shift to and to who does it shift?  
7. What are the different types of bond? 
8. When does a judge have to give a bond? 
9. What is the timing on when a bond should be considered for a defendant? 
10. What do the roles of specific facts about a defnedant play in bond setting? 
11. What is the standard of review for denying bond? 
12. What types of conditions can be set on bond? 
13. When can a bond be revoked? 
 
Ga R Unif Super Ct  Rule 26.1 
Immediately following any arrest but not later than 48 hours if the arrest was without a warrant, 
or 72 hours following an arrest with a warrant, unless the accused has made bond in the 
meantime, the arresting officer or the law officer having custody of the accused shall present the 
accused in person before a magistrate or other judicial officer for first appearance. 
At the first appearance, the judicial officer shall: 
(A) Inform the accused of the charges; 
(B) Inform the accused of the right to remain silent, that any statement made may be used 
against the accused, and of the right to the presence and advice of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed; 
(C) Determine whether or not the accused desires and is in need of an appointed attorney 
and, if appropriate, advise the accused of the necessity for filing a written application; 
(D) Inform the accused of his or her right to a later pre-indictment commitment hearing, 
unless the first appearance covers the commitment hearing issues, and inform the accused 
that giving a bond shall be a waiver of the right to a commitment hearing; 
(E) In the case of warrantless arrest, make a fair and reliable determination of the 
probable cause for the arrest unless a warrant has been issued before the first appearance; 
(F) Inform the accused of the right to grand jury indictment in felony cases and the right 
to trial by jury, and when the next grand jury will convene; 
(G) Inform the accused that if he or she desires to waive these rights and plead guilty, 
then the accused shall so notify the judge or the law officer having custody, who shall in 
turn notify the judge. 
(H) Set the amount of bail if the offense is not one bailable only by a superior court 
judge, or so inform the accused if it is. 
 
Ga R Unif. Mag. Court Rule 23.3 
The court may set bail which may be secured by: 
(1) Cash - by a deposit with the sheriff of an amount equal to the required cash bail; or 
(2) Property - by real estate located within the State of Georgia with unencumbered 
equity, not 
exempted, owned by the accused or surety, valued at double the amount of bail set in the 
bond; or 
(3) Recognizance - in the discretion of the court; 
(4) Professional - by a professional bail bondsman authorized by the sheriff and in 
compliance with the rules and regulations for execution of a surety bail bond. 
Bail may be conditioned upon such other specified and reasonable conditions as the court may 
consider just and proper. The court may restrict the type of security permitted for the bond 
although the sheriff shall determine what sureties are acceptable when surety bond is permitted. 
 
OCGA § 17-6-1  




(4) Aggravated sodomy; 
(5) Armed robbery; 
(5.1) Home invasion in the first degree; 
(6) Aircraft hijacking and hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree; 
(7) Aggravated child molestation; 
(8) Aggravated sexual battery; 
(9) Manufacturing, distributing, delivering, dispensing, administering, or selling any 
controlled substance classified under Code Section 16-13-25 as Schedule I or under Code 
Section 16-13-26 as Schedule II; 
(10) Violating Code Section 16-13-31 or Code Section 16-13-31.1; 
(11) Kidnapping, arson, aggravated assault, or burglary in any degree if the person, at the 
time of the alleged kidnapping, arson, aggravated assault, or burglary in any degree, had 
previously been convicted of, was on probation or parole with respect to, or was on bail 
for kidnapping, arson, aggravated assault, burglary in any degree, or one or more of the 
offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (10) of this subsection; 
(12) Aggravated stalking; and 
(13) Violations of Chapter 15 of Title 16. 
(b)(1) All offenses not included in subsection (a) of this Code section, inclusive of offenses that 
are violations of local ordinances, are bailable by a court of inquiry. Except as provided in 
subsection (g) of this Code section, at no time, either before a court of inquiry, when indicted or 
accused, after a motion for new trial is made, or while an appeal is pending, shall any person 
charged with a misdemeanor be refused bail. When determining bail for a person charged with a 
misdemeanor, courts shall not impose excessive bail and shall impose only the conditions 
reasonably necessary to ensure such person attends court appearances and to protect the safety of 
any person or the public given the circumstances of the alleged offense and the totality of 
circumstances. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter: 
(A) A person charged with violating Code Section 40-6-391 whose alcohol 
concentration at the time of arrest, as determined by any method authorized by 
law, violates that provided in paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-
6-391 may be detained for a period of time up to six hours after booking and prior 
to being released on bail or on recognizance; and 
(B) When an arrest is made by a law enforcement officer without a warrant upon 
an act of family violence or a violation of a criminal family violence order 
pursuant to Code Section 17-4-20, the person charged with the offense shall not 
be eligible for bail prior to the arresting officer or some other law enforcement 
officer taking the arrested person before a judicial officer pursuant to Code 
Section 17-4-21. 
(3)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a judge of a court of inquiry may, as a 
condition of bail or other pretrial release of a person who is charged with violating Code 
Section 16-5-90 or 16-5-91, prohibit the defendant from entering or remaining present at 
the victim's school, place of employment, or other specified places at times when the 
victim is present or intentionally following such person. 
(B) If the evidence shows that the defendant has previously violated the 
conditions of pretrial release or probation or parole which arose out of a violation 
of Code Section 16-5-90 or 16-5-91, the judge of a court of inquiry may impose 
such restrictions on the defendant which may be necessary to deter further 
stalking of the victim, including but not limited to denying bail or pretrial release. 
(c)(1) In the event a person is detained in a facility other than a municipal jail for an offense 
which is bailable only before a judge of the superior court, as provided in subsection (a) of this 
Code section, and a hearing is held pursuant to Code Section 17-4-26 or 17-4-62, the presiding 
judicial officer shall notify the superior court in writing within 48 hours that the arrested person 
is being held without bail. If the detained person has not already petitioned for bail as provided in 
subsection (d) of this Code section, the superior court shall notify the district attorney and shall 
set a date for a hearing on the issue of bail within 30 days after receipt of such notice. 
(2) In the event a person is detained in a municipal jail for an offense which is bailable 
only before a judge of the superior court as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section for a 
period of 30 days, the municipal court shall notify the superior court in writing within 48 hours 
that the arrested person has been held for such time without bail. If the detained person has not 
already petitioned for bail as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, the superior court 
shall notify the district attorney and set a date for a hearing on the issue of bail within 30 days 
after receipt of such notice. 
(3) Notice sent to the superior court pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection 
shall include any incident reports and criminal history reports relevant to the detention of such 
person. 
(d) A person charged with any offense which is bailable only before a judge of the superior court 
as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section may petition the superior court requesting that 
such person be released on bail. The court shall notify the district attorney and set a date for a 
hearing within ten days after receipt of such petition. 
(e)(1) A court shall be authorized to release a person on bail if the court finds that the person: 
(A) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court or failing 
to appear in court when required; 
(B) Poses no significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to 
any property in the community; 
(C) Poses no significant risk of committing any felony pending trial; and 
(D) Poses no significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing 
the administration of justice. 
(2) When determining bail, as soon as possible, the court shall consider: 
(A) The accused's financial resources and other assets, including whether any 
such assets are jointly controlled; 
(B) The accused's earnings and other income; 
(C) The accused's financial obligations, including obligations to dependents; 
(D) The purpose of bail; and 
(E) Any other factor the court deems appropriate. 
(3) If the person is charged with a serious violent felony and has already been convicted 
of a serious violent felony, or of an offense under the laws of any other state or of the United 
States which offense if committed in this state would be a serious violent felony, there shall be a 
rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required or assure the safety of any other person or the community. 
As used in this subsection, the term “serious violent felony” means a serious violent felony as 
defined in Code Section 17-10-6.1. 
(4) Any bond issued by an elected judge or judge sitting by designation that purports a 
dollar amount shall be executed in the full-face amount of such bond through secured means as 
provided for in Code Section 17-6-4 or 17-6-50 or shall be executed by use of property as 
approved by the sheriff in the county where the offense was committed. 
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in this Code section shall 
prohibit a duly sworn sheriff from releasing an inmate from custody in cases of medical 
emergency with the consent of the judge in the county in which he or she presides. 
(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section or as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, the judge of any court of inquiry may by written order establish a schedule of bails 
and unless otherwise ordered by the judge of any court, an accused shall be released from 
custody upon posting bail as fixed in the schedule. 
(2) For offenses involving an act of family violence, as defined in Code Section 19-13-1, 
bail or other release from custody shall be set by a judge on an individual basis and a schedule of 
bails provided for in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be utilized; provided, however, 
that the judge shall include a listing of specific conditions which shall include, but not be limited 
to, having no contact of any kind or character with the victim or any member of the victim's 
family or household, not physically abusing or threatening to physically abuse the victim, the 
immediate enrollment in and participation in domestic violence counseling, substance abuse 
therapy, or other therapeutic requirements. 
(3) For offenses involving an act of family violence, the judge shall determine whether 
one or more specific conditions shall be used, except that any offense involving an act of family 
violence and serious injury to the victim shall be bailable only before a judge when the judge or 
the arresting officer is of the opinion that the danger of further violence to or harassment or 
intimidation of the victim is such as to make it desirable that the consideration of the imposition 
of additional conditions as authorized in this Code section should be made. Upon setting bail in 
any case involving family violence, the judge shall give particular consideration to the exigencies 
of the case at hand and shall impose any specific conditions as he or she may deem necessary. As 
used in this Code section, the term “serious injury” means bodily harm capable of being 
perceived by a person other than the victim and may include, but is not limited to, substantially 
blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, substantial bruises to 
body parts, fractured bones, or permanent disfigurements and wounds inflicted by deadly 
weapons or any other objects which, when used offensively against a person, are capable of 
causing serious bodily injury. 
(4) For violations of Code Section 16-15-4, the court shall require increased bail and shall 
include as a condition of bail or pretrial release that the accused shall not have contact of any 
kind or character with any other member or associate of a criminal street gang and, in cases 
involving an alleged victim, that the accused shall not have contact of any kind or character with 
any such victim or any member of any such victim's family or household. 
(5) For offenses involving violations of Code Section 40-6-393, bail or other release from 
custody shall be set by a judge on an individual basis and not a schedule of bails pursuant to this 
Code section. 
(g) No appeal bond shall be granted to any person who has been convicted of murder, rape, 
aggravated sodomy, armed robbery, home invasion in any degree, aggravated child molestation, 
child molestation, kidnapping, trafficking in cocaine or marijuana, aggravated stalking, or 
aircraft hijacking and who has been sentenced to serve a period of incarceration of five years or 
more. The granting of an appeal bond to a person who has been convicted of any other felony 
offense or of any misdemeanor offense involving an act of family violence as defined in Code 
Section 19-13-1, or of any offense delineated as a high and aggravated misdemeanor or of any 
offense set forth in Code Section 40-6-391, shall be in the discretion of the convicting court. 
Appeal bonds shall terminate when the right of appeal terminates, and such bonds shall not be 
effective as to any petition or application for writ of certiorari unless the court in which the 
petition or application is filed so specifies. 
(h) Except in cases in which life imprisonment or the death penalty may be imposed, a judge of 
the superior court by written order may delegate the authority provided for in this Code section 
to any judge of any court of inquiry within such superior court judge's circuit. However, such 
authority may not be exercised outside the county in which said judge of the court of inquiry was 
appointed or elected. The written order delegating such authority shall be valid for a period of 
one year, but may be revoked by the superior court judge issuing such order at any time prior to 
the end of that one-year period. 
(i) As used in this Code section, the term “bail” shall include the release of a person on an 
unsecured judicial release, except as limited by Code Section 17-6-12. 
(j) For all persons who have been authorized by law or the court to be released on bail, sheriffs 
and constables shall accept such bail; provided, however, that the sureties tendered and offered 
on the bond are approved by the sheriff of the county in which the offense was committed. 
 
OCGA § 17-6-2 
(b) In all other misdemeanor cases, sheriffs and constables shall accept bail in such reasonable 
amount as may be just and fair for any person or persons charged with a misdemeanor, provided 
that the sureties tendered and offered on the bond are approved by the sheriff in the county where 
the offense was committed. 
OCGA § 17-6-12 
(a) As used in this Code section, the term: 
(1) “Bail restricted offense” means the person is charged with: 
(A) An offense of: 
(i) Murder or felony murder, as defined in Code Section 16-5-1; 
(ii) Armed robbery, as defined in Code Section 16-8-41; 
(iii) Kidnapping, as defined in Code Section 16-5-40; 
(iv) Rape, as defined in Code Section 16-6-1; 
(v) Aggravated child molestation, as defined in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-
6-4, unless subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code 
Section 16-6-4; 
(vi) Aggravated sodomy, as defined in Code Section 16-6-2; or 
(vii) Aggravated sexual battery, as defined in Code Section 16-6-22.2; or 
(B) A felony offense of: 
(i) Aggravated assault; 
(ii) Aggravated battery; 
(iii) Hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree; 
(iv) Aggravated stalking; 
(v) Child molestation; 
(vi) Enticing a child for indecent purposes; 
(vii) Pimping; 
(viii) Robbery; 
(ix) Bail jumping; 
(x) Escape; 
(xi) Possession of a firearm or knife during the commission of or attempt to 
commit certain crimes; 
(xii) Possession of firearms by convicted felons and first offender probationers; 
(xiii) Trafficking in cocaine, illegal drugs, marijuana, or methamphetamine; 
(xiv) Participating in criminal street gang activity; 
(xv) Habitual violator; or 
(xvi) Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating 
substances. 
(2) “Unsecured judicial release” means any release on a person's own recognizance that 
does not purport a dollar amount through secured means as provided for in Code Section 17-6-4 
or 17-6-50 or property as approved by the sheriff in the county where the offense was 
committed. 
(b) An elected judge or judge sitting by designation as provided for in subsection (c) or (d) of 
this Code section may issue an unsecured judicial release if: 
(1) Such unsecured judicial release is noted on the release order; and 
(2) Except as provided for in subsection (c) of this Code section, the person is not 
charged with a bail restricted offense. 
(c) A person charged with a bail restricted offense shall not be released on bail on an unsecured 
judicial release for the purpose of entering a pretrial release program, a pretrial release and 
diversion program as provided for in Article 4 of Chapter 3 of Title 42, or a pretrial intervention 
and diversion program as provided for in Article 4 of Chapter 18 of Title 15, or pursuant to 
Uniform Superior Court Rule 27. 
(d) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section and in addition to other laws 
regarding the release of an accused person, the judge of any court having jurisdiction over a 
person charged with committing an offense against the criminal laws of this state shall have 
authority, in his or her sound discretion and in appropriate cases, to authorize the release of the 
person on an unsecured judicial release only. 
(e) Upon the failure of a person released on an unsecured judicial release to appear for trial, if the 
release is not otherwise conditioned by the court, absent a finding of sufficient excuse to appear, 
the court shall summarily issue an order for his or her arrest which shall be enforced as in cases 
of forfeited bonds. 
 
OCGA § 17-7-50 
Any person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail shall, within 90 days after the 
date of confinement, be entitled to have the charge against him or her heard by a grand jury 
having jurisdiction over the accused person; provided, however, that if the person is arrested for 
a crime for which the death penalty is being sought, the superior court may, upon motion of the 
district attorney for an extension and after a hearing and good cause shown, grant one extension 
to the 90 day period not to exceed 90 additional days; and, provided, further, that if such 
extension is granted by the court, the person shall not be entitled to have the charge against him 
or her heard by the grand jury until the expiration of such extended period. In the event no grand 
jury considers the charges against the accused person within the 90 day period of confinement or 
within the extended period of confinement where such an extension is granted by the court, the 
accused shall have bail set upon application to the court. 
 
Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704 (1993). 
This court granted the application for interlocutory appeal to consider whether the state must 
prove that a person charged with murder who seeks a pretrial bond has not met the conditions for 
release in OCGA § 17-6-1(e). We hold that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence 
on community ties, but the state has the burden of persuading by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defendant is not entitled to release on bail. We vacate the trial court's order 
denying bail and remand for further proceedings. 
Jesus Ayala is charged with the murder and aggravated assault of his sister's husband, possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. 
The state is not seeking the death penalty. Ayala, a Mexican citizen, presented testimony at his 
bond hearing that he has resided in Hall County for three years and in the United States for 12 
years; he has 20 to 30 relatives living in Hall County; and he would have a job in Hall County if 
released on bond. The state objected to bond because of the nature of the charges. The trial court 
found that the defendant met his burden of proving that he posed no danger to the community, 
risk of committing any felony, or risk of intimidating witnesses. The court denied bond because 
“the defendant has not carried his burden of proving that he is not a risk to flee the jurisdiction of 
this Court if released on bond.” 
1. A person charged with the offense of murder may obtain bail only before a superior court 
judge. OCGA § 17-6-1(a)(2). The purpose of a pretrial bond is to prevent punishment before a 
conviction and to secure the appearance of the person in court for trial. Roberts v. State, 32 
Ga.App. 339, 340-41 (1924). The standards for determining whether to grant release prior to trial 
are based on the 1968 American Bar Association pretrial release standards. Lane v. State, 247 
Ga. 387, 388, n. 2 (1981). The trial court may release a person on bail if the court finds the 
person: 
(1) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court or failing to 
appear in court when required; 
(2) Poses no significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to any 
property in the community; 
(3) Poses no significant risk of committing any felony pending trial; and 
(4) Poses no significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the 
administration of justice. 
OCGA § 17-6-1(e). The trial court must explain its reasons for denying bond to assist appellate 
review. Lane, 247 Ga. at 389, 276 S.E.2d 644. The granting or denial of bail will not be set aside 
unless there is a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion. Jernagin v. State, 118 Ga. 307, 308 
(1903). 
This court has not addressed whether the state or the defendant has the burden of proof in 
pretrial bond hearings before a superior court. Neither the Lane opinion nor the law codifying the 
ABA standards specifies which party has the burden of proof or the evidentiary standard to be 
applied. See 1982 Ga.Laws 910, § 1. 
Because of the phrasing of the statutory language, we conclude that the defendant has the 
burden of coming forward initially with evidence to show that he or she poses no significant risk 
of fleeing, threatening the community, committing another crime, or intimidating a witness. This 
burden of production means that a person charged with murder must present evidence at the 
bond hearing on factors that indicate roots in the community. These factors include the 
defendant's length and character of residence in the community, employment status and history, 
past history of responding to legal process, and prior criminal record. See Lane, 247 Ga. at 388, 
n. 2. Once the defendant meets the burden of production, the state may present evidence to rebut 
it. Placing the burden of production on the defendant is fair because the accused is the best 
source of information on his or her community ties. 
In this state, unlike many other states, the presumption of innocence has always remained 
with the person accused of a capital offense, even during the trial. Vanderford v. Brand, 126 Ga. 
67, 70 (1906). “The most fundamental premise of our criminal justice system is that a person 
ought not to be punished for a criminal offense until the state demonstrates guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” 2 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 10-1.1 comment (1980). “Unless [the] 
right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries 
of struggle, would lose its meaning.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
To protect this presumption of innocence, we hold that the state has the burden of 
persuasion in convincing the superior court that a defendant is not entitled to pretrial release. 
This requirement means the state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the trial court should deny bail either to secure the defendant's appearance in court or to 
protect the community. Depending on the quality of the defendant's evidence, the state may not 
need to present any evidence to carry its burden of persuasion. Other states and the Federal Bail 
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152, place a similar burden of proof on the government. 
The state argues that the burden of proof should be placed on accused persons in pretrial 
bond hearings because convicted defendants have the burden of proof on appeal bonds. See 
Moore v. State, 151 Ga.App. 413, 414 (1979). The release of defendants after their conviction for 
murder, however, is based on different standards than the pretrial release of persons accused of 
murder. See OCGA § 17-6-1(g) (denying appeal bonds to certain convicted felons). We have 
held, for example, that the ABA Standards on release pending appeal do not apply in capital 
felony cases and that a trial court need not give any reasons for denying an appeal bond to a 
convicted murderer. Hardin v. State, 251 Ga. 533, 534 (1983). The defendant's conviction rebuts 
the prior presumption of innocence and justifies requiring the defendant to bear the burden of 
convincing the court to grant an appeal bond. See Vanderford, 126 Ga. at 70. 
In contrast, the law favoring release of persons prior to trial supports placing the burden 
of persuasion on the state in hearings on pretrial release in superior court. Because the trial court 
placed the burden of proof on Ayala, rather than the state, we vacate the order denying bail and 
remand for reconsideration in light of this opinion. 
 
Myers v. St. Lawrence, 289 Ga. 240 (2011). 
Pro se appellant James K. Myers appeals the denial of his pre-trial petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
Myers was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, obstruction of a law enforcement 
officer, criminal damage to property, and simple battery against a pregnant person. The trial 
court denied a pre-trial bond, finding that Myers posed: a significant flight risk; a significant 
threat to persons, the community, or property; a significant risk for committing a felony pending 
trial; and a significant risk for intimidating witnesses. The court also noted that Myers had a 
lengthy history of felonies and had previously been a fugitive from justice. While awaiting trial, 
Myers filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his detention without bail was 
illegal, and that his counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the habeas court denied the petition. 
Myers has been charged with felonies and, thus, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of 
right. Constantino v. Warren, 285 Ga. 851, 853(1). Rather, 
whether he should have been released on bail is governed by OCGA § 17–6–1(e), which 
provides as follows: 
A court shall be authorized to release a person on bail if the court finds that the person: 
(1) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court or failing to 
appear in court when required; 
(2) Poses no significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to any 
property in the community; 
(3) Poses no significant risk of committing any felony pending trial; and 
(4) Poses no significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the 
administration of justice. 
The conjunctive “and” indicates that the trial court may grant bail only if it finds that none of the 
four risks exists. Id. at 853–854(2). 
In his habeas petition, Myers contended that the denial of bail constituted excessive bail, 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. 
XVII of the Georgia Constitution. “[T]he foremost consideration when fixing bail is the 
probability that the accused, if freed, will appear at trial; and ... the amount of bail assessed is 
within the sole discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of 
discretion.” Pullin v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882, 882–883 (2000). Myers did not provide the habeas 
court with a transcript of his bail hearing. Thus, there is no such transcript before this Court on 
his appeal from the habeas court's ruling, and we presume that the evidence presented in the trial 
court justifies that court's decision. See Blue v. Blue, 279 Ga. 550(1) (2005); Kegler v. State, 267 
Ga. 147, 148(3) (1996). But, the trial court specifically concluded that he was a flight risk, and 
the habeas court noted that under recidivist treatment, Myers faced incarceration for a significant 
period of time. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
bail, and it was thus not error for the habeas court to deny Myers's petition. See Constantino, 
supra at 855(3).  
 
Constantino v. Warren, 285 Ga. 851 (2009). 
Frank Constantino appeals from the habeas court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus 
relief, in which he sought release from pre-trial detention following the trial court's denial of his 
request for bail. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
On February 19, 2009, Constantino was indicted by a Cobb County grand jury for 
violating the Georgia RICO Act, securities fraud, and theft by taking. The indictment alleges that 
Constantino took more than $2 million from an elderly woman and invested it in business 
ventures in Belize. On February 20, 2009, Constantino was arrested, and on February 24, 2009, 
he filed a motion for pre-trial bail. On March 5, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the 
motion. At the hearing, Constantino's wife, Sandra Newhouse, testified that she and Constantino 
have lived in her Cobb County home since 1992; that they married in 1993; that she purchased 
the house in 1998; and that she was willing to put the home up for bail. She added that 
Constantino, who is 65 years old, has high blood pressure; that he had surgery for prostate cancer 
in October 2008 and has received radiation treatments; and that they have numerous friends in 
the community. She also stated that she had given Constantino's passport to his attorney and that 
Constantino was willing to surrender it to the Court. Newhouse and Constantino moved to 
Atlanta from West Virginia, and several of Constantino's relatives from West Virginia were in 
the courtroom but did not testify. 
On cross-examination, Newhouse testified that the house in which she and Constantino 
live is in her name; that Constantino has no assets in the United States; that she has no assets 
except for the house; and that Constantino owns property in Belize and Nicaragua and has 
traveled to Belize ten to twelve times in the past few years. Newhouse also testified she 
purchased her house in 1998 for $450,000, but she now owes $700,000 on the property and does 
not know how much the house is worth. 
The trial court denied Constantino's motion for bond, stating, in an oral ruling, that he 
had no real ties to Cobb County and was a “great risk to flee” given his property and connections 
in Belize and Nicaragua. 
On March 13, 2009, Constantino filed a habeas petition contending that the trial court's 
denial of bail was unconstitutional, that the Georgia and United States Constitutions forbid 
excessive bail, and that he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. On March 27, 2009, the habeas 
court held a hearing on Constantino's habeas petition. The parties agreed that the court could 
consider the testimony of Constantino's wife at the bond hearing, and Constantino offered 
additional testimony from seven witnesses who testified about their relationships with him. 
For example, Rudy Weber testified he has lived in Georgia for forty-five years and has 
known Constantino for three years. He met Constantino when he helped Constantino refinance 
his home for $900,000 at a time when the home was worth $1.2 million. Since the refinancing, 
Weber has remained in “good contact” with Constantino and has been to Constantino's home a 
few times. Weber acknowledged that Constantino's home had been refinanced at the height of 
the real estate market and that the value of the home had likely dropped some since that time. 
Marjorie Crouch testified she has been friends with Constantino and his wife for about 15 
years and has been to their house numerous times. Crouch added that she has invested money 
with Constantino and does not believe he is a flight risk. David Kim, a service consultant for 
Audi, testified he has known Constantino for about six years and has been to different “Audi-
related outings” with him. Kim added he did not believe Constantino was a risk to flee. Paul 
Miller, who has known Constantino from church for about four years, testified he did not believe 
Constantino would flee. In addition, Craig Stephens testified that he has known Constantino for 
about 17 years, that they met when they were both in the insurance business, that he has a 
business and social relationship with Constantino, and that he does not believe Constantino 
would flee. On cross-examination, the witnesses acknowledged that they did not know whether 
Constantino owned either the house in which he lived or any other property in this country, and 
several of the witnesses had short-term, mostly business relationships with Constantino (three of 
the witnesses had businesses that serviced the cars he drove). 
At the hearing, Constantino contended that, based on the testimony of his wife and the 
other seven witnesses, there was no evidence he was a risk to flee, and he was entitled to bail. 
The sheriff, on the other hand, contended that Constantino was a significant risk to flee because, 
among other things, he did not own any assets in this country, he owned assets in Belize and 
Nicaragua, and he traveled to Belize on a regular basis. On May 27, 2009, the habeas court 
denied Constantino's habeas petition, concluding that the trial court's denial of bail “was a 
reasonable exercise of that court's discretion.” Constantino then filed this appeal. 
Constantino contends that, because he is not indicted for one of the offenses specified in 
OCGA § 17–6–1(a), the bail provisions of OCGA § 17–6–1(e) do not apply to his case, and he is 
entitled to bail as a matter of right. He is wrong. OCGA § 17–6–1(a) merely specifies that certain 
crimes are bailable only before a superior court; it does not provide that persons who commit 
other crimes are entitled to bail as a matter of right.  
*** 
OCGA § 17–6–1 is now the statute that governs bail, however, and it does not provide for 
bail as a matter of right except in misdemeanor cases. OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(1). 
For the foregoing reasons, Constantino was not entitled to bail as a matter of right. 
Instead, whether he should have been released on bail is governed by OCGA § 17–6–1(e), which 
provides as follows: 
A court shall be authorized to release a person on bail if the court finds that the person: 
(1) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court or failing to 
appear in court when required; 
(2) Poses no significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to any 
property in the community; 
(3) Poses no significant risk of committing any felony pending trial; and 
(4) Poses no significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the 
administration of justice. 
The conjunctive “and” indicates that the trial court may grant bail only if it finds that none of the 
four risks exists. 
“The trial court must explain its reasons for denying bond to assist appellate review. The 
granting or denial of bail will not be set aside unless there is a manifest and flagrant abuse of 
discretion.” Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 705 (1993). Constantino bore the burden of producing 
evidence that he posed “no significant risk of fleeing, threatening the community, committing 
another crime, or intimidating a witness.” Id. “To meet this burden, the defendant must first 
present evidence showing his roots in the community.” Dunn v. Edwards, 275 Ga. 458, 458 
(2002). The State, however, always retains the burden of persuasion that the defendant is not 
entitled to pretrial release. Id. 
In the present case, Constantino offered some evidence of ties to his community and 
argued that he did not flee the country either during his ongoing civil litigation with the woman 
who is the victim in his criminal case or during the criminal investigation of his conduct. He also 
offered evidence of health problems, and his attorney and wife stated he was willing to surrender 
his passport. On the other hand, Constantino has now been indicted on 16 counts of criminal 
activity that may result in significant incarceration if he is convicted. The court also heard 
evidence that Constantino does not own the home in which he lives, has no assets in the United 
States, has assets in Belize and Nicaragua, has allegedly funneled significant amounts of money 
to investments in Belize, and has traveled extensively to Belize. There was evidence that his wife 
has no assets other than her home, that she was uncertain how much equity she has in the house, 
and that, due to the downturn in the real estate market, the house is worth less than it was several 
years ago. Based on this evidence, we conclude the habeas court did not err in ruling that the trial 
court acted within its broad discretion in finding that Constantino posed a significant risk to flee 
and in denying bail on that ground. 
Constantino contends that the denial of bail violated the Excessive Bail Clauses of both 
the Georgia and United States Constitutions. See Ga. Const.1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII and 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution (both providing that “[e]xcessive bail 
shall not be required”). Based on the evidence discussed above, however, we conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the denial of bail was “necessary to 
ensure [Constantino's] presence at trial,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753, and that the habeas court did 
not err in denying relief. See Pullin v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882, 882–883 (2000) (holding that 
excessive bail is bail not “reasonably calculated to insure the presence of the defendant”); 
Mullinax v. State, 271 Ga. 112, 112–113, 515 S.E.2d 839 (1999) (same). 
 
Mullinax v. State, 271 Ga. 112 (1999). 
This is an appeal by Charles Mullinax from the denial of his motion to reduce bond and 
from the denial of his pre-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons which 
follow we dismiss the appeal from the order denying his motion to reduce bond and affirm the 
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
In April 1998 Lindsey Strickland, Mullinax's girlfriend, was discovered dead by 
strangulation in Thomas County. Police found a curtain sash from the nearby residence once 
owned by Mullinax's mother alongside Strickland's body and Strickland's missing earring was 
found inside the residence. Mullinax was arrested and charged with murder shortly after the 
discovery of the body. On May 14, 1998 Mullinax petitioned the trial court to set bond. Because 
of the likelihood that Mullinax would interfere with the administration of justice the trial court 
denied bond. On July 30, 1998, Mullinax, who had not been indicted because of delays in 
processing the physical evidence at the State Crime Lab, petitioned for bail arguing that he was 
entitled to bond because he had been detained for more than 90 days without being indicted. See 
OCGA § 17–7–50. Following a hearing on October 5, 1998 the court set bond in the amount of 
$250,000 and denied a subsequent motion to reduce the amount of that bond. A pre-trial petition 
for writ of habeas corpus challenging the amount of bond on grounds of excessiveness was 
denied on December 10, 1998. Because the refusal to reduce the amount of bond did not amount 
to an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm. 
*** 
The sole issue raised in Mullinax's appeal from the denial of his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus is whether the bond set by the Superior Court of Thomas County is so excessive 
as to amount to a refusal to grant bail. Excessive bail is prohibited by the Georgia Constitution 
(Ga. Const.1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII) and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, excessive bail is defined as bail set at an amount higher 
than an amount reasonably calculated to insure the presence of the defendant. Stack v. Boyle, 342 
U.S. 1, 5 (1951). When fixing bail in Georgia, a trial judge's foremost consideration is the 
probability that the accused, if freed, will appear at trial and to a lesser extent “the accused's 
ability to pay, the seriousness of the offense, and the accused's character and reputation. [Cit.]” 
Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338, 341(2)(b) (1984). See generally OCGA § 17–6–1(e). A defendant 
who seeks release on bail has the burden of showing “roots in the community, that the defendant 
does not pose a significant risk of fleeing, threatening the community, committing another crime, 
or intimidating a witness. [Cits.]” Cowards v. State, 266 Ga. 191, 193(2) (1996). However, in all 
cases the amount of bail assessed is within the sole discretion of the trial court and will not be 
overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585(2) (1964). 
The State adduced evidence that Mullinax, who is a teenager and a high school drop-out, 
had little contact with his family and no means of support. Mullinax did not reside with either 
parent and had no apparent supervision from any other relative or adult. He had been arrested 
previously for possession of marijuana, shoplifting, and simple battery. With regard to the crime 
charged, a GBI agent testified that Mullinax had been in contact with potential witnesses to 
coach them about the information they were to supply to law enforcement officers investigating 
the case. 
Under the circumstances, based upon the seriousness of the offense charged and the 
likelihood that Mullinax would not appear at trial, we discern no clear abuse of discretion by the 
trial court in holding that the bail amount originally set was not excessive. Taylor v. Chitwood, 
266 Ga. 793(2), 471 S.E.2d 511 (1996); Jones v. Grimes, supra, 219 Ga. at 587(2), 134 S.E.2d 
790. 
 
Dunn v. Edwards, 275 Ga. 458 (2002). 
Torrance Dunn was arrested and charged with malice murder and felony obstruction of 
justice. The trial court denied his request for bond and Dunn brought this habeas action 
challenging that decision. Because Dunn failed to offer evidence indicating roots in the 
community, the habeas court did not err in denying relief. Therefore, we affirm. 
In Ayala v. State, this Court addressed the burden of proof required in a pretrial bond 
hearing. Initially, the defendant bears the burden of producing evidence that he does not pose a 
significant risk to flee, threaten the community, commit another crime, or intimidate witnesses. 
To meet this burden, the defendant must first present evidence showing his roots in the 
community. The Court stated in Ayala that evidence demonstrating ties to the community would 
include “the length and character of residence in the community, employment status and history, 
past history of responding to legal process, and prior criminal record.” Once the defendant has 
satisfied this burden, the burden of production shifts to the State. If the defendant fails to produce 
sufficient evidence, the State may not be required to produce any evidence. However, the State 
always retains the burden of persuasion that the defendant is not entitled to pretrial release. 
The defendant in this case failed to satisfy his initial burden. The only testimony 
presented at the bond hearing on the issue of the defendant's ties to the community came from 
the investigating officer. When questioned about whether Dunn was from Athens and whether he 
lived there, the officer answered affirmatively. There was no evidence that Dunn had 
continuously lived in Athens for a significant period of time, that he had significant involvement 
with family, friends or institutions in the community, that he had a stable job history, or that he 
had a reputation for reliability. The record contains defense counsel's introduction of a cousin 
and reference to an aunt who had previously been in the courtroom. The record also contains the 
statement that “other family members identified themselves.” The presence of family members 
in the courtroom, however, is not evidence. Because Dunn failed to meet his burden, the trial 
court properly denied bond and the habeas court did not err in denying relief. 
Dunn contends that the trial court's order denying bond is insufficient as a matter of law 
because it did not make findings of fact. We agree, that as a general matter, trial courts should 
render findings of fact in denying bond because they will help provide an adequate basis for 
appellate review. However, in this case, Dunn presented virtually no evidence on the relevant 
issue of community ties and therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to 
be more specific in its order denying bond. 
 
Prigmore v. State, 327 Ga. App. 368 (2014). 
Spencer Prigmore was arrested on charges of vehicular homicide (OCGA § 40–6–393), 
reckless driving (OCGA § 40–6–390), leaving the scene of an accident (OCGA § 40–6–270), 
and driving under the influence of drugs (OCGA § 40–6–391). We granted Prigmore's 
application for interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in denying his 
motion for pre-trial bond. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
In determining whether the trial court erred in denying bond, we apply a “flagrant abuse” 
standard. (Citation omitted.) Hardy v. State, 192 Ga.App. 860, 860(2) (1989). In other words, the 
trial court's discretion will not be disturbed “unless it was manifestly or flagrantly abused.” 
(Citation omitted.) Id. 
The transcript from the bond hearing shows the following facts. Prigmore was driving his 
vehicle along Lawrenceville Highway at about 6:45 p.m. when he crossed a lane of traffic and 
left the roadway, traveled for some distance on the sidewalk, and struck and killed a woman and 
her six-year-old daughter. After striking the pedestrians, Prigmore returned to the roadway and 
continued driving for approximately a quarter-mile before turning into a parking lot and parking 
his vehicle in the drive-thru of a business. Witnesses to the accident had followed Prigmore and 
informed police of his location. When the police approached Prigmore in his vehicle, he 
appeared very upset, and he stated “[O]h, my God, just tell me, did I kill them[?]” After 
Prigmore was taken into custody for further investigation, police officers described Prigmore as 
being so intoxicated that they could not get any statement from him. Prigmore was read the 
implied consent law, but he refused to submit to a state-administered test. Consequently, the 
police sought and obtained a search warrant for a blood draw. While being held in jail on these 
charges, Prigmore was placed on suicide watch due to his despondency over the incident. 
Although Prigmore did not testify at the bond hearing, he presented witnesses to testify 
regarding his ties to the community. In response, the State elicited testimony that Prigmore had 
multiple convictions for driving under the influence. The State then proffered evidence that 
Prigmore has three previous DUI convictions, the most recent in 1999. In addition, he entered a 
plea as a first offender to a charge of possession of a controlled substance in 1998, followed by a 
battery conviction in 2006, a charge of furnishing alcohol to a minor in 2009, and a shoplifting 
conviction in 2012. The State also argued that Prigmore may flee if released, pointing to 
evidence that he left the scene after running over the pedestrians and that he stopped when his 
vehicle became inoperable a quarter-mile down the road. 
Under Georgia law, a trial court may release a defendant on bail if it finds that the defendant: 
(1) [p]oses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court or failing 
to appear in court when required; (2) [p]oses no significant threat or danger to any 
person, to the community, or to any property in the community; (3) [p]oses no 
significant risk of committing any felony pending trial; and (4) [p]oses no significant 
risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the administration of justice. 
OCGA § 17–6–1(e). 
In announcing its ruling at the conclusion of the bond hearing, the trial court expressed 
concern about Prigmore's well-being and that Prigmore may pose a danger to himself and to the 
community if released. The trial court also acknowledged that there was evidence that officers 
believed that Prigmore may have been under the influence at the time of the accident, and it 
expressed concern about Prigmore's history with alcohol and driving under the influence. The 
trial court further stated that it was concerned about the possibility that Prigmore may flee. In its 
written order, the trial court stated that Prigmore “poses a significant risk of committing further 
felonies pending trial of this matter and poses a significant risk to persons in the community, 
including himself.” 
Given the facts presented to the trial court, we cannot say that it flagrantly abused its 
discretion in reaching its conclusions. “Whether we agree with [the trial court's] findings and 
conclusions is not controlling.” (Citations omitted.) Hardy, supra at 361(2). As there is some 
evidence to support at least part of the underlying basis for the trial court's conclusions, the trial 
court did not err in denying bond. Id. 
 
Hardy v. State, 192 Ga. App. 860 (1989). 
Following the issuance of two warrants charging appellant with trafficking in cocaine and 
selling cocaine, appellant was arrested and incarcerated. Thereupon, appellant moved for the 
setting of bond and, with the consent of the district attorney's office, bond was set at $40,000. 
Upon his release, appellant was arrested again and charged with trafficking in cocaine on two 
other occasions. These charges pertained to incidents which occurred before appellant's arrest. 
Appellant again moved for the setting of bond. This time, the motion was opposed by the district 
attorney's office and bond was denied, the superior court ruling that there was a substantial 
likelihood appellant would commit additional crimes (i.e., sell cocaine) if he was released. This 
appeal followed. Held: 
In determining whether bond was denied properly in cases of this kind, we apply a 
“flagrant abuse” standard. Reed v. State, 134 Ga.App. 47, 48. In other words, the superior court's 
discretion will not be controlled unless it was manifestly or flagrantly abused. Id. 
The considerations to be employed by the superior court in granting or denying pre-trial bonds 
are the same as the considerations to be employed in granting or denying appeal bonds. One such 
consideration is whether the person incarcerated is likely to commit a serious crime, i.e., a 
felony, upon being released. Birge v. State, 238 Ga. 88, 90. Release is authorized if the superior 
court finds the person incarcerated “[p]oses no significant risk of committing any felony pending 
trial.” OCGA § 17-6-1(e)(3). 
In the case sub judice, the superior court concluded that there was a substantial likelihood 
appellant would commit a serious crime. Given the additional serious crimes with which 
appellant was charged following his initial release, we cannot say the superior court flagrantly 
abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. “Whether we agree with these findings and 
conclusions is not controlling. There is some evidence to support at least part of the underlying 
basis for the [superior] court's conclusion. Consequently, we do not find a flagrant abuse of the 
[superior] court's discretion in denying bail.”  
 
Womack v. State, 223 Ga. App. 82 (1996). 
Hajj Womack is charged in a 93 count indictment alleging armed robbery, aggravated 
assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, kidnapping, carrying a 
concealed weapon and participation in criminal gang activity. We granted Womack's application 
for interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in denying his petition for pre-
trial bond. For reasons which follow, we affirm. 
Womack asserts eight enumerations of error, all of which stem from the initial bond 
hearing. All eight enumerations rely upon the evidence heard by the trial court in the initial bond 
hearing. However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, the bond hearing was not recorded. In 
an order denying Womack's petition for reconsideration, the trial judge indicated that the judge 
acted properly in the initial hearing and there was “no basis to alter the previous order denying 
the request for a bond.” 
“In determining whether bond was denied properly in cases of this kind, we apply a ‘flagrant 
abuse’ standard. [Cit.] In other words, the superior court's discretion will not be controlled unless 
it was manifestly or flagrantly abused. [Cit.]” (Indention omitted.) Hardy v. State, 192 Ga.App. 
860(2) (1989). 
“In Birge v. State, 238 Ga. 88 (1976), we set out standards for determining whether or not 
to grant bond pending appeal. We find that similar considerations are relevant when a trial court 
is considering a motion for bond prior to trial. The defendant may be detained pending trial if the 
facts support a finding that the defendant is likely to commit a serious crime, intimidate 
witnesses or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice or will flee if released.” 
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lane v. State, 247 Ga. 387, 388 (1981). 
In this case, the trial court “found there was reason to believe that there was a threat of 
additional crimes being committed if [Womack] was released from custody.” Thus, the trial 
court stated one of the findings enunciated in Lane, thereby supporting the denial of bond. 
“Whether we agree with these findings and conclusions is not controlling.” Hardy, supra. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 
 
Rooney v. State, 217 Ga. App. 850 (1995). 
We granted John Thomas Rooney's application for interlocutory appeal to consider 
whether a superior court judge erred in reconsidering, and subsequently revoking, the pretrial 
bond set by another judge, who was presiding in the superior court judge's place by designation. 
Under the facts of this particular case, we conclude that no error occurred because the designated 
judge should not have granted bond to Rooney after expressly finding that he was likely to 
intimidate witnesses or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. 
The Gwinnett County police arrested Rooney, and a magistrate formally charged him 
with rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, burglary and battery. The magistrate 
set bond in the amount of $25,000 on each of the charges of aggravated sexual battery, burglary 
and battery. The magistrate did not, however, set bond on the rape and aggravated sodomy 
charges because only a superior court judge has the authority to do so. See OCGA § 17-6-
1(a)(3), (4). 
On October 6, 1994, Rooney filed a petition for bond in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County. 
The matter was assigned to Judge James Oxendine, and a hearing was scheduled for October 20, 
1994. On the day of the hearing, Judge Oxendine was out of town. Rooney admits, however, that 
Judge Oxendine had delegated authority to hear the matter to Gwinnett County Recorder's Court 
Judge Michael Greene pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-1(h). Neither party disputes that Judge 
Greene's designation was appropriate, nor does either party contend that his designation was 
made pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.1(e). Thus we reject the dissent's assertion that a copy of the 
actual order designating Judge Greene must be obtained before a decision can be reached in this 
case. 
During the bond hearing, Judge Greene heard testimony from Rooney and two witnesses 
for the State. The State's first witness was Investigator Lorraine Jackson. She testified that her 
investigation showed that Rooney had forced his way into a woman's home. When the woman 
resisted Rooney's aggressions, Rooney became enraged. Rooney took the woman into the 
bathroom and forced her to perform oral sodomy on him. He then sodomized her with a tube of 
toothpaste. Thereafter, Rooney took the woman into her bedroom where he allegedly beat her 
with a belt and raped her. The woman later identified Rooney as her attacker in a photographic 
lineup. 
The State's second witness, Billy Davis, testified that he was in a holding cell with 
Rooney. According to Davis, Rooney approached him about having the woman that accused him 
of rape “done in” during a carjacking. Davis said Rooney told him the woman's name. He also 
testified that Rooney later told him that Rooney might try to pay the woman off. 
After the bond hearing, Judge Greene issued a written order, dated October 21, 1994, wherein he 
specifically found that there was a substantial risk that Rooney would intimidate witnesses or 
otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. Nonetheless, Judge Greene set bond in the 
amount of $50,000 on each of the rape and aggravated sodomy charges. Additionally, he ordered 
that the rape bond be “cash only.” Judge Greene did not disturb the bonds previously set by the 
magistrate. 
On November 7, 1994, the State filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Oxendine held 
a hearing on the State's motion on November 14, 1994. During this hearing, Rooney presented 
no evidence, and the State only recalled Davis, who in essence gave the same testimony that he 
previously had given. At the hearing's conclusion, after considering Davis's testimony, the 
transcript of the hearing before Judge Greene and argument from both sides, Judge Oxendine 
granted the State's motion. By order dated November 14, 1994, he revoked the rape and 
aggravated sodomy bonds. Judge Oxendine specifically stated in his order that there was 
evidence that Rooney raped and sodomized the victim and that there was a risk that Rooney 
would intimidate witnesses if released on bond. It is undisputed that Rooney had not made bond 
prior to the time the State filed its motion for reconsideration. 
In his sole enumeration, Rooney contends that Judge Oxendine lacked the authority to 
reconsider Judge Greene's order and that Judge Oxendine erred when he vacated the order and 
denied bond on the rape and aggravated sodomy charges. We disagree. 
Contrary to Rooney's assertion otherwise, this is not a case where one superior court 
judge has reconsidered and vacated another superior court judge's order. In this case, Judge 
Greene merely was presiding over a matter pending before Judge Oxendine's court. Moreover, 
any authority Judge Greene had was given to him by Judge Oxendine. Consequently, any order 
Judge Greene issued must be viewed as coming from Judge Oxendine's court. Having said this, 
we hold that the authority to reconsider and subsequently vacate any such order was within 
Judge Oxendine's sound legal discretion. 
 
Edvalson v. State, 339 Ga. App. 348 (2016). 
Thomas Scot Edvalson appeals from an order of the Gwinnett County Superior Court 
denying his motion to dismiss and plea of former jeopardy. Edvalson asserts that his prosecution 
is barred by double jeopardy because certain amended bond conditions imposed upon him by the 
trial court were punitive in nature. Edvalson further contends that because these bond conditions 
punished him for the indicted crimes, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the State from 
punishing him further, and therefore the State cannot try him for those crimes. Finding that 
Edvalson has no cognizable double jeopardy claim, we affirm the order of the trial court. 
On an appeal from the grant or denial of a double jeopardy plea in bar, we generally 
review the trial court's oral and written rulings as a whole to determine whether any 
factual findings contained therein support the trial court's ruling as to whether the 
defendant was entitled to a plea in bar. But in those cases where the relevant facts 
are undisputed and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, 
we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to undisputed facts. 
Honester v. State, 336 Ga.App. 166, 167 (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, the 
relevant facts are undisputed and show that Edvalson was arrested in September 2012 on charges 
of possession of child pornography, and he was subsequently indicted on four counts of sexual 
exploitation of children, in violation of OCGA § 16–12–100 (b) (8). In November 2012, the trial 
court granted Edvalson a bail bond which allowed Edvalson to remain free from incarceration 
while awaiting trial. The trial court's bond order contained two special conditions, with the first 
condition prohibiting Edvalson from having a computer, smart phone, or other Internet-enabled 
device in his house. The second condition prohibited Edvalson from having unsupervised contact 
with any child under the age of 16. On November 5, 2014, the State filed an emergency motion 
seeking to revoke Edvalson's bond on the grounds that he had violated the first special condition. 
Two days later, the trial court held a hearing on that motion, at which both Edvalson and his 
lawyer were present. During that hearing, the State presented the testimony of Detective Jeff 
Madson, who was a certified forensic computer examiner. Madson's testimony established that 
since his release on bond, Edvalson had been online; had submitted images of child erotica to at 
least one website; had been banned from a website for posting child pornography; and had 
posted a number of comments regarding child pornography, “including sarcastic comments about 
certain child pornography laws posted 29 days before the revocation hearing.” Edvalson v. State, 
298 Ga. 626, 627 (2016). 
However, on cross-examination, the detective acknowledged that he had not been 
inside Edvalson's house or applied for a search warrant for it; that he had no 
evidence that Edvalson had a computer, smartphone, or internet-enabled [device] in 
his house; and that he was not alleging that Edvalson had unsupervised contact with 
anyone under the age of 16 since he posted bond. 
Id. at 627. 
At the close of the evidence, 
[t]he superior court stated that it accepted that Edvalson was the author of the 
internet posts in question but despite the disturbing nature of the circumstances and 
the court's concern, it was going to deny the motion to revoke bond because there 
was no evidence that Edvalson used, or possessed in his home, any of the devices 
prohibited in the bond or that he violated the terms and conditions as set forth in the 
bond order. However, the superior court detailed additional conditions of the bond 
which would then be in force, and stated that the special conditions of the original 
bond order would also remain in effect. 
Id. at 627, 783 S.E.2d 603. 
The trial court set forth on the record the additional bond conditions it intended to impose 
and told Edvalson, “I want it to be very clear, sir, that I don't intend for you to be on the internet 
at all or using any computer or electronic devices....” Following the hearing, the trial court 
entered an order adding the following special conditions to Edvalson's bond: 
1. [Edvalson] shall not use or otherwise access the internet by any means nor shall he access any 
online service of any nature. 
2. [Edvalson] shall not possess, either directly or indirectly, images in any form depicting a child 
under 18 years of age. 
3. [Edvalson] shall not use or possess a computer, tablet, smart phone, or any other device 
capable of accessing the internet. 
After the trial court denied his motion for reconsideration of the order amending his bond 
conditions, Edvalson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, “alleging that the additional 
bond conditions were overbroad, unduly restrictive, and imposed in violation of due process.” 
Edvalson, 298 Ga. at 628. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, and in a 
decision issued on March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court. Id. at 
629. In rejecting Edvalson's claim that the imposition of the amended bond conditions violated 
his due process rights, the Supreme Court noted that “the superior court had the authority to 
impose additional reasonable restrictions on Edvalson's behavior as conditions of his pretrial 
release on bond”; “Edvalson's bond was not revoked and he was not deprived of his freedom by 
incarceration”; “he had a full and fair opportunity to be heard before his bond was modified”; 
and the amended bond conditions were neither overbroad nor punitive in nature. Id. 
While Edvalson's appeal on the writ of habeas corpus was pending, the State re-indicted 
Edvalson, with the new indictment charging Edvalson with 22 counts of sexual exploitation of a 
minor. Several months after the new indictment was handed down, Edvalson filed a motion to 
dismiss and plea of former jeopardy, arguing that the amended bond conditions were punitive, 
rather than remedial; that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars him from being punished twice for 
the same crimes; and that because the State could not punish him further for the indicted crimes, 
the charges against him should be dismissed. The trial court held a hearing on that motion, and 
thereafter denied the same. Edvalson now appeals from that order. 
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, 
and multiple punishments for the same offense.” Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of 
Commissioners, 263 Ga. 63 (1) (1993). In their respective briefs, both Edvalson and the State 
focus on the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments, but in doing so, 
neither party acknowledges the “fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy 
before he can suffer double jeopardy.” Serfass v. U.S., 420 U.S. 377, 393 (IV) (1975). Thus, 
neither party addresses the threshold question presented by this appeal, which is whether 
jeopardy attached as a result of Edvalson's pretrial bond revocation proceeding. See Haynes v. 
State, 245 Ga. 817, 818 (1980) (“[t]he threshold question to be addressed in any case involving 
double jeopardy is whether jeopardy has attached to defendant during the proceedings which he 
contends preclude further prosecution”). 
“In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn. In a 
non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence.” Serfass, 420 U.S. at 
388 (III) (citations omitted). See also Hoke v. State, 326 Ga.App. 71, 74 (1) (2014) (although 
jury had been selected, it had not been sworn, and therefore jeopardy had not attached at the time 
the court dismissed the jury). Thus, “jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition 
[against double jeopardy] can have no application, until a defendant is put to trial before the trier 
of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.” Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388 (III) (citations and 
punctuation omitted). Accordingly, jeopardy does not attach at any pretrial proceeding, including 
a bond revocation hearing. See Wells v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 199, 201 (1973) (a pretrial 
hearing that does not involve a determination as to the guilt or innocence of the accused does not 
trigger jeopardy); See Strickland v. State, 300 Ga.App. 898, 901 (2009) (a hearing on the State's 
motion to modify the defendant's bond conditions was not a “prosecution[ ] for the purposes of 
double jeopardy” and did not cause jeopardy to attach); Smith v. State, 171 Ga.App. 279, 282 
(1984) (“jeopardy [does] not attach to a preliminary hearing”). Given that Edvalson has not yet 
suffered jeopardy, he has no basis for asserting a claim of double jeopardy. Moreover, because 
jeopardy does not attach until the defendant is put to trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
prohibition on multiple punishments forbids only the imposition of multiple punishments 
following the defendant's conviction upon one or more of the indicted crimes. See Whalen v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (I) (1980) (a claim that a defendant's sentence violates the 
double jeopardy clause's prohibition on multiple punishments presents “the question whether 
punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are 
unconstitutionally multiple”) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). See also State v. Marlowe, 
277 Ga. 383 –384 (1) (2003) (discussing whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the 
merger of the defendant's convictions on multiple crimes, so as to avoid the prohibition on 
multiple punishments). As Edvalson's petition for habeas corpus implicitly recognized, it is the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not its Double Jeopardy Clause, that protects a 
defendant from pretrial punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–536 (II) (B) (1979) 
(“under the Due Process Clause, a [defendant] may not be punished prior to an adjudication of 
guilt in accordance with due process of law”). Thus, the appropriate remedy for pretrial 
punishment (including bond conditions that are punitive, rather than remedial) is to bring a 
petition for habeas corpus or other proceeding under the Due Process Clause. See Edvalson, 298 
Ga. at 628 (noting Edvalson's contention that the amended bond conditions violated his due 
process rights because, inter alia, they were “punitive [rather than remedial] in nature”). See also 
Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 587 (1) (b) (1964) (the appropriate remedy for excessive bail is a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus). 
As the foregoing demonstrates, Edvalson has not suffered jeopardy and therefore he 
cannot assert a claim of double jeopardy. In reaching this conclusion, we note that three 
relatively recent decisions from this Court have analyzed a defendant's challenge to the denial of 
his motion to dismiss and plea of former jeopardy that, like Edvalson's plea in bar, was based on 
the argument that pretrial bond conditions constituted punishment within the meaning of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. See Alden, 314 Ga.App. at 440, n. 10 (analyzing defendant's claim that 
allegedly punitive bond conditions entitled him to a plea in bar and noting that because the 
defendant had not been tried, and therefore had been neither convicted nor acquitted of the 
indicted crimes, only the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishments 
could arguably apply to that claim); Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga.App. 614, 616 (1) (2005) 
(analyzing defendant's claim that the trial court's imposition of allegedly punitive bond 
conditions and subsequent revocation of his bond for violating those conditions “subjected him 
to multiple punishments in violation of ... double jeopardy”). To the extent that either Alden or 
Bozzuto can be read as affording a defendant a right to assert a plea of former jeopardy based on 
any pretrial punishment, including any allegedly punitive conditions imposed on a defendant's 
pretrial bail bond, those holdings are disapproved. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the order of the trial court denying Edvalson's motion 
to dismiss and plea of former jeopardy. 
 
Patel v. State, 283 Ga. App. 181 (2006). 
Following his nolo contendere plea to a charge of family violence battery, Viren Patel 
(represented by counsel) moved to withdraw his plea, which motion the court denied. He appeals 
pro se, contending that the court erred in...imposing a special condition on his pre-trial bond that 
precluded him from contacting the victim, revoking his bond for contacting the victim, [and] 
denying his motion to set aside this revocation….Discerning no error, we affirm. 
The undisputed evidence shows that Patel was arrested and charged with one count of 
family violence battery and two counts of simple battery arising out of an alleged violent 
encounter with his wife. He was released from jail on a cash bond with the special condition that 
he “stay away absolutely, directly or indirectly, by person, telephone, messenger or any other 
means of communication from [his wife].” He acknowledged that “upon a violation of any of 
these special conditions, my bond may be revoked.” 
Alleging that Patel violated this special condition by accompanying his wife to court to 
have her dismiss a separate temporary protective order against him, the State moved the court to 
revoke the bond. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Patel was represented by counsel, 
the court revoked the bond. Two weeks later, Patel (with advice of counsel) negotiated with the 
State and decided to plead nolo contendere to the family violence battery charge; he was 
sentenced to thirty days imprisonment plus eleven months probation. Conditions of probation 
included 20 days of community service plus no violent contact with his wife. 
Obtaining a new attorney, Patel timely moved to withdraw his nolo plea, claiming that he 
was coerced into making the plea and that his sentence was greater than that negotiated. 
Following another evidentiary hearing, the court denied this motion and later denied a motion to 
reconsider this ruling. The court further denied Patel's motion to transfer venue and his motion to 
set aside the order revoking bond. Filing an affidavit of indigence, Patel moved the court to 
appoint appellate counsel for him. Based on evidence presented at a third hearing, the court 
found Patel's testimony of indigence incredible and denied the appointment of appellate counsel. 
Patel appeals pro se. 
*** 
Patel's...enumeration claims that the trial court lacked the authority to impose the special 
bond condition that Patel have no contact with his wife. For offenses involving an act of family 
violence, OCGA § 17–6–1(f)(2) expressly authorizes special bond conditions that the accused 
“hav[e] no contact of any kind or character with the victim.” Even without this express statutory 
authorization, the trial court has inherent authority to impose such conditions when the defendant 
is charged with a violent crime against a specific victim. This enumeration must fail. 
Patel's [next] enumeration charges that the trial court erred in revoking his pre-trial bond. 
However, since Patel subsequently entered a nolo plea and is now free on supersedeas bond, this 
issue is moot, particularly since we affirm in Division 4 below the court's judgment denying the 
withdrawal of that plea.  
Moreover, even if the issue were not moot, Patel's argument that no evidence supported 
the court's order revoking the bond fails. The bond's special condition mandated that Patel “stay 
away absolutely, directly or indirectly, by person, telephone, messenger or any other means of 
communication from [his wife].” At the hearing on the bond revocation, one witness testified 
that Patel admitted (i) he had been communicating with his wife through a mutual friend and (ii) 
he met with his wife at the courthouse to have her withdraw a temporary protective order against 
him. Another witness testified that she saw Patel in the clerk's office with his wife and that he sat 
directly behind her in the courtroom. Thus, some evidence supported the trial court's finding that 
Patel had violated the special bond condition, which justified the revocation of the bond.  
Patel complains that the trial court admitted certain hearsay testimony during the bond 
revocation hearing. However, even assuming that such evidence was inadmissible hearsay, we 
note that in hearings where the trial judge is the finder of fact, “there is a presumption, in the 
absence of a strong showing to the contrary, that the trial judge sifts the wheat from the chaff, 
ignoring illegal evidence and considering only legal evidence.” (Punctuation omitted.) Allen v. 
State. As no showing to the contrary was made here, we must affirm. See King v. State. 
In his argument on this enumeration, Patel also alleges that the trial court erred in denying his 
pro se motion to continue the bond revocation hearing. However, this ruling was not enumerated 
as error in any of Patel's enumerations of error. Therefore, “the arguments in his brief that a 
[continuance] should have been granted are not before us.  
Because the issue is moot and because in any case the court did not err in revoking the 
bond, Patel's ...enumeration of error fails.  
 
Clarke v. State, 228 Ga. App. 219 (1997). 
This is a case of first impression for this Court. Max Clarke challenges the trial court's 
authority to place conditions on his bail bond and the trial court's authority to revoke bail when 
he violated those conditions. 
Clarke was arrested for committing battery and simple battery on November 18, 1996, on 
a woman acquaintance. Bail was set on November 22, 1996, in the amount of $2,500; bail was 
conditioned upon the following provision: that Clarke “not intimidate, threaten, harass, verbally 
or physically abuse or harm [the victim]. [Clarke] is to have no contact with [the victim], either 
... personal contact or at her place of residence or her place of employment. Do not telephone or 
write letters to [the victim]. Do not engage in any type of following or surveillance behavior as 
described in OCGA § 16–5–90.” 
On December 23, 1996, the State filed a motion to revoke the bail bond, asserting that 
Clarke violated the conditions. Clarke made an oral motion to dismiss the State's motion, 
asserting that defendants charged with a misdemeanor cannot be denied bail. Following a motion 
hearing, the trial court denied Clarke's motion to dismiss. Recognizing that this was a case of 
first impression in Georgia, the trial court granted a Certificate of Immediate Review. This 
appeal follows.  
*** 
Clarke first challenges the trial court's power to place conditions on bail in misdemeanor 
cases absent statutory authority. In support of this enumeration, Clarke asserts that placing such 
conditions on bail is the same thing as refusing to set bail, and that the Code forbids the trial 
court from denying bail in a misdemeanor case. OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(1). We find no merit in 
Clarke's analysis. OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(1) does not require the court to set unconditional bail, nor 
does it invade the judge's discretion as to how much bail may be set. In this case, Clarke was not 
denied bail; he was, in fact, released on a bail bond prior to his violation of the conditions 
thereon. 
Further, we find that the trial court had inherent authority to place such conditions, which 
will be upheld by this Court absent an abuse of discretion. The trial court has inherent discretion 
to release a misdemeanor defendant on his own recognizance pending trial or to require payment 
of a bail bond. OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(1). However, in lieu of setting a higher bail, which may 
preclude a defendant from being released at all prior to trial, a trial court may choose to impose 
reasonable restrictions on a defendant's behavior. When a defendant is charged with a violent 
crime against a specific victim, it is within the trial court's inherent powers to require that the 
defendant avoid any contact with the victim as a condition of remaining free pending trial. Such 
condition is not arbitrary or capricious; it is a reasonable response to the trial court's function of 
balancing the defendant's rights with the public's safety interests, while avoiding the intimidation 
of prosecuting witnesses. Birge v. State, 238 Ga. 88, 90, 230 S.E.2d 895 (1976). This rule 
bridges the gap between two seemingly inconsistent statutory provisions: (1) the absolute 
requirement of bail for committing misdemeanor offenses under OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(1), and (2) 
the trial court's limited authorization “to release a person on bail if the court finds that the person 
... [p]oses no significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to any property in 
the community,” under OCGA § 17–6–1(e)(2).  
In actual practice, the monetary bond ensures the defendant's presence at trial, while the 
conditions protect the victim/witness' safety. Although the Georgia legislature specifically has 
allowed bond conditions in cases of family violence, stalking, or driving while intoxicated, 
OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(2)(A), (B); (b)(3); (f)(2), the absence of such statutory authority does not 
preclude such conditions when the trial court, in its discretion, believes the conditions are 
appropriate and necessary under the facts of the case. 
In this case, Clarke was charged with battery against a specific female victim. It was not 
unreasonable to forbid him from threatening, harassing, stalking, or abusing her as conditions of 
his release pending trial. There was no abuse of discretion in setting such conditions of bail. 
Clarke also asserts that the trial court has no authority to revoke his bond following his violation 
of the bail conditions. However, the trial court has express authority under OCGA § 15–1–3(3) 
to “compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process and to the orders of a judge out of 
court in an action or proceeding therein.” Inherent in such provision is the power to address 
wilful violations of court mandates; without such authority, bail bond conditions would be 
rendered meaningless. 
In Hood v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579, 580–581, 481 S.E.2d 525 (1997), the Supreme Court of 
Georgia stated that they were “unaware of and the parties have not presented any specific 
guidelines under Georgia law pertaining to a trial court's power to revoke a bond. It is clear that 
trial courts have such power ...,” as long as the trial courts provide at least minimal due process 
protection prior to the revocation. (Footnote omitted.) “[C]ourts must be vested with authority to 
act promptly to protect the victim and enforce the bond conditions imposed.” Id. at 582, 481 
S.E.2d 525. Notably, Hood involved a defendant who was charged with stalking, and there is a 
specific statutory provision allowing the trial court to impose bond conditions or, if necessary, to 
deny bail in order to protect the victim. OCGA § 17–6–1(b)(3). However, in Division 1, supra, 
we found that the trial court has the inherent authority to place reasonable conditions on a 
defendant's bond. Therefore, under Hood, it is clear that the trial court also has the authority to 
revoke the bond if, following a hearing, the trial court determines that the defendant violated 
those conditions. See also Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642, 644, 5 L.Ed.2d 683, 686 
(1961) (holding that, even in the presence of an absolute right to bail, “on principle, [trial courts] 
have authority, as an incident of their inherent powers to manage the conduct of proceedings 
before them, to revoke bail during the course of a criminal trial, when such action is appropriate 
to the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice”). 
Further, even absent specific bail bond conditions prohibiting contact with a victim, a 
trial court's authority to revoke a defendant's bond may be found under OCGA § 17–17–7, which 
states that the State may move a trial court to revoke a defendant's bond upon a victim's assertion 
of “acts or threats of physical violence or intimidation by the accused....”1 Such language clearly 
indicates a legislative intent to allow bond revocation when necessary to protect the victim from 
further violence. 
In this case, Clarke was charged with battery, and bail was issued with the condition that 
he stay away from the victim. However, the State asserts that Clarke went to the victim's place of 
employment and made threatening statements toward third persons regarding the victim; Clarke 
was arrested after he refused to leave the premises. 
On remand, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine if Clarke's actions 
constituted a violation of the conditions of his bail bond. If such violation is found, the trial court 
is authorized to decide whether to revoke Clarke's bail bond, raise the amount of bail, set more 
restrictive conditions on the bail, or hold Clarke in criminal contempt of court. 
 
Charging Documents 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 




2. What is a general demurrer? 
3. What is a special demurrer? 
4. What is the benefit of tracking statutory language when drafting charging documents and 
when does tracking the statutory language create an issue? 
5. Referencing specific part of the statute can matter; why? 
6. When do dates matter? 
7. When do names of victims matter? 
8. What crimes can be accused, and what do they have in common? 
9. Why is venue important? 
10. When do you have to allege prior convictions? 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50 
Any person who is arrested for a crime and who is refused bail shall, within 90 days after the 
date of confinement, be entitled to have the charge against him or her heard by a grand jury 
having jurisdiction over the accused person; provided, however, that if the person is arrested for 
a crime for which the death penalty is being sought, the superior court may, upon motion of the 
district attorney for an extension and after a hearing and good cause shown, grant one extension 
to the 90 day period not to exceed 90 additional days; and, provided, further, that if such 
extension is granted by the court, the person shall not be entitled to have the charge against him 
or her heard by the grand jury until the expiration of such extended period. In the event no grand 
jury considers the charges against the accused person within the 90 day period of confinement or 
within the extended period of confinement where such an extension is granted by the court, the 
accused shall have bail set upon application to the court. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-51 
All special presentments by the grand jury charging defendants with violations of the penal laws 
shall be treated as indictments. It shall not be necessary for the clerk of the court to enter the 
special presentments in full upon the minutes, but only the statement of the case and finding of 
the grand jury as in cases of indictments. It shall not be necessary for the district attorney to 
frame bills of indictment on the special presentments, but he may arraign defendants upon the 
special presentments and put them on trial in like manner as if the presentments were bills of 
indictment. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54 
(a) Every indictment of the grand jury which states the offense in the terms and language of this 
Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury 
shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct. The form of every indictment shall be 
substantially as follows: 
 
Georgia, _____ County. 
The grand jurors selected, chosen, and sworn for the County of _____, to wit: _____, in the name 
and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse (name of the accused) of the county and 
state aforesaid with the offense of _____; for that the said (name of the accused) (state with 
sufficient certainty the offense and the time and place of committing the same), contrary to the 
laws of said state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof. 
 
(b) If there should be more than one count, each additional count shall state: 
 
And the jurors aforesaid, in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, further charge and 
accuse (name of the accused) with having committed the offense of _____; for that the said 
(name of the accused) (state with sufficient certainty the offense and the time and place of 
committing the same) contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace, and dignity 
thereof. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70 
(a) In all felony cases, other than cases involving capital felonies, in which defendants have been 
bound over to the superior court, are confined in jail or released on bond pending a commitment 
hearing, or are in jail having waived a commitment hearing, the district attorney shall have 
authority to prefer accusations, and such defendants shall be tried on such accusations, provided 
that defendants going to trial under such accusations shall, in writing, waive indictment by a 
grand jury. 
(b) Judges of the superior court may open their courts at any time without the presence of either a 
grand jury or a trial jury to receive and act upon pleas of guilty in misdemeanor cases and in 
felony cases, except those punishable by death or life imprisonment, when the judge and the 
defendant consent thereto. The judge may try the issues in such cases without a jury upon an 
accusation filed by the district attorney where the defendant has waived indictment and 
consented thereto in writing and counsel is present in court representing the defendant either by 
virtue of his employment or by appointment by the court. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1 
(a) 
(1) In felony cases involving violations of the following: 
(A) Code Sections 16-8-2, 16-8-14, 16-8-18, 16-9-1, 16-9-20, 16-9-31, 16-9-33, 
16-9-37, 16-10-52, and 40-5-58; 
(B) Article 1 of Chapter 8 of Title 16, relating to theft; 
(C) Chapter 9 of Title 16, relating to forgery and fraudulent practices; 
(D) Article 3 of Chapter 10 of Title 16, relating to escape and other offenses 
related to confinement; or 
(E) Code Section 16-11-131, relating to possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon or first offender probationer, 
in which defendants have either been bound over to the superior court based on a finding 
of probable cause pursuant to a commitment hearing under Article 2 of this chapter or 
have expressly or by operation of law waived a commitment hearing, the district attorney 
shall have authority to prefer accusations, and the defendants shall be tried on such 
accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to 
defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. 
(2) All laws relating to rights and responsibilities attendant to indicted cases shall be 
applicable to cases brought by accusations signed by the district attorney. 
(3) The accusation need not be supported by an affidavit except in those cases in which 
the defendant has not been previously arrested in conjunction with the transaction 
charged in the accusation. 
(a.1) The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall apply to violations of Code 
Section 16-13-30 whenever there has been a finding of probable cause pursuant to a commitment 
hearing under Article 2 of this chapter or the accused has waived either expressly or by operation 
of law the right to this hearing. 
(b) Judges of the superior court may open their courts at any time without the presence of either a 
grand jury or a trial jury to receive and act upon pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in felony and 
misdemeanor cases. The judge of the superior court may try the issues in such cases without a 
jury upon an indictment or upon an accusation filed by the district attorney where the defendant 
has waived trial by jury. 
(c) An accusation substantially complying with the form provided in subsections (d) and (e) of 
Code Section 17-7-71 shall in all cases be sufficient. 
(d) The district attorney may not bring an accusation pursuant to this Code section in those cases 
where the grand jury has heard evidence or conducted an investigation or in which a no bill has 
been returned. 
(e) Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (d) of this Code section, nothing in this Code section 
shall affect the rights of public officials to appear before a grand jury as provided in Code 
Sections 45-11-4 and 45-15-11 or peace officers to appear before a grand jury as provided in 
Code Section 17-7-52. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-71 
(a) In all misdemeanor cases, the defendant may be tried upon an accusation framed and signed 
by the prosecuting attorney of the court. The accusation need not be supported by an affidavit 
except in those cases where the defendant has not been previously arrested in conjunction with 
the transaction charged in the accusation and where the accusation is to be used as the basis for 
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant. 
(b) 
(1) In all misdemeanor cases arising out of violations of the laws of this state, relating to 
(A) the operation and licensing of motor vehicles and operators;  
(B) the width, height, and length of vehicles and loads;  
(C) motor common carriers and motor contract carriers; or  
(D) road taxes on motor carriers as provided in Article 2 of Chapter 9 of Title 48, 
the defendant may be tried upon the uniform traffic citation and complaint 
provided for in Article 1 of Chapter 13 of Title 40. 
(2) In all misdemeanor cases arising out of violations of the laws of this state relating to 
game, fish, or boating, the defendant may be tried upon the summons provided for in 
Code Section 27-1-35. 
(c) Every accusation which states the offense in the terms and language of the law or so plainly 
that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury shall be deemed 
sufficiently technical and correct. 
(d) An accusation substantially complying with the following form shall in all cases be 
sufficient: 
 
IN THE _____ COURT OF _____ COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA 
On behalf of the people of the State of Georgia, the undersigned, as prosecuting attorney for the 
county and state aforesaid, does hereby charge and accuse (name of accused) with the offense of 
_____; for that the said (name of accused) (state with sufficient certainty the offense and the time 






(e) If there should be more than one count, each additional count shall state: 
 
The undersigned, as prosecuting attorney, does further charge and accuse the said (name of 
accused) with the offense of _____ (the offense as before); for that the said (name of accused) 
(state with sufficient certainty the offense and the time and place it occurred), contrary to the 
laws of this state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof. 
 
(f) Prior to trial, the prosecuting attorney may amend the accusation, summons, or any citation to 
allege or to change the allegations regarding any offense arising out of the same conduct of the 
defendant which gave rise to any offense alleged or attempted to be alleged in the original 
accusation, summons, or citation. A copy of any such amendment shall be served upon the 
defendant or his or her counsel and the original filed with the clerk of the court. On motion, the 
court shall grant the defendant a continuance which is reasonably necessitated by an amendment. 
If any additional charges against the defendant are made the judge shall advise the defendant that 
he or she has an automatic right to a continuance. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-72 
In probate courts which have jurisdiction over misdemeanor possession of marijuana in 
accordance with Code Sections 16-13-2 and 16-13-30 and certain misdemeanor violations of 
Code Section 3-3-23 pursuant to Code Section 15-9-30.6, the following offenses may be tried 
upon a summons or citation without an accusation: 
(1) Possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, in accordance with Code Sections 16-
13-2 and 16-13-30; and 
(2) Any violation of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of Code Section 3-3-23 which is 
punishable as a misdemeanor, but not violations punishable as high and aggravated 
misdemeanors. 
 





City of Peachtree City v. Shaver, 276 Ga. 298 (2003). 
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Shaver v. City of Peachtree City, 
253 Ga.App. 212 (2002), to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that a 
uniform traffic citation, see OCGA § 40–13–1 and the Rules of Department of Public Safety, 
Rule 570–19–.01, cannot be used as a charging instrument for the non-traffic offense of underage 
possession of alcohol. See OCGA § 3–3–23(a)(2). The Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding 
that the uniform traffic citation in this case could not be so used. Accordingly, we reverse. 
On September 16, 1999, Eric Shaver (“Shaver”) was arrested for underage possession of 
alcohol and issued a uniform traffic citation. The uniform traffic citation stated the offense and 
referred to the Code section alleged to have been violated, OCGA § 3–3–23. According to a 
stipulation in lieu of a transcript, prior to trial in the municipal court, Shaver objected to the use 
of the uniform traffic citation, arguing that it was not a valid charging instrument for non-traffic 
offenses. 
The Municipal Court of Peachtree City denied the objection, and Shaver was convicted 
and sentenced to pay a fine and serve a period of time on probation. On certiorari, the superior 
court affirmed the conviction. Shaver sought a discretionary appeal in the Court of Appeals, 
which granted review. See OCGA § 5–6–35(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed the superior 
court, holding that a uniform traffic citation cannot be used to prosecute the non-traffic offense 
of underage possession of alcohol, and that consequently the municipal court lacked jurisdiction 
to try Shaver for the offense of underage possession of alcohol. 
Municipal courts, such as the Municipal Court of Peachtree City, are granted jurisdiction 
“to try and dispose of first offense violations” of possession of alcoholic beverages by a person 
under 21 years of age. OCGA § 36–32–10(a). And the General Assembly has specifically 
provided that one charged with the offense of possession of alcoholic beverages by a person 
under the age of 21 may be arrested upon a citation which shall enumerate the specific charges 
against the person and either the date upon which the person is to appear and answer the charges 
or a notation that the person will be later notified of the date upon which the person is to appear 
and answer the charges. If the person charged shall fail to appear as required, the judge having 
jurisdiction of the offense may issue a warrant or other order directing the apprehension of such 
person and commanding that such person be brought before the court to answer the charges 
contained within the citation and the charge of his or her failure to appear as required. OCGA § 
3–3–23.1(d). 
Clearly, under OCGA § 3–3–23.1(d), no formal accusation is contemplated, and the 
defendant may be prosecuted on the citation. Thus, a citation is a proper charging instrument for 
this offense in municipal court. The only question then, is whether the uniform traffic citation 
can serve as that charging instrument. OCGA § 3–3–23.1(d) sets forth certain requirements that 
the instrument must meet, and the uniform traffic citation at issue here met those requirements. 
The uniform traffic citation named the offense and specifically provided that it was OCGA § 3–
3–23 that was alleged to have been violated. The uniform traffic citation also informed Shaver 
that he was to appear at 8:30 a.m. on October 6, 1999 in the Municipal Court of Peachtree City to 
respond to the charge, and provided the court's street address. Nothing else is required by OCGA 
§ 3–3–23.1(d).3 
Shaver argues that, nonetheless, the uniform traffic citation cannot serve as a citation for 
this offense because OCGA § 17–7–71(b)(1) limits the offenses for which the uniform traffic 
citation can be used as a charging instrument, and underage possession of alcohol is not one of 
them. Shaver particularly points to State v. Rustin, 208 Ga.App. 431, 435 (1993), which 
addressed OCGA § 17–7–71 and stated that “[t]he import of these statutory and regulatory 
provisions is that a uniform traffic citation and complaint may serve as an accusation only for 
traffic offenses” and is not available to be used as a charging instrument for other, non-traffic 
offenses. (Emphasis supplied.). However, this reliance is misplaced. Rustin addressed OCGA § 
17–7–71, which by its own terms does not apply to a municipal court, but only to “superior, 
state, or county courts.” OCGA § 17–7–71(a). And OCGA § 17–7–71 deals with accusations, not 
citations, and is silent as to whether the uniform traffic citation can serve as a citation in a non-
traffic offense; the uniform traffic citation is only mentioned therein as an exception to the 
accusation procedure. Rustin was also specifically concerned with the amendment of an 
accusation under OCGA § 17–7–71(f), and no such question is presented here; not only is this 
prosecution not under an accusation, but there has been no attempt to amend the citation. Thus, 
Rustin is irrelevant as regards any consideration of the use of a uniform traffic citation as a 
citation for a non-traffic offense, and Rustin's statement that “a uniform traffic citation and 
complaint may serve as an accusation only for traffic offenses,” does not apply. (Emphasis 
supplied.) Rustin, supra at 435, 430 S.E.2d 765. 
Nor does there appear to be any other impediment to allowing a uniform traffic citation to 
serve as a citation under OCGA § 3–3–23.1(d). Although the uniform traffic citation was 
established to create a standard charging instrument for traffic offenses throughout the State, the 
uniform traffic citation is simply a printed form, promulgated by the Department of Public 
Safety. Neither the statute authorizing it nor the administrative rule establishing it restrict it to 
traffic offenses. See OCGA § 40–13–1; Rules of Department of Public Safety, Rule 570–19–.01. 
The administrative rule simply requires that it “shall be used by all law enforcement officers who 
are empowered to enforce the traffic laws and ordinances in effect in this State.” Rules of 
Department of Public Safety, Rule 570–19–.01. And OCGA § 40–13–1 contemplates the 
uniform traffic citation to be a versatile document, stating that the “form shall serve as the 
citation, summons, accusation, or other instrument of prosecution of the offense or offenses for 
which the accused is charged, and as the record of the disposition of the matter by the court 
before which the accused is brought....” But for the appearance of the words “Uniform Traffic” 
at the top of the form, the propriety of using the document as a citation under OCGA § 3–3–
23.1(d) would not even be an issue. Thus, the appearance of those words does not render it 
improper as a charging instrument under OCGA § 3–3–23.1(d). 
Further, even if the Court of Appeals had been correct in reading Rustin as preventing the 
uniform traffic citation from serving as a charging instrument against Shaver, it applied an 
incorrect analysis. The Court of Appeals held: “Peachtree City lacked a valid charging 
instrument. Accordingly, we agree that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to try Shaver for 
such offense.” (Citation omitted.) Shaver, supra at 213. In no way does the failure to have “a 
valid charging instrument” equate to a failure of jurisdiction over the case, and the Court of 
Appeals' reliance on Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736 (1999), for that proposition is misplaced. 
Weatherbed did not deal with a charging instrument that failed for reasons of form, but with a 
prosecution that proceeded on an accusation, when an instrument of entirely different character-
an indictment-was required. Here there is a charging instrument of the proper character-a 
citation-and the only possible failing is one of form. 
A defendant is entitled to a charging instrument that is perfect in form as well as 
substance, and the proper method to challenge the form of such instrument is a special demurrer. 
State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 485 (1977); Dennard v. State, 243 Ga.App. 868, 877(2) (2000). 
But the standard of review occasioned by the trial court's denial of a special demurrer is harmless 
error; the question then becomes whether the defense was prejudiced by the incorrect form. 
Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 819–820(1) (2000); Blackwelder v. State, 256 Ga. 283, 284(4) 
(1986). And in no manner did the inclusion of the words “Uniform Traffic” on the citation 
prejudice Shaver's ability to defend the charge. Thus, even had the Court of Appeals been correct 
in determining that the charging instrument here was invalid, the conviction still should not have 
been reversed. 
 
Sexton-Johnson v. State, 354 Ga. App. 646 (2020), reconsideration denied (Mar. 19, 2020), cert. 
granted (Dec. 7, 2020). 
*** 
Count 3 of the indictment charged Sexton-Johnson 
with the offense of POSSESSION OF OPEN CONTAINER OF ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGE WHILE OPERATING A VEHICLE (O.C.G.A. 40-6-253) for the said 
accused ... did possess an open container of an alcoholic beverage ... while operating a 
vehicle ... said container was not in the possession of a passenger and was not located in a 
locked glove compartment, locked trunk, or other locked non-passenger area of the 
vehicle. ... 
Sexton-Johnson contends that “[o]peration of a vehicle contemporaneous with possession of the 
open container is not an essential element of the crime.” She intimates that in order for the State 
to have charged her sufficiently with an open container violation under OCGA § 40-6-253, the 
State needed to allege that she possessed the open alcoholic beverage containers in the passenger 
area of the motor vehicle on the “roadway or shoulder of [a] public highway.” OCGA § 40-6-
253 (b) (1) (B) provides that “[a] person shall not ... [p]ossess any open alcoholic beverage 
container in the passenger area of  any motor vehicle which is on the roadway or shoulder of any 
public highway.” We agree. 
A general demurrer challenges the validity of an indictment by asserting that the 
substance of the indictment is legally insufficient to charge any crime. In other words, a 
general demurrer is essentially a claim that the indictment is fatally defective and, 
therefore, void, because it fails to allege facts that constitute the charged crime or any 
other crime, including a lesser included offense of the charged crime. 
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Everhart, 337 Ga. App. at 353-354 (3) (a). See also Coleman 
v. State, 318 Ga. App. 478, 479 (1) (2012). A general demurrer “should be granted only when an 
indictment is absolutely void in that it fails to charge the accused with any act made a crime by 
the law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Poole v. State, 326 Ga. App. 243, 247 (2) (a) 
(2014). 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that criminal defendants 
shall “be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.” It is established in 
Georgia that satisfaction of this fundamental principle requires that a criminal indictment which 
does not recite language from the Code must allege every essential element of the crime charged. 
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Everhart, 337 Ga. App. at 354-355 (3) (a). As we reiterated 
in Everhart, “there can be no conviction for the commission of a crime an essential element of 
which is not charged in the indictment. If an accused individual can admit to all of the allegations 
in an indictment and still be not guilty of a crime, then the indictment generally is insufficient 
and must be declared void.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 355 (3) (a), 786 S.E.2d 866. 
Here, Sexton-Johnson could have admitted all the allegations in Count 3 and still not be 
guilty of a crime. Indeed, it might be possible for one to possess an open container of alcoholic 
beverage while operating a motor vehicle in a parking lot or driveway and not be guilty of 
violating OCGA § 40-6-253. Had trial counsel filed a motion to quash the open container charge, 
asserting that it was subject to a general demurrer, the trial court would have been required to 
dismiss the charge. “Accordingly, [Sexton-Johnson's] trial counsel's failure to challenge this 
count constitutes deficient performance, contributed to [her] conviction on a void count, and 
therefore harmed [her] and prejudiced [her] case.” Everhart, 337 Ga. App. at 355 (3) (a). Sexton-
Johnson's conviction on Count 3 is therefore reversed. 
 
State v. Delaby, 298 Ga. App. 723 (2009). 
The State of Georgia appeals from the trial court's partial grant of Ronald Charles 
Delaby's special demurrer to an indictment charging him with two counts of influencing a 
witness pursuant to OCGA § 16–10–93. 
This case arises out of the separate criminal prosecution of David Daniel for child 
molestation. Delaby was employed as a private investigator to assist in Daniel's defense, and in 
March 2006, he conducted a recorded interview with the victim, D.K. Daniel's defense team 
provided the prosecution a tape and transcript of that interview through discovery procedures, 
and Delaby was subsequently arrested based upon that recording. A Forsyth County grand jury 
indicted Delaby on April 18, 2008, and he filed his special demurrer on May 7, 2008. 
“By [filing a] special demurrer[,] an accused claims, not that the charge in an indictment 
... is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as would be asserted by general 
demurrer), but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to 
more information.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Jones, 251 Ga.App. 192, 193 (2001). See also 
State v. Gamblin, 251 Ga.App. 283(1) (2001). 
The Georgia courts apply a stricter analysis to indictments like Delaby's, to which a 
special demurrer has been filed before trial, than to special demurrers considered after trial: 
Because we are reviewing [an] indictment before any trial, we do not conduct a harmless 
error analysis to determine if he has actually been prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies 
in the indictment; rather, we must apply the rule that a defendant who has timely filed a 
special demurrer is entitled to an indictment perfect in form and substance. 
(Footnote omitted.) Blackmon v. State, 272 Ga.App. 854 (2005). Under Georgia law, an 
indictment that “states the offense in the terms and language of [the applicable Code section] or 
so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury shall be 
deemed sufficiently technical and correct.” OCGA § 17–7–54(a). The real test, therefore, is not 
whether the indictment could have been clearer, but whether it states the elements of the offense 
and “sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any 
other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with 
accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.” (Citations and 
punctuation omitted.) State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 346(2)(a) (2003). Thus, “[i]t is useful to 
remember that the purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense 
intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. 
The applicable statute in this case provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to use intimidation, physical force, or 
threats; to persuade another person by means of corruption or to attempt to do so; or to 
engage in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to ... [i]nfluence, delay, 
or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding. 
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16–10–93(b)(1)(A).  
The trial court granted the demurrer as to Count 1 of the indictment, which alleged that 
on March 31, 2006, Delaby “did knowingly use intimidation with the intent to influence the 
testimony of [D.K.], in an official proceeding....” The trial court acknowledged that Count 1 
tracked the language of the statute and that an indictment tracking statutory language is generally 
deemed sufficient. See State v. Austin, 297 Ga.App. 478 (2009) (“By tracking the statute, the 
state presented a technically correct allegation.”) (footnote omitted); Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 
72(2) (1980). But the trial court also found that “[w]here the statutory definition of an offense 
includes generic terms, the indictment must state the species of acts charged; it must descend to 
particulars.” (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Lee v. State, 117 Ga.App. 765, 766 
(1968). The court found that in this context the word “ ‘intimidation’ must be alleged with 
greater clearness,” and as alleged, the indictment did not “sufficiently apprise” Delaby of “what 
he must be prepared to meet at trial.” 
The State argues that the trial court erred in granting the demurrer as to Count 1 because 
the word “intimidation” has been defined by Georgia courts in the context of robbery by 
intimidation. But the definition of “intimidation” in that context does not resolve the issue of 
whether the language of Delaby's indictment was sufficient to apprise him of what he must 
defend at his trial for influencing a witness. Moreover, the cases upholding indictments for 
robbery by force or intimidation cited by the State are inapposite. One of the cases considered 
the validity of an indictment after the defendant had already been convicted. Ramsey v. State, 
212 Ga. 381(1) (1956). That indictment, therefore, would be subject to a less stringent analysis. 
Additionally, each of the indictments in those cases provided at least some factual detail to 
support the crime charged, as each alleged that the defendant took a specific amount of money 
from the victim violently and by force.  
*** 
No similarly specific facts appear in the language of Count 1 in this case. 
An indictment must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to 
meet. “The defendant is entitled to know the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to 
enable him to prepare for trial.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Black, 149 Ga.App. 389, 390–
391(3) (1979). Applying this principle in Military Circle Pet Center No. 94 v. State, 181 Ga.App. 
657 (1987), this Court reversed the denial of a special demurrer, holding that the use of the term 
“neglect” in an accusation alleging cruelty to animals was generic even though it tracked the 
statutory language. The Court found that the accusation was required to assert the manner in 
which the defendants were negligent in order to withstand a special demurrer: 
Appellants ... were charged only with causing unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or 
death by “neglect,” without specifying the manner in which they were negligent. Since 
their negligence could have taken many forms, such as failure to provide adequate food 
and water, physical abuse, failure to treat a disease, etc., the failure to charge the manner 
in which the crime was committed subjected the accusations to a special demurrer. 
Id. at 658(1)(a) 
Similarly in this case, the intimidation of a witness could come in a number of ways, 
none of which is alleged in the indictment. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the use of 
the statutory language in Count 1 of the indictment was generic and did not adequately inform 
Delaby of the facts constituting the offense alleged against him. Because Delaby filed a timely 
special demurrer, he was entitled to an indictment that was perfect in form and substance. Count 
1 of Delaby's indictment failed to meet that standard, and we affirm the trial court's grant of the 
special demurrer to that count. 
 
Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878 (2017). 
Heather Leigh Kimbrough and Melissa Ann Mayfield were charged by indictment with a 
violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The 
indictment alleges that Kimbrough and Mayfield, being associated with an enterprise, violated 
the Act by participating in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, 
see OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), and it identifies the alleged enterprise and pattern of racketeering 
activity. But other than the allegation that Kimbrough and Mayfield participated in the enterprise 
“through” a pattern of racketeering activity, the indictment says nothing at all about the alleged 
connection between the enterprise and the racketeering. Seeking more detail about that alleged 
connection, Kimbrough and Mayfield filed special demurrers. The trial court, however, denied 
the special demurrers, and Kimbrough and Mayfield appealed.  
In Kimbrough v. State, 336 Ga.App. 381, 384-386 (2) (b) (i) (2016), the Court of Appeals 
held that the indictment contains enough detail about the connection between the enterprise and 
the racketeering activity to survive a special demurrer, and it affirmed the denial of Kimbrough 
and Mayfield’s special demurrers. We issued a writ of certiorari to review that decision, and for 
the reasons that follow, we reverse. 
In July 2013, a Gwinnett County grand jury returned a 50-count indictment against 
Kimbrough, Mayfield, Jason Dennis Doerr, and Samantha Shay Downard. Count 1 charges all of 
the defendants with a violation of the RICO Act, alleging that they, “being associated with an 
enterprise[,] to wit: Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation, did participate in, directly and 
indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Count 1 further alleges that 
the pattern of racketeering activity consists of multiple violations of the Georgia Controlled 
Substances Act. More specifically, Count 1 alleges that the racketeering activity involved the 
defendants unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone (a Schedule II controlled substance) by 
“withholding information from various [medical] practitioners ... that [the defendants] had 
obtained a controlled substance of a similar therapeutic use in a concurrent time period from 
another practitioner.” See OCGA § 16-13-43 (a) (6). Count 1 says that the pattern of racketeering 
activity is “more particularly described” in subsequent counts of the indictment, and indeed, 
nineteen other counts charge various defendants with unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by 
withholding information from a medical practitioner. The remaining 30 counts charge various 
other violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Altogether, the indictment identifies Executive 
Wellness and Rehabilitation as the enterprise at the bottom of the RICO charge, alleges that the 
defendants were associated with the enterprise and participated in it “through” a pattern of 
racketeering activity, and specifies nineteen predicate acts of racketeering that form the alleged 
pattern of racketeering activity. The indictment says nothing more, however, about the nature of 
the alleged connection between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity. By their 
special demurrers, Kimbrough and Mayfield insisted upon greater detail about that connection. 
An indictment may be challenged by general or special demurrer. A general demurrer 
“challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment.” Green v. State, 292 Ga. 451, 452 
(2013) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). If the accused could admit each and every fact 
alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of any crime, the indictment is subject to a general 
demurrer. See Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) (2003). If, however, the admission of the facts 
alleged would lead necessarily to the conclusion that the accused is guilty of a crime, the 
indictment is sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. See id. A special demurrer, on the other 
hand, “challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment.” Green, 292 Ga. at 452 (citation 
and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). By filing a special demurrer, the accused claims 
“not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction 
(as would be asserted by general demurrer), but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or 
that the accused is entitled to more information.” State v. Delaby, 298 Ga.App. 723, 724, 645 
(2009)(punctuation and citation omitted). 
“Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment by the filing of a special 
demurrer before going to trial, [s]he is entitled to an indictment perfect in form.” State v. Grube, 
293 Ga. 257, 259 (2) (2013). Even so, an indictment does not have to contain “every detail of the 
crime” to withstand a special demurrer. State v. English, 276 Ga. at 346 (2) (a) (2003). 
According to OCGA § 17-7-54 (a), an indictment “shall be deemed sufficiently technical and 
correct” if it “states the offense in the terms and language of this Code or so plainly that the 
nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury.” Subsection 17-7-54 (a) also 
requires, however, that an indictment state the offense “with sufficient certainty.” Consistent 
with these statutory directives, we have held that an indictment not only must state the essential 
elements of the offense charged, see Henderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 538 (3) (2010), but it 
also must allege the underlying facts with enough detail to “sufficiently apprise[ ] the defendant 
of what he must be prepared to meet.” State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 346 (2) (a) (2003) (citation 
and punctuation omitted). As we have explained, when a court considers whether an indictment 
is sufficient to withstand a special demurrer, “[i]t is useful to remember that [a] purpose of the 
indictment is to allow [a] defendant to prepare [her] defense intelligently.” English, 276 Ga. at 
346 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). 
Turning to the indictment in this case, Count 1 charges Kimbrough and Mayfield with a 
violation of OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, 
such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” An essential element of this offense is 
a connection or nexus between the enterprise and the racketeering activity. See Dorsey v. State, 
279 Ga. 534, 540 (2) (b) (2005) (holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain RICO conviction 
because there was “a clear connection between the enterprise ... and the predicate acts”). 
Although Count 1 identifies the enterprise with which the defendants allegedly were associated 
(Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation) and specifies the alleged racketeering activity through 
which they participated in the enterprise (unlawfully obtaining Oxycodone by withholding 
information from medical practitioners), the indictment fails to set forth any facts that show a 
connection between the enterprise and the racketeering activity, and the nature of that connection 
is not apparent from the identification of the enterprise, the general description of the 
racketeering activity in Count 1, or the subsequent counts charging more particularly the 
predicate acts of racketeering. 
To be sure, the indictment alleges that Kimbrough and Mayfield were “associated with” 
the enterprise and “participated” in it “through” the pattern of racketeering activity. But not 
knowing whether the enterprise is alleged to be a licit or illicit one, how the defendants allegedly 
were “associated with” it, or how the alleged racketeering activity relates in any way to the 
business or affairs of the enterprise, Kimbrough and Mayfield cannot possibly ascertain from the 
indictment what they must be prepared to meet with respect to proof of the requisite connection 
between the enterprise and the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. The indictment does not 
disclose whether the State intends to prove the connection with evidence that, for instance: 
• The defendants were clients of Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation and obtained 
Oxycodone for their own use by unlawfully obtaining prescriptions from medical 
practitioners employed by the enterprise; 
• The defendants were clients of Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation and obtained 
Oxycodone for shared use at the facilities of the enterprise; 
• The defendants unlawfully obtained prescriptions for Oxycodone and filled those 
prescriptions at Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation; 
• The defendants worked for Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation and unlawfully 
obtained Oxycodone to supply to clients of the enterprise; 
• The defendants were vendors or suppliers of Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation and 
unlawfully obtained Oxycodone for resale to the enterprise; 
• The defendants unlawfully obtained Oxycodone, sold it, and used the proceeds to 
finance other activities of Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation; or 
• Executive Wellness and Rehabilitation is an illicit association in fact that exists for the 
purpose of unlawfully obtaining, possessing, and using controlled substances. 
As written, the indictment simply does not give Kimbrough and Mayfield enough information 
about the RICO charge to “prepare [their] defense intelligently.” English, 276 Ga. at 346. 
To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that a RICO indictment must contain pages and 
pages of extensive detail about the connection between the enterprise and the pattern of 
racketeering activity. We hold only that the sparse allegations of this indictment—which says 
nothing at all about the nature of the connection—are insufficient to enable the defendants to 
prepare for trial. Accordingly, the special demurrers ought to have been sustained, and the Court 
of Appeals erred when it affirmed the denial of the special demurrers. In that respect, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
 
Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137 (2017). 
In 2004, appellant Prentiss Ashon Jackson entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count 
of statutory rape, registered with the sexual offender registry, and listed an address in Houston 
County. He was made aware of the requirement to update his registration information within 72 
hours prior to any change of address. Nevertheless, in 2011, he moved to Bibb County without 
registering his new address within the required period of time. He was indicted, and the caption 
of the one-count indictment read: “Failure to register as a sex offender.” The body of the count 
read as follows: 
for that the said accused, in the State of Georgia and County of Houston, on or about 
September 15, 2011, did fail to register his change of address with the Houston County 
Sheriff’s Office within 72 hours of the change as required under OCGA § 42-1-12, 
contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof. 
During trial, Jackson made an oral general demurrer to the indictment, which the trial court 
denied. Jackson was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 30 years, serving six years in prison 
without the possibility of parole and serving the remaining 24 years on probation. Jackson 
appealed and challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the indictment against him. The 
Court of Appeals held the indictment was not fatally defective and affirmed his conviction. See 
Jackson v. State, 335 Ga.App. 597, 598-599 (1) (2016). This Court granted Jackson’s petition for 
certiorari to examine whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the indictment was not 
fatally defective. 
*** 
…[I]f the allegation that a statute has been violated were the only essential element 
required to be set forth in an indictment, and the only test to be applied for judging whether the 
indictment is fatally defective were whether an accused could admit violation of the statute and 
yet be not guilty of the alleged offense, all that would be required of an indictment is that it 
accuse the defendant of being in violation of the referenced statute. But this is not enough.  
*** 
[S]uch an indictment would not provide the accused with due process of law in that it 
would not notify the accused of what factual allegations he must defend in court. Nor would it 
establish what facts the grand jury considered when it determined probable cause existed to 
charge the accused with a crime. “Unless every essential element of a crime is stated in an 
indictment, it is impossible to ensure that the grand jury found probable cause to indict.” Smith v. 
Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55 (1) (1995). An indictment that alleges the accused violated a certain 
statute, without more, would simply state a legal conclusion regarding guilt, and not an 
allegation of facts from which the grand jury determined probable cause of guilt was shown. 
Likewise, it would not allege sufficient facts from which a trial jury could determine guilt if 
those facts are shown at trial. A valid indictment “[uses] the language of the statute, includ[ing] 
the essential elements of the offense, and [is] sufficiently definite to advise [the accused] of what 
he must be prepared to confront.” Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 818, 819 (1) (2000). 
In sum, to withstand a general demurrer, an indictment must: (1) recite the language of 
the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to 
establish violation of a criminal statute. If either of these requisites is met, then the accused 
cannot admit the allegations of the indictment and yet be not guilty of the crime charged. In this 
case, however, neither of these methods for creating a legally sufficient indictment was followed. 
The indictment in this case is based upon several assumptions of fact not set forth in the 
indictment. The caption of the indictment seems to imply that appellant is a convicted sexual 
offender who was required to register his address. Nevertheless, while the indictment does 
reference a change of address and that defendant was required to register it with the Houston 
County sheriff’s office, it does not assert that appellant previously was registered there as a 
sexual offender and has now established a new address within Houston County, or that appellant 
has moved from Houston County to an address in another county, or that he has moved to 
Houston County from an address in another county where he was previously registered. In other 
words, the indictment does not inform the accused of what alleged action or inaction would 
constitute a violation of even subsection (f) (5) of the Code section, which subsection was not 
even referenced in the indictment. Nor does it inform the parties what facts the grand jury 
considered in arriving at its conclusion that probable cause was shown that the accused 
committed a specific crime. 
Moreover, the offense denominated in the indictment is “failure to register as a sex 
offender” and the Court of Appeals concluded appellant could not admit he violated the 
referenced Code section “and still be innocent of the charged offense.” But this simply illustrates 
the problem with the indictment in this case, since failure to register is not the offense for which 
appellant was tried. The record reflects that appellant properly registered his original address 
after his guilty plea conviction; he did not fail to register as required by OCGA § 42-1-12. The 
evidence presented at trial related to appellant’s failure to update his required registration 
information with a change of address, not an initial failure to register as a sexual offender. 
Although the indictment in this case cited the statute appellant was accused of violating (OCGA 
§ 42-1-12), and it referenced some of the language of that statute, it did not recite a sufficient 
portion of the statute to set out all the elements of the offense for which he was tried and 
convicted. Likewise, the indictment did not allege all the facts necessary to establish a violation 
of OCGA § 42-1-12 (f)(5). 
The case of Relaford v. State provides a good example of a legally adequate indictment in 
a case in which the appellant, a registered sexual offender, was accused and convicted of failing 
to report an address change when he relocated his residence within the same county in which he 
initially registered, an offense also covered by OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (5). One of the counts of the 
indictment against the accused in Relaford read as follows: 
[O]n or about April 4, 2007, the exact date being unknown to the grand jurors, after 
having previously been convicted of Rape ... on November 14, 2000, which conviction 
required [him] to register as a sexual offender in the county in which he resided, [the 
accused] did change his Chatham County residence from [stated address], Savannah, 
Chatham County, Georgia and did fail to notify the Sheriff of Chatham County of such 
change within 72 hours following such change in violation of Code Section 42-1-12. 
Supra, 306 Ga.App. at 550. By contrast, the indictment in this case did not allege appellant was a 
convicted sexual offender; that he was required as a sexual offender to register his address with 
the sheriff of the county in which he resides; that he had previously resided in Houston County 
and had registered his address with the sheriff of that county; or that he changed his address from 
one in Houston County to one in another county. It simply alleged that appellant failed to register 
his change of address with the Houston County sheriff’s office within 72 hours as required by 
law.  Only if additional factual allegations had been asserted in the indictment would it be clear 
what acts or omissions the grand jury had found probable cause to believe the appellant had 
committed, and what acts or omissions the trial jury would be required to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that appellant had committed in order to find him guilty as charged. 
We conclude the indictment in this case was not sufficient to withstand a general 
demurrer and was deficient and void. Consequently, appellant’s conviction is reversed. 
 
State v. Layman, 279 Ga. 340 (2005). 
The appellant, the State of Georgia, appeals from the trial court's order quashing seven 
counts of an indictment against the appellee, Josh Layman. On appeal, the State contends that the 
trial court erred by quashing those counts of the indictment on the ground that the indictment did 
not allege the date of the alleged crimes with enough specificity. For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm. 
On November 10, 2003, Layman was indicted for eight crimes stemming from the death 
of Cameron Green. Counts 1–7 of the indictment were for the crimes of felony murder, malice 
murder, armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, concealing the death of 
another, and theft by taking of a motor vehicle. All seven of these counts alleged that the crimes 
occurred between June 30, 2003, and July 19, 2003. Count 8 of the indictment was for the crime 
of making a false statement, and the indictment alleged that the crime occurred on July 24, 2003. 
Layman filed a special demurrer to Counts 1–7 of the indictment, contending that the indictment 
failed to identify the date of the crimes with sufficient particularity. At a hearing on the special 
demurrer, Agent David King of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation testified that on July 19, 
2003, the body of Cameron Green was found in Dawson County, and that he investigated 
Green's death. Agent King testified that several witnesses had seen Green alive on July 4, and 
that they had seen Green with Layman on that day. In addition, Agent King testified that Green's 
father stated that he had talked to his son about 11:00 a.m. on July 4. Moreover, Agent King 
testified that the remains found were skeletal, and that, based on his experience, Green had been 
dead about a week when his remains were found. He also added, however, that he was not 
trained in estimating the time of death; that he could not form an expert opinion as to the time of 
death; that the autopsy report did not list an estimated time of death; and that no medical 
examiner had related an estimated time of death to him. The agent also added that Green's black 
Mercedes automobile was found abandoned on July 8, 2003. 
The trial court sustained Layman's demurrer to the indictment, stating that the State could 
narrow the range of dates on which the crimes allegedly occurred. The State has now appealed. 
“Generally, an indictment which fails to allege a specific date on which the crime was 
committed is not perfect in form and is subject to a timely special demurrer.” However, where 
the State can show that the evidence does not permit it to allege a specific date on which the 
offense occurred, the State is permitted to allege that the crime occurred between two particular 
dates. Layman contended below, and the trial court agreed, that where the State was reasonably 
capable of narrowing the range of dates alleged in the indictment, it must do so. Although we can 
find no case exactly on point, we agree with the trial court's conclusion. First, the conclusion is 
consistent with the general rule that an indictment must be perfect in form and must allege a 
specific date on which the crime was committed. Moreover, it is consistent with OCGA § 17–7–
54, which provides that the indictment must state with “sufficient certainty” the date of the 
offense. In addition, if the State alleges a certain range of dates in an indictment, and, at trial, 
proves that the crimes occurred outside that range of dates, the State generally is not harmed. In 
this regard, the State is not restricted at trial to proving that an offense occurred on the date 
alleged in the indictment when the indictment does not specifically allege that the date of the 
offense is material. And, if there is a variation between the date alleged and the date proved at 
trial, the variance does not entitle a defendant to a new trial unless it prejudiced the defense.  
Accordingly, we conclude that, if an indictment alleges that a crime occurred between 
two particular dates, and if evidence presented to the trial court shows that the State can 
reasonably narrow the range of dates during which the crime is alleged to have occurred, the 
indictment is subject to a special demurrer. 
Applying this rule in the present case, we conclude that the evidence at the hearing on the 
demurrer showed that the State reasonably could narrow the range of dates during which the 
indictment alleged the crimes were committed. In this regard, the evidence showed that several 
witnesses, including the victim's father, stated that the victim was alive on July 4. Moreover, as 
for the crimes involving the victim's car, the evidence showed that the car was found abandoned 
on July 8, 2003. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the crimes concerning the car occurred on 
or before that date. Moreover, as for the July 19, 2003, end date alleged in the indictment, the 
evidence at the hearing established that Green had been dead for some significant period of days 
before his body was discovered. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Layman's special 
demurrer to the indictment. 
 
State v. Grube, 293 Ga. 257 (2013). 
In October 2009, a Catoosa County Sheriff's deputy pretending to be a 14–year–old girl 
named Tiffany posted a listing on an Internet website indicating she was looking for something 
fun to do over an upcoming holiday weekend. Appellant Timothy Grube, then a 27–year–old 
male, responded to the post and subsequently exchanged numerous e-mail communications with 
undercover officers who were posing as Tiffany. Grube ultimately arranged to meet Tiffany, 
whom he believed to be a 14–year–old girl, for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations. He 
was arrested by police when he arrived at the agreed upon meeting place. 
Grube was indicted on charges of computer pornography, attempted aggravated child 
molestation and attempted child molestation. See OCGA § 16–6–4(a) and (c); OCGA § 16–12–
100.2(d). The trial court determined all three counts of the indictment were deficient because 
each failed to identify the victim of the alleged crimes. The State filed a second indictment 
charging Grube with the same crimes but amended the language used so as to identify the victim 
as “ ‘Tiffany,’ a person believed by the accused to be a child” and “ ‘Tiffany,’ a person he 
believed to be a 14–year–old girl.” Grube filed a special demurrer to the second indictment, 
again asserting the indictment failed to sufficiently identify the victim. The trial court agreed, 
and the indictment was dismissed. 
After the Court of Appeals affirmed, State v. Grube, 315 Ga.App. 885 (2012), we granted 
the State's petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by finding the 
second indictment insufficient to withstand a special demurrer. We now reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
*** 
The test of the constitutional sufficiency of an indictment  
is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains 
the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the 
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are 
taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what 
extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction. 
State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 346 (2003), quoting Snider v. State, 238 Ga.App. 55, 58 (1999). 
Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment by the filing of a special demurrer 
before going to trial, he is entitled to an indictment perfect in form. South v. State, 268 Ga.App. 
110, 110–11 (2004). See OCGA § 17–7–54. 
 
Count one of the indictment charges Grube with the crime of computer pornography 
under OCGA § 16–12–100.2(d)1 in that 
between the 9th day of October, 2009, and the 25th day of October, 2009, Grube did 
intentionally utilize a computer Internet service to attempt to lure and entice “Tiffany,” a 
person believed by the accused to be a child, to commit child molestation and aggravated 
child molestation. 
In count two, Grube is charged with attempted aggravated child molestation in the following 
manner: 
on the 25th day of October, 2009, Grube did attempt to commit the crime of aggravated 
child molestation ... in that he did knowingly and intentionally perform acts which 
constituted a substantial step toward the commission of said crime in that he did engage 
in explicit communications with “Tiffany,” a person he believed to be a 14–year–old girl, 
describing his desire to engage in oral sodomy with said 14–year–old girl, arrange a 
meeting with her, and arrived at said meeting place. 
Count three alleges Grube committed the crime of attempted child molestation when 
on the 25th day of October, 2009, Grube ... did knowingly and intentionally perform acts 
which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of said crime in that he did 
engage in explicit communications with “Tiffany,” a person he believed to be a 14–year–
old girl, describing his desire to engage in sexual intercourse with her, arrange a meeting 
with her, and arrived at said meeting place with condoms. 
All three counts follow in large part the language of the statutes Grube is charged with violating, 
set forth the dates of the alleged crimes, and set forth with particularity the acts constituting the 
offenses so that Grube may prepare a defense. The only deficiency Grube alleges is that each of 
the counts fails to more precisely identify the victim. In response, the State concedes that as a 
general rule an indictment for offenses against a particular person should identify the victim by 
providing the victim's name but argues that identification of the victim as Tiffany, the only name 
by which Grube knew the victim and by which he could identify a specific set of 
communications, is sufficient under the facts of this case…. 
The requirement that an indictment identify the victim of a crime against a person serves 
these same purposes and does so best when it provides the full and correct name of the victim. 
Irwin v. State, 117 Ga. 722 (1903) (indictment should name victim by correct name, if known, or 
some name by which the victim is generally called). Because this cannot be accomplished in 
every circumstance, however, our cases allow for identification of the victim by the name by 
which he or she is generally known, always keeping in mind that the constitutional purpose for 
identifying the victim is to apprise the defendant of the charges against him. See Irwin, supra, 
117 Ga. 722. 
Application of these criteria is not altered, but is informed, by the fact that a defendant's 
criminal conduct is revealed through the use of an Internet “sting” operated by law enforcement. 
In such cases, the undercover officer may be the person against whom a defendant's conduct is 
directed, but the defendant knows the officer only by the fictitious persona, alias, or on-line 
moniker created for purposes of the investigation. A requirement that the officer's true identity be 
included in the indictment would do nothing to further the goal of apprising the defendant of 
what he must be prepared to meet at trial. Rather, meaningful notice of the specific conduct 
forming the basis of the criminal charges in such cases is provided if the victim is identified by 
the alias or name by which he or she is known to the defendant.  
This conclusion is consistent with our holdings in other cases challenging the manner in 
which an indictment identifies the victim or defendant. Addressing similar due process concerns, 
courts in cases involving an alleged variance between the indictment and proof at trial or 
misnomer in the indictment consistently have concluded that the notice provided by use of an 
alias or other name by which a victim or defendant is generally known is constitutionally 
sufficient. Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17(1) (1973) (where accused is known by different names, 
indictment may identify accused by all such names as alias dictus); Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 
84(9) (1943) (indictment may identify defendant by alias or other name by which he is generally 
known); Cockrell v. State, 248 Ga.App. 359, 361(2) (2001) (defendant apprised of charges 
against him where victim identified in indictment by fictitious name); Bland v. State, 182 
Ga.App. 626, 627 (1987) (defendant definitely informed as to charges where indictment 
identified victim by use of nickname); Bennett v. State, 107 Ga.App. 284(1) (1963) (grand jury 
may indict an accused using alias). We see no legal reason to distinguish these cases with regard 
to notice under the Due Process clause and hold that identification of a victim by use of an alias 
or other name by which the victim is generally known sufficiently informs a defendant of the 
victim's identity and apprises the defendant of the nature of evidence he or she must be prepared 
to meet. This is especially true when identification of the victim is accompanied by language 
which highlights or explains the use of the alias or alternative name. 
Here, the indictment identifies the victim as “Tiffany, a person believed by the accused to 
be a child.” Because Tiffany is an alias used by undercover officers engaged in a sting operation, 
the State properly relied upon the partial name by which she was known to Grube to identify her 
and the set of communications on which the charges are based. The State supplemented this 
description with language indicating that Tiffany was not an actual child/person, information 
which explains the absence of a full name and allows Grube to prepare his defense at trial. While 
the better practice may have been for the indictment to include both the alias by which Grube 
knew the victim and the fact that Tiffany was an alias or a fictitious persona created by 
undercover officers, the indictment as drafted apprises Grube of the essential elements of the 
charges against him, identifies the victim by the only name by which the victim is generally 
known to him, and informs him that Tiffany is not a 14–year–old girl. That the victim may also 
have been a fictitious persona created by an undercover officer is a fact to be proved at trial, and 
its absence from the indictment is not a material defect. 
The second criteria of a valid indictment, protecting a defendant from double jeopardy in 
a possible future proceeding, is similarly met by the instant indictment. Because the indictment 
not only informs Grube that the charges arise out of conduct directed toward Tiffany but also sets 
out the dates on which the alleged conduct took place and with respect to Counts 2 and 3, 
informs him with some precision of the content of the alleged communications, it cannot 
reasonably be argued that he is not protected from the dangers of double jeopardy. This is 
especially true because Grube will be free to use other parts of the record in this case to 
distinguish charges brought against him in a potential future proceeding. 
 
State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257 (2014). 
Appellee John Randall Wyatt was indicted in Gwinnett County on seven charges related 
to the death of two-year-old Andrea Marginean. After the trial court granted his special 
demurrers on four of the counts, the State filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse. 
On the morning of April 11, 2009, Wyatt, who was then 29 years old, was babysitting 
Andrea and her two brothers, aged four and six. He had been babysitting the three children 
regularly for the past several months. When their mother, Nicole Marginean, got home around 
1:00 p.m. that day, Andrea was essentially unresponsive, and Ms. Marginean took her to a local 
hospital. Andrea died three days later. 
After taking Andrea to the hospital, Ms. Marginean called Wyatt and told him the police 
were looking for him....At first Wyatt told the officers the following: When he awoke around 
9:00 a.m. that morning, he checked on Andrea, discovered that her diaper was overflowing with 
feces, and took her to the bathroom to clean her off and change her diaper. She did not like 
taking baths and began screaming on the way to the bathroom. In the bathroom, Wyatt laid 
Andrea down on the tile floor, reasoning that the tile would be easier to clean, but she would not 
remain still and began banging her head on the underside of the toilet. He grabbed her to hold her 
down but then had difficulty reaching the water. This continued for some time, with Wyatt trying 
to clean and calm Andrea and her banging her head on the floor, the toilet, and the tub. Once she 
was clean, Andrea stood up on her own, Wyatt helped her put on her pants, and he then carried 
her back to her bedroom where she fell asleep. Later, he checked on her and discovered that her 
breathing was labored. He began CPR in an attempt to remove the phlegm he believed was 
obstructing her breathing. Ms. Marginean returned home at that point and took Andrea to the 
hospital. 
After the officers told Wyatt that his story was inconsistent with the injuries the doctors 
had found on Andrea, Wyatt changed his account, saying that before the diaper incident Andrea 
had been disobeying him and sliding down the stairs on her back. After she slid down the stairs 
twice, he grabbed her and took her to the bathroom, and it was then that she defecated on herself 
and him. He first maintained that everything else he had said was true, but he then admitted that 
while he was trying to calm Andrea down in the bathroom, he hit her on the head once or twice 
with an open hand. 
*** 
On August 19, 2013, the trial court held a hearing, at which the State introduced, without 
objection, reports from the hospitals where the victim was treated and from the medical 
examiner. The hospital reports showed that the doctor at the local hospital to which Andrea was 
first taken noticed extensive bruising on several parts of her body and ordered a head CT scan, 
which showed a large subdural hematoma. Andrea was then flown to a hospital in Atlanta, where 
doctors performed emergency surgery, which proved to be unsuccessful; Andrea was 
pronounced dead three days later. The medical examiner's report concluded that the cause of 
death was “closed head trauma with subdural hematoma, delayed effects” and that the manner of 
death was homicide. The report also said that “surgical intervention, producing associated 
hemorrhage within the scalp, confounds the assessment of the presence or absence of an impact 
site.” 
At the demurrer hearing, the State argued that the indictment was sufficiently specific and 
that it was permitted to allege in Count 5 that the object with which Wyatt assaulted Andrea was 
unknown because her head could have been hit by “the toilet or the tub or by the defendant's own 
hand.” On August 23, 2013, the trial court summarily granted Wyatt's special demurrers to 
Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. The State requested a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court 
granted, and then filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted to 
consider whether those four counts as indicted were sufficient to put Wyatt on notice as to what 
he must defend against at trial. 
*** 
Wyatt's special demurrers are based on his contention that the aggravated assault 
accusation, which states that the object used to assault the victim is unknown and is silent at to 
how the object was used, and the aggravated battery accusation, which is silent as to the way in 
which the battery was committed, do not allow him to prepare for trial on those charges and their 
corresponding felony murder charges. We will consider each felony murder count and its 
underlying felony count together, and examine whether the entirety of the indictment provides 
sufficient detail about the crimes Wyatt is accused of committing. See Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 
367, 368 (2008) (“[The rule that] each count must be wholly complete within itself applies only 
to the essential elements of the crime, and not to the form of the indictment or to factual details 
alleged therein. The indictment must be read as a whole.” (citations omitted)). 
(a) Aggravated Assault 
Count 5 charges Wyatt with aggravated assault, alleging that on April 11, 2009, he 
“unlawfully ma[d]e an assault [on Andrea] with an object the exact nature of which is unknown 
to the members of the Grand Jury, which when used offensively against another person is likely 
to result in serious bodily injury.” Count 2, charging felony murder based on aggravated assault, 
adds that the assault “cause[d] bleeding to and damage to [Andrea's] brain.” Wyatt argues that 
the lack of detail about the dangerous object he allegedly used and the manner in which he used 
it leaves him without adequate notice of what he must defend against at trial. The State argues in 
response that the indictment is as specific as it can be because the nature of Andrea's head 
wounds and the surgery performed in the attempt to save her life make it impossible to determine 
the exact nature of the object that inflicted her injuries. We conclude that there is no basis under 
our precedent to grant a special demurrer on Counts 2 and 5. 
Wyatt is charged with aggravated assault under OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2), which is defined 
as an assault “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when 
used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” An 
indictment charging aggravated assault must allege the element that aggravates the crime above a 
simple assault, in this case the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous object. See Simpson v. State, 
277 Ga. 356, 358 (2003) (“[A]n indictment for aggravated assault should ... allege the 
aggravating aspect of the simple assault.”). See also Lizana v. State, 287 Ga. 184, 185–186 
(2010). 
This Court has held, however, that an indictment under OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2) “need 
not ... specify the manner in which the defendant committed the simple assault, when that is a 
lesser included offense within the greater offense of aggravated assault.” Simpson, 277 Ga. at 
358. See also Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (2004) (“It is not necessary that an indictment 
charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was 
committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.”). Likewise, the indictment need not say 
how the defendant used the weapon or object that aggravated the assault. See, e.g., Arthur v. 
State, 275 Ga. 790, 791 (2002) (affirming the denial of a special demurrer because, “by alleging 
[the defendant's] general use of a gun, the State apprised him that he would have to defend 
against all of the possible ways of committing the assault that he himself had admitted in his 
statement”); Watson v. State, 178 Ga.App. 778, 780 (1986) (concluding that an indictment 
charging that the defendant assaulted the victim “with a metal pipe,” without specifying how the 
pipe was used, was sufficient). 
Furthermore, while an indictment under OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2) must allege that the 
assault was committed with a deadly weapon or an object that was likely to or actually did result 
in serious bodily injury, the indictment is not required to identify the exact weapon or object 
used if the circumstances of the case do not allow such specificity. We have held that alleging 
that the object used to commit the aggravated assault is unknown can be “sufficiently definite to 
advise [the defendant] of what he must be prepared to confront.” Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 
433–434 (2010) (involving an indictment alleging that the defendant assaulted the victim with 
“hands and an object, the description of which being unknown”). That holding is consistent with 
cases involving indictments for malice murder, where we have explained that “ ‘[a]n indictment 
failing to specify the cause of death is sufficient when the circumstances of the case will not 
admit of greater certainty in stating the means of death.’ ” Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 815–816 
(2006) (quoting Phillips v. State, 258 Ga. 228, 228, 367 S.E.2d 805 (1988)) (punctuation 
omitted). “ ‘The state cannot be more specific than the evidence permits.’ ” Eberhardt v. State, 
257 Ga. 420, 421 (1987) (citation omitted). 
Wyatt suggests that the first indictment's allegation that he caused Andrea's injuries by 
striking her “against a hard object” demonstrates that the evidence allows the State to be more 
specific in identifying the object used. But “hard object” was hardly a precise description in the 
first place, and the State and the grand jury were not precluded from determining, after re-
examining the evidence, or obtaining additional evidence, that the specific object used to damage 
Andrea's brain cannot be proved. In that case, alleging that the object which caused her fatal 
injuries is “unknown” is more accurate and provides better notice of how the State plans to prove 
the aggravated assault at trial. 
Based on the indictment he will defend against at trial, Wyatt knows that the State intends 
to prove that on April 11, 2009, a day when Wyatt admits Andrea was in his custody, he used an 
object that is likely to result in serious bodily injury when used offensively to fatally injure her 
by causing damage to her brain. Wyatt also knows that the State claims not to know—and thus 
does not intend to prove—what specific object he used to assault Andrea. That is sufficient 
notice for Wyatt to prepare a defense to the charges of aggravated assault and felony murder 
based on aggravated assault—notice that may be supplemented, of course, by the pretrial 
discovery he receives and any investigation his counsel conducts. If at trial the State proves the 
case differently, definitively specifying the object used to assault Andrea, then Wyatt might raise 
a claim of fatal variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial, but that 
is a different claim than the one now before us. For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting 
Wyatt's special demurrers as to Counts 2 and 5. 
(b) Aggravated Battery 
Count 4 alleges that on April 11, 2009, Wyatt “unlawfully and maliciously caus[ed] 
bodily harm to [Andrea] ... by rendering useless a member of her body, to wit: her brain, by 
causing bleeding to and damage to the brain.” Count 1 charges felony murder based on that 
aggravated battery. Wyatt contends that the State should have alleged the acts that constituted the 
aggravated battery, not just the resulting injury. The State responds that, just as it cannot specify 
the object used to assault Andrea, it cannot specify the manner in which Wyatt committed 
aggravated battery against her, because the nature of her brain injuries and the attempts to treat 
them obscured the source of those injuries. We conclude that even if the State could determine 
the specific manner in which the aggravated battery was perpetrated, it was not required to 
include that detail in the indictment. 
Aggravated battery is defined as “maliciously caus[ing] bodily harm to another by 
depriving him or her of a member of his or her body, by rendering a member of his or her body 
useless, or by seriously disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof.” OCGA § 16–5–24(a). 
The manner in which the defendant caused one of these three kinds of bodily harm is not an 
element of the offense, but Wyatt maintains that the indictment must nevertheless allege the way 
in which he rendered Andrea's brain useless so that he can adequately prepare his defense. 
As best we can tell, Georgia's appellate courts have never before decided whether the manner of 
an aggravated battery must be alleged in an indictment in order to survive a special demurrer. 
Long ago, however, this Court addressed the level of specificity required in an indictment for the 
lesser included offense of battery, concluding that allegations of battery need not be specific: 
[A]n indictment for assault and battery is expressed in more general terms, and simply alleges 
that on a given day, in the county, the defendant, with force and arms, committed an assault upon 
another named person, and then and there unlawfully beat, bruised and ill-treated him. The exact 
manner and means of the battery are left to be developed by the evidence. A battery may be 
committed in ways innumerable, and the indictment will apply to one way as well as another. 
Hill v. State, 63 Ga. 578, 583 (1879). See also Bard v. State, 55 Ga. 319, 320 (1875) (explaining 
that for purposes of an indictment for assault or assault and battery, allegations that the defendant 
“with force and arms, and a knife, a weapon likely to produce death, in and upon [the victim] ... 
did make an assault,” provided “a full description of [the] offense”). 
*** 
In accordance with this precedent, the indictment's allegation that Wyatt “unlawfully and 
maliciously cause[d] bodily harm” to Andrea, particularly when read in conjunction with the 
charge of aggravated assault, provided all the detail required to charge battery, and we see no 
reason to require a charge of aggravated battery to detail the manner of the underlying battery 
with greater specificity. The element that distinguishes aggravated battery is not the way the 
battery was committed, but rather the resulting injury, and here the indictment properly identified 
the injury by alleging that Wyatt caused bleeding and damage to Andrea's brain, rendering it 
useless. As with aggravated assault, what must be specified is the fact that aggravates the crime.  
Thus, like the counts alleging aggravated assault, the counts alleging aggravated battery 
sufficiently apprise Wyatt of what he must defend against at trial. He knows that the State will 
contend that he maliciously caused damage to Andrea's brain on April 11, 2009, and that such 
damage rendered her brain useless; under the circumstances of this case, he is entitled to no 




Townsend v. State, 357 Ga. App. 111 (2020), reconsideration denied (Oct. 15, 2020). 
Following a jury trial, Quentin Townsend was convicted of three counts of theft by taking 
and one count of forgery in the first degree. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in 
failing to merge his convictions, and that his order of restitution must be vacated. Although we 
affirm the trial court's order awarding restitution, and conclude that the convictions for theft by 
taking and forgery do not merge, for the reasons that follow, we vacate Townsend's convictions 
and sentences for theft by taking, and remand the case for the trial court to merge these 
convictions so that only one theft by taking conviction remains and resentence Townsend 
accordingly. On remand, the trial court must also correct a scrivener's error in the restitution 
order. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U. S. 307 (1979), the record shows that the two victims were interested in opportunities for 
ownership of minor league basketball teams. An acquaintance suggested that they contact 
Townsend, who owned another minor league team with his wife. Ultimately, the victims met 
with Townsend and decided to invest money for an interest in an Atlanta team. The victims 
formed Jayhawk Development, LLC, to handle the business related to this investment. Not long 
after this initial collaboration, the victims decided they wanted to move to ownership of a team in 
a different minor league, the NBA D-League (“NBADL”), and they discussed the options with 
Townsend. Townsend told the victims that he knew people in the NBADL and that they needed 
to put together an application to submit to the league. Townsend told them that the fee to obtain a 
team license was $1 million, but that they would only have to put in $500,000 if they could get a 
major league team to sponsor them. Townsend then suggested that they put up a significant 
amount of funds as a show of good faith. For their 20 percent share of the team, the victims 
would need to offer $200,000. 
In January 2008, the victims gave Townsend $40,000 toward their ownership interest. 
Townsend told them that he was in contact with the NBADL and the Atlanta Spirit, the owners 
of the Atlanta Hawks, and he gave the victims a NBADL ownership application to complete. 
Townsend also showed them a letter that appeared to be from a member of the NBADL 
operations department setting out all of the financial obligations and the expected operating 
budget for ownership of a team. 
Based on that letter, in February 2008, the victims gave Townsend another $60,000 
toward their ownership interest in a NBADL team. However, they later learned that no major 
league team would sponsor them, and as a result, Townsend told the victims that they would 
need to proffer their share of the entire $1 million to show they were serious about bringing a 
NBADL team to Atlanta. In June 2008, the victims gave Townsend another $100,000. 
Townsend's deception continued over the summer of 2008 when he told the victims that 
members of the NBADL leadership were coming to Atlanta and that he would be meeting with 
them to discuss the victims’ NBADL application. In reality, the NBADL had never given 
Townsend approval to move forward with the process to obtain a NBADL team, and the 
purported letter from the operations manager that Townsend showed the victims was fake. And 
Townsend never actually submitted the victims’ ownership application to the NBADL. 
Eventually, the victims realized that Townsend was attempting to defraud them, and they 
contacted police and filed a civil suit against him. When he learned of the suit, Townsend agreed 
to reimburse the victims, and he signed a consent judgment in the civil case. Nevertheless, he 
failed to repay the money. 
Based on this scam, Townsend was indicted for three counts of theft by taking and a 
single count of forgery arising from the fake NBADL letter. Following a trial, at which 
Townsend testified, the jury convicted him of all counts. 
*** 
With respect to his theft by taking convictions, Townsend argues that the offenses in 
Counts 1 and 2 merge because they involve the same crime committed on different dates, but the 
date was not made a material element. We are constrained to agree. 
It is a longstanding principle of Georgia law that a date or range of dates alleged in an 
indictment, without more, is not a material allegation of the indictment, and, 
consequently, unless the indictment specifically states that the alleged dates are material, 
the State may prove that the alleged crime was committed on any date within the statute 
of limitation. Thus, such an averment of materiality is necessary to overcome a plea of 
double jeopardy to a subsequent charge of committing the same act on a separate date. To 
make such dates a material allegation, the indictment must “specifically allege” that the 
date of the offense is material. 
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Thomas v. State, 352 Ga. App. 640, 642 
(1) (a) (2019).  
In Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment, Townsend was charged with taking an amount 
over $500 from the victims on three different dates. Specifically, the indictment alleged that, on 
separate dates, Townsend 
did unlawfully take a sum of United States currency, the property of [the victims], with a 
value exceeding $500.00, with the intention of depriving said owner of said property, this 
count not included in any other count of this indictment[.] 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The State contends that this language is sufficient to make the date material and to protect 
Townsend from double jeopardy concerns. In light of our recent decision in Thomas, we are 
constrained to conclude otherwise. Thomas, 352 Ga. App. at 642-643 (1) (a) (“[N]umerous cases 
hold that if the counts in the indictment are identical except for the dates alleged, and the dates 
were not made essential averments, only one conviction can stand.”) (citation and punctuation 
omitted). Here, as in Thomas, the allegations in the indictment failed to particularize the dates, 
such as by specifying the amount of money taken on each occasion, and therefore, the date was 
not a material element in the indictment. See id. at 643 (1) (a). See also Brown v. State, 355 
Ga.App. 308, 313 (3), 844 S.E.2d 182, 189 (3) (2020) (date was a material averment where 
indictment alleged “said date being a material element of the offense”). 
We have never opined what language is required to make the date material in the absence 
of express language stating that it is. But, we conclude that simply stating that the offenses in 
each count are “not included in the other counts” does not “specifically allege” that the date is 
material. See Hunt v. State, 336 Ga. App. 821, 825 (1) (b) (2016) (convictions merged despite 
language in indictment that the second count occurred on an “occasion different” or “on a 
different date” than the first count).  
As a result, Townsend is correct that his convictions for theft by taking must merge. And, 
as the sentences imposed on each count were to run consecutively, we must vacate the sentences 
and remand with instructions to merge the three theft offenses and resentence Townsend for only 
one theft conviction, in addition to the forgery conviction. 
*** 
 
Marlin v. State, 273 Ga. App. 856 (2005). 
A Tift County jury convicted Eugene Marlin of armed robbery. The trial court denied 
Marlin's motion for a new trial. Marlin appeals, contending that his attorney was ineffective and 
that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm. 
On appeal, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and the 
defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. “We do not weigh the evidence or 
decide the witnesses' credibility, but only determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
convictions.” Accordingly, the evidence shows that on December 17, 2001, Marlin entered the 
South Georgia Bank in Tifton and approached teller Dawn Marchant. He showed Marchant a 
note which said “stay calm, I have a gun. I will shoot you. Give me all your fifties and hundreds 
or I'll shoot everybody in here.” Marlin had a hand under his shirt, and Marchant believed he had 
a gun. She gave him all the fifties and hundreds she had, because she thought he would shoot if 
she did not. These events were captured on the bank's surveillance cameras, and the footage was 
shown to the jury. Marchant and another teller identified Marlin as the perpetrator in a lineup and 
at trial. 
Marlin fled in a Mercury Marquis, which was subsequently recovered by police. 
Fingerprints taken from the bank and the car matched Marlin's fingerprints. After his arrest, 
Marlin's mother came to the police station, and Marlin asked her to retrieve some clothing from 
his car. A detective went with her, and saw amongst the clothing a t-shirt similar to the one worn 
in the robbery. He obtained a search warrant and retrieved the t-shirt, which was gray with a 
picture of Mark Twain smoking a cigarette. Marlin's sister-in-law testified she had given him the 
shirt, and it was the same as the one worn by the perpetrator in the surveillance pictures from the 
bank. A search of Marlin's residence produced other items similar to ones worn by the 
perpetrator during the robbery. 
*** 
The indictment charged Marlin with taking “United States Currency [which is] the 
property of South Georgia Bank, from the immediate presence of [Marchant].” Marlin contends 
that this description was not specific enough, and, therefore, counsel should have filed a 
demurrer to the indictment seeking to have it dismissed or amended. He asserts that her failure to 
do so was ineffective assistance of counsel, which warrants reversal of his conviction. We 
disagree. 
A demurrer, even if filed by counsel, would not have been granted, because the 
indictment sufficiently described what was stolen. When theft is alleged, 
the description of the stolen property should be simply such as, in connection with the 
other allegations, will affirmatively show the accused to be guilty, will reasonably inform 
him of the transaction charged, and will put him in a position to make the needful 
preparations for his defense. It is not essential to a charge ... that the indictment do more 
than inform the accused generally of the items which it is contended were taken. 
The indictment here was detailed enough for Marlin to understand what he was alleged to have 
taken, and from whom. Thus, Marlin cannot have been prejudiced by counsel's failure to file a 
demurrer which would have been denied. 
 
Leverette v. State, 291 Ga. 834 (2012). 
In 2000, appellant David Leverette entered guilty pleas to charges arising from the malice 
murder of his wife and was sentenced to life imprisonment plus several terms of years to be 
served concurrently with each other and with the life sentence. In June 2011, appellant filed a 
motion for out-of-time appeal, which the trial court denied after holding a hearing. Leverette now 
appeals the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. “[A]n appeal will lie from a judgment 
entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in the 
record[,]” and the trial court's denial of a motion for out-of-time appeal is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 321(1) (2012). We examine those assertions of error that can 
be resolved by facts appearing in the record. 
*** 
Appellant contends the indictment was fatally flawed in that it did not state the venue of 
the crimes. The indictment was returned in the Superior Court of Elbert County, and each count 
of the indictment charged that appellant committed the crime “in the County and State 
aforesaid....” Since the Georgia Constitution requires that “all criminal cases shall be tried in the 
county where the crime was committed” (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI), an 
indictment need only set forth the Georgia county in which the crime is alleged to have occurred 
and failure to set out the street address at which the crime took place is not a fatal flaw. See West 
v. State, 296 Ga.App. 58(1) (2009) (proof of county in which the crime was committed, not the 
street address of the site establishes venue). 
 
Wainwright v. State, 208 Ga. App. 777 (1993). 
Wainwright was convicted of six counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 
OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2). He was sentenced as a recidivist, under OCGA § 17–10–7(a), to six 
concurrent twenty-year terms, to serve fourteen years in prison and six years on probation. 
The offenses were committed in the early morning hours on February 2, 1992. Wainwright, his 
friend Stephens, and another friend arrived at a local establishment shortly before closing time. 
Bobby Ingram and a number of his relatives and friends were there playing pool and drinking. 
Ingram suggested that his party adjourn to his home. The evidence is in conflict as to whether 
Wainwright and his two friends were invited as well, but they went with the others to Ingram's 
trailer and were not prevented from entering. An argument later developed between Stephens and 
Ingram, and Ingram asked Wainwright and his friends several times to leave. 
The evidence about what transpired thereafter sharply conflicted. Wainwright testified 
that he and his friends were in the process of leaving when the host and a number of the guests, 
armed with various weapons and household implements, attacked him. The State's witnesses all 
testified that they had been unarmed and had not provoked Wainwright, and that after Stephens 
and one of the other guests began scuffling, Wainwright attacked several of those present with a 
metal level taken from his truck. Several of them suffered severe beatings, and at least one 
sustained broken limbs. 
*** 
Since 1974 when Georgia adopted judge sentencing, OCGA § 17–10–2, it is not required 
that the prior convictions be included in the indictment but only that the accused receive notice 
of the state's intention to seek recidivist punishment and of the identity of the prior convictions. 
[Cits.]” Favors v. State, 182 Ga.App. 179(1) (1987). Of course, if the prior conviction is an 
element of the crime, it must be alleged and proved. Favors, supra at 180(2). Also, where the 
nature of the offense is changed from misdemeanor to felony by its repetition, such as felony 
shoplifting under OCGA § 16–8–14(b)(1)(C), recidivism must be alleged in the indictment “so 
that the indictment reflects the maximum punishment to which the defendant can be sentenced.” 
Darty v. State, 188 Ga.App. 447, 448, 373 S.E.2d 389 (1988). 
*** 
In Wainwright's case, the maximum penalty for one aggravated assault was twenty years. 
OCGA § 16–5–21(b). That was not changed by OCGA § 17–10–7. The grand jury exposed him 
to a maximum 20–year sentence, and he was given notice of it by the indictment. OCGA § 17–
10–7 merely gives direction as to the imposition of punishment under certain aggravated 
circumstances. Anderson v. State, 176 Ga.App. 255, 256 (1985).  
*** 
Where the prior convictions do no more than subject defendant to a greater risk of the 
maximum sentence (OCGA § 17–10–7(a)) or even to a certainty of the maximum sentence 
(OCGA § 17–10–7(b)) for the crime as indicted, the prior convictions need not be alleged in the 
indictment. Imposition of the maximum sentence has already been authorized by the grand jury's 
action, and adequate advance notice to defendant is assured by OCGA § 17–10–2(a). 
 
Arraignments 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. What is arraignment? 
2. What is the process for arraignment? 
3. Can you waive formal arraignment? 
4. What happens if you waive? If you don’t? 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 30.2 
Before arraignment the court shall inquire whether the accused is represented by counsel and, if 
not, inquire into the defendant's desires and financial circumstances. If the defendant desires an 
attorney and is indigent, the court shall authorize the immediate appointment of counsel. 
Upon the call of a case for arraignment, unless continued for good cause, the accused, or the 
attorney for the accused, shall answer whether the accused pleads “guilty,” “not guilty” or 
desires to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the offense or offenses charged; a plea of not guilty 
shall constitute the joining of the issue. 
Upon arraignment, the attorney, if any, who announces for or on behalf of an accused, or who is 
entered as counsel of record, shall represent the accused in that case throughout the trial, unless 
other counsel and the defendant notify the judge prior to trial that such other counsel represents 
the accused and is ready to proceed, or counsel is otherwise relieved by the judge. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-91 
(a) In all criminal cases the court shall fix a date on which the defendant shall be arraigned. The 
clerk of the court, at least five days prior to the date set therefor, shall mail to the accused and his 
attorney of record, if known, notice of the date which has been fixed for arraignment. For such 
first service of notice, the clerk shall receive the fee prescribed in Code Section 15-6-77. This 
notice may be served by the sheriff of the county in which the court is situated or his lawful 
deputies. If the defendant has posted a bond or recognizance, a copy of the notice shall be mailed 
to each surety on the bond. 
(b) On the date fixed by the court the accused shall be arraigned. The court shall receive the plea 
of the accused and enter the plea as provided for in this chapter. In those cases in which a plea of 
not guilty is entered, the court shall set the case down for trial at such time as shall be determined 
by the court. 
(c) The appearance and entering of a plea by the accused shall be a waiver of the notice required 
in this Code section. 
 
O.C.G.A. §  17-7-93 
(a) Upon the arraignment of a person accused of committing a crime, the indictment or 
accusation shall be read to him and he shall be required to answer whether he is guilty or not 
guilty of the offense charged, which answer or plea shall be made orally by the accused person or 
his counsel. 
(b) If the person pleads “guilty,” the plea shall be immediately recorded on the minutes of the 
court by the clerk, together with the arraignment; and the court shall pronounce the judgment of 
the law upon the person in the same manner as if he or she had been convicted of the offense by 
the verdict of a jury. At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may 
withdraw the plea of “guilty” and plead “not guilty.” 
 
O.C.G.A. §  17-7-94 
If the person accused of committing a crime, upon being arraigned, pleads “not guilty” or stands 
mute, the clerk shall immediately record upon the minutes of the court the plea of “not guilty,” 
together with the arraignment; and the arraignment and plea shall constitute the issue between 
the accused and the state. 
 
O.C.G.A. §  17-7-96 
The arraignment and plea of the person accused of committing a crime shall be entered on the 
indictment or accusation by the prosecuting attorney or other person acting as prosecuting officer 
on the part of the state. 
 
Sapp v. State, 338 Ga. App. 628 (2016). 
In two related enumerations, Sapp contends that she received inadequate notice of her 
arraignment and was never formally arraigned. The State concedes that it cannot show that Sapp 
was ever formally arraigned on the charges against her, and that Sapp did not waive arraignment. 
The record demonstrates that before jury selection, the trial court requested that Sapp sign 
the accusation. Subsequently, the following exchange occurred: 
SAPP: From what I'm reading its says defendant, Lawanda Sapp, waives copy of the accusation. 
I do not. Waive list of witnesses, I do not. Waive formal arraignment, I do not. 
COURT: We've already gone through all that. We're going to trial now.... [Y]ou have a copy of 
this. We're going to trial today. We scheduled this case for trial today so you're not waiving 
anything. 
... 
SAPP: I'm going to put I do not waive anything. 
COURT: Perfect. You have been here, as I recollect, at least two or three times. 
SAPP: I'm just going by what the paper says, as Lawanda Sapp waives. 
COURT: You can put anything you want down there. You don't waive anything, I understand. 
... 
COURT: I know you have been here at least once, if not twice. 
STATE: Judge, we're showing arraignment was on December 7, calendar call was on January 8. 
The State concedes that there is no record of Sapp's arraignment other than the court notice filed 
on November 4, 2015 setting the date of arraignment for December 7, 2015.  
It acknowledges that the State cannot show that Sapp was formally arraigned and aware 
of the charges against her in conjunction with OCGA § 17–16–212 or OCGA § 17–7–933, and 
that because she objected to the lack of a formal arraignment, “the trial court should have 
arraigned her ... and this Court should reverse the sentence.” 
“ ‘Generally, a person indicted for or charged with an offense against the laws of this state is 
entitled as a matter of right to be arraigned before pleading to the indictment....’ [Cit.]” Shorter v. 
State, 155 Ga.App. 609, 610 (1980). While, OCGA § 17–7–91 (c) permits waiver upon 
“appearance and entering of a plea,” it is reversible error for a trial court to require a defendant to 
go to trial on an indictment “when [she] was not formally arraigned and refused specifically to 
waive such arraignment.” Presnell v. State, 159 Ga.App. 598 (1981). See Hicks v. State, 145 
Ga.App. 669 (1978) (no waiver if accused makes timely express invocation of right to 
arraignment despite entry of plea). 
In this case, the State concedes that it cannot demonstrate that Sapp was formally arraigned 
and that Sapp refused to waive a formal arraignment. Thus, we reverse Sapp's conviction for 
speeding. 
 
Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613 (2016). 
*** 
Finally, Appellant points to the State's failure to formally arraign him until after the close of 
evidence at trial, when the court noted that he had not been arraigned while reviewing the 
indictment before sending it to the jury. But Appellant never objected at trial to the lack of an 
earlier arraignment, and “any error in the lack of arraignment was waived by [his] failure to raise 
the issue prior to verdict.” Spear v. State, 270 Ga. 628 (1999). Moreover, Appellant's rights were 
not affected by the late arraignment, as he does not assert that he was unaware of the charges 
against him, both sides participated in discovery and filed motions, and it is clear from his 
proceeding to trial that he was offering a plea of not guilty. See Singleton v. State, 324 Ga.App. 
141, 145 & n. 9 (2013). 
For these reasons, Appellant's claim that his right to due process was violated has no 
merit. 
 
Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga. App. 729 (2012). 
Sevostiyanova contends that her convictions should be reversed because she was never 
formally arraigned on the two misdemeanor counts of striking an unattended vehicle. However, 
the record shows that Sevostiyanova waived formal arraignment as to these charges on June 11, 
2008. After the accusation was amended on June 15, 2009, Sevostiyanova entered a “not guilty” 
plea to Counts 1 and 2, thus again waiving formal arraignment. Moreover, Sevostiyanova voiced 
no objection to the alleged lack of arraignment before or at trial. “Any error in the lack of 
arraignment was waived by [her] failure to raise the issue prior to verdict.” Even if there had 
been no waiver, “procedural errors occurring at the arraignment stage are subject to a harmless 
error analysis,” and appellant has failed to show harm in this case. As trial counsel testified at the 
hearing on the motion for new trial, she and Sevostiyanova were well aware of and discussed the 
charges against her. This enumeration presents no basis for reversal. 
 
Price v. State, 223 Ga. App. 185 (1996). 
Price contends that he was denied due process because no arraignment was held. 
However, the record shows that Price and his attorney signed a not guilty plea and specifically 
waived formal arraignment in February 1992. Price does not deny signing the waiver. He simply 
asserts on appeal that he did not sign the form until January 1993, just before closing arguments. 
Assuming that Price did sign the waiver and plea during rather than before trial, he has failed to 
show any harm resulting from the procedure. Moreover, Price voiced no objection at trial either 
to signing the waiver during trial or to the fact that no formal arraignment had been held. 
Therefore, his right to a formal arraignment was waived on that basis as well. See Frazier v. 
State, 204 Ga.App. 795 (1992) 
 
Discovery 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. What is discovery? 
2. What are the differences in discovery between felony and misdemeanor cases? 
3. What is the discovery timeline? 
4. What is discoverable? What is not? 
5. What is reciprocal discovery? 
6. What happens if you don’t opt in to reciprocal discovery? 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1  
As used in this chapter, the term: 
(1) “Possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution” means an item which is within 
the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney or any law enforcement agency 
involved in the investigation of the case being prosecuted. 
(2) “Statement of a witness” means: 
(A) A written or recorded statement, or copies thereof, made by the witness that is signed 
or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness; 
(B) A substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness that is 
recorded contemporaneously with the making of the oral statement and is contained in a 
stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording or a transcription thereof; or 
(C) A summary of the substance of a statement made by a witness contained in a 
memorandum, report, or other type of written document but does not include notes or 
summaries made by counsel. 
3) “Witness” does not include the defendant. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-2  
(a) This article shall apply to all criminal cases in which at least one felony offense is charged in 
the event that at or prior to arraignment, or at such time as the court permits, the defendant 
provides written notice to the prosecuting attorney that such defendant elects to have this article 
apply to the defendant's case. When one defendant in a multidefendant case demands discovery 
under this article, the provisions of this article shall apply to all defendants in the case, unless a 
severance is granted. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, this article shall not apply to 
juvenile court proceedings. 
(c) This article shall be deemed to have been automatically invoked, without the written notice 
provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, when a defendant has sought discovery 
pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 9, the “Georgia Civil Practice Act,” pursuant to Part 8 of Article 
6 of Chapter 11 of Title 15, or pursuant to the Uniform Rules for the Juvenile Courts of Georgia 
where such discovery material is the same as the discovery material that may be provided under 
this article when a written notice is filed pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section. 
(d) Except as provided under Code Section 17-16-8, this article is not intended to authorize 
discovery or inspection of attorney work product. 
(e) This article shall apply also to all criminal cases in which at least one felony offense is 
charged which was docketed, indicted, or in which an accusation was returned prior to January 1, 
1995, if both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant agree in writing that the provisions of 
this article shall apply to the case. 
(f) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Code Section 17-16-4, if a defendant 
has elected to have the provisions of this article apply, the provisions of this article shall also 
apply to sentencing hearings and the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-3  
Prior to arraignment, every person charged with a criminal offense shall be furnished with a copy 
of the indictment or accusation and a list of witnesses that may be supplemented pursuant to the 
other provisions of this article. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4  
(a) 
(1) The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or at such time as 
the court orders, disclose to the defendant and make available for inspection, copying, or 
photographing any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or 
copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and 
that portion of any written record containing the substance of any relevant oral statement 
made by the defendant, whether before or after arrest, in response to interrogation by any 
person then known to the defendant to be a law enforcement officer or member of the 
prosecuting attorney's staff. The prosecuting attorney shall also disclose to the defendant 
the substance of any other relevant oral statement made by the defendant, before or after 
arrest, in response to interrogation by any person then known by the defendant to be a 
law enforcement officer or member of the prosecuting attorney's staff if the state intends 
to use that statement at trial. The prosecuting attorney shall also disclose to the defendant 
the substance of any other relevant written or oral statement made by the defendant while 
in custody, whether or not in response to interrogation. Statements of coconspirators that 
are attributable to the defendant and arguably admissible against the defendant at trial 
also shall be disclosed under this Code section. Where the defendant is a corporation, 
partnership, association, or labor union, the court may grant the defendant, upon its 
motion, discovery of any similar such statement of any witness who was: 
(A) At the time of the statement, so situated as an officer or employee as to have 
been legally able to bind the defendant in respect to conduct constituting the 
offense; or 
(B) At the time of the offense, personally involved in the alleged conduct 
constituting the offense and so situated as an officer or employee as to have been 
legally able to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged conduct in which the 
witness was involved. 
(2) The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise 
ordered by the court, furnish to the defendant a copy of the defendant's Georgia Crime 
Information Center criminal history, if any, as is within the possession, custody, or 
control of the state or prosecution. Nothing in this Code section shall affect the provisions 
of Code Section 17-10-2. 
(3) 
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, the prosecuting 
attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the 
court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the 
court to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, 
tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or 
portions thereof and to inspect and photograph buildings or places which are 
within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and are 
intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution's case-
in-chief or rebuttal at the trial or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. 
Evidence that is within the possession, custody, or control of the Forensic 
Sciences Division of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation or other laboratory for 
the purpose of testing and analysis may be examined, tested, and analyzed at the 
facility where the evidence is being held pursuant to reasonable rules and 
regulations adopted by the Forensic Sciences Division of the Georgia Bureau of 
Investigation or the laboratory where the evidence is being held. 
(B) With respect to any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, 
audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or portions thereof which 
are within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and are 
intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence in the prosecution's case-
in-chief or rebuttal at the trial of any violation of Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 
of Title 16, such evidence shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as 
otherwise ordered by the court, be allowed to be inspected by the defendant but 
shall not be allowed to be copied. 
(4) The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise 
ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by 
the court to inspect and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental 
examinations and of scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for 
the expert opinion rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the state intends to 
introduce in evidence in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results of the physical or 
mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, 
the prosecuting attorney shall reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report 
to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such portions no later than ten days prior 
to trial. Nothing in this Code section shall require the disclosure of any other material, 
note, or memorandum relating to the psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of 
any victim or witness. 
(5) The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or at such time as 
the court orders but in no event later than the beginning of the trial, provide the defendant 
with notice of any evidence in aggravation of punishment that the state intends to 
introduce in sentencing. 
(b) 
(1) The defendant within ten days of timely compliance by the prosecuting attorney but 
no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, shall permit the 
prosecuting attorney at a time agreed to by the parties or as ordered by the court to 
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, 
audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or copies or portions thereof and to inspect 
and photograph buildings or places, which are within the possession, custody, or control 
of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in the 
defense's case-in-chief or rebuttal at the trial. 
(2) The defendant shall within ten days of timely compliance by the prosecuting attorney 
but no later than five days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the 
prosecuting attorney at a time agreed to by the parties or as ordered by the court to 
inspect and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental examinations and of 
scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion 
rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the defendant intends to introduce in evidence 
in the defense's case-in-chief or rebuttal the results of the physical or mental examination 
or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or partially oral, the defendant shall 
reduce all relevant and material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve 
opposing counsel with such portions no later than five days prior to trial. Nothing in this 
Code section shall require the disclosure of any other material, note, or memorandum 
relating to the psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of any defendant or 
witness. 
(3) 
(A) The defendant shall, no later than the announcement of the verdict of the jury 
or if the defendant has waived a jury trial at the time the verdict is published by 
the court, serve upon the prosecuting attorney all books, papers, documents, 
photographs, tangible objects, audio and visual tapes, films and recordings, or 
copies or portions thereof and to inspect and photograph buildings or places 
which are within the possession, custody, or control of the defendant and which 
the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in the presentence hearing. 
(B) The defendant shall, no later than the announcement of the verdict of the jury 
or if the defendant has waived a jury trial at the time the verdict is published by 
the court, serve upon the prosecuting attorney all reports of any physical or mental 
examinations and scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the basis 
for the expert opinions rendered in the reports, or copies thereof, if the defendant 
intends to introduce in evidence in the presentence hearing the results of the 
physical or mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is 
oral or partially oral, the defendant shall reduce all relevant and material oral 
portions of such report to writing and shall serve opposing counsel with such 
portions. 
(C) The defendant shall, no later than five days before the trial commences, serve 
upon the prosecuting attorney a list of witnesses that the defendant intends to call 
as a witness in the presentence hearing. No later than the announcement of the 
verdict of the jury or if the defendant has waived a jury trial at the time the verdict 
is published by the court, the defendant shall produce for the opposing party any 
statement of such witnesses that is in the possession, custody, or control of the 
defendants or the defendant's counsel that relates to the subject matter of the 
testimony of such witnesses unless such statement is protected from disclosure by 
the privilege contained in paragraph (5), (6), (7), or (8) of subsection (a) of Code 
Section 24-5-501. 
(c) If prior to or during trial a party discovers additional evidence or material previously 
requested or ordered which is subject to discovery or inspection under this article, such party 
shall promptly notify the other party of the existence of the additional evidence or material and 
make this additional evidence or material available as provided in this article. 
(d) Upon a sufficient showing that a discovery required by this article would create a substantial 
threat of physical or economic harm to a witness, the court may at any time order that the 
discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in 
whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the 
court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the 
party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court subject to further order 
of the court and to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(e) Discovery with respect to alibi witnesses shall be as provided for in Code Section 17-16-5. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-20  
The provisions of this article shall apply only to misdemeanor cases or to felony cases docketed, 
indicted, or in which an accusation was returned prior to January 1, 1995, if the prosecuting 
attorney and the defendant do not agree in writing that the provisions of Article 1 of this chapter 
shall apply. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-21  
Prior to arraignment, every person charged with a criminal offense shall be furnished with a copy 
of the indictment or accusation and, on demand, with a list of the witnesses on whose testimony 
the charge against such person is founded. Without the consent of the defendant, no witness shall 
be permitted to testify for the state whose name does not appear on the list of witnesses as 
furnished to the defendant unless the prosecuting attorney shall state that the evidence sought to 
be presented is newly discovered evidence which the state was not aware of at the time of its 
furnishing the defendant with a list of the witnesses. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-22  
(a) At least ten days prior to the trial of the case, the defendant shall be entitled to have a copy of 
any statement given by the defendant while in police custody. The defendant may make such 
request for a copy of any such statement, in writing, within any reasonable period of time prior to 
trial. 
(b) If the defendant's statement is oral or partially oral, the prosecution shall furnish, in writing, 
all relevant and material portions of the defendant's statement. 
(c) Failure of the prosecution to comply with a defendant's timely written request for a copy of 
such defendant's statement, whether written or oral, shall result in such statement being excluded 
and suppressed from the prosecution's use in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal. 
(d) If the defendant's statement is oral, no relevant and material, incriminating or inculpatory, 
portion of the statement of the defendant may be used against the defendant unless it has been 
previously furnished to the defendant, if a timely written request for a copy of the statement has 
been made by the defendant. 
(e) This Code section shall not apply to evidence discovered after a request has been filed. If a 
request has been filed, such evidence shall be produced as soon as possible after it has been 
discovered. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-23  
(a) As used in this Code section, the term “written scientific reports” includes, but is not limited 
to, reports from the Division of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation; an 
autopsy report by the coroner of a county or by a private pathologist; blood alcohol test results 
done by a law enforcement agency or a private physician; and similar types of reports that would 
be used as scientific evidence by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal against the 
defendant. 
(b) In all criminal trials the defendant shall be entitled to have a complete copy of any written 
scientific reports in the possession of the prosecution which will be introduced in whole or in 
part against the defendant by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal. The request for a 
copy of any written scientific reports shall be made by the defendant in writing at arraignment or 
within any reasonable time prior to trial. If such written request is not made at arraignment, it 
shall be within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine in each case what constitutes a 
reasonable time prior to trial. If the scientific report is in the possession of or available to the 
prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney must comply with this Code section at least ten 
days prior to the trial of the case. 
(c) Failure by the prosecution to furnish the defendant with a copy of any written scientific 
report, when a proper and timely written demand has been made by the defendant, shall result in 
such report being excluded and suppressed from evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief or in 
rebuttal. 
 
Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682 (2017). 
With respect to due process, our analysis begins with the settled principle that “[t]here is no 
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 
545, 559 (III) (1977). Because the Constitution does not generally entitle the accused to pretrial 
discovery, statutory limitations of pretrial discovery are not generally impermissible. The 
constitutional guarantee of due process does, however, promise that an accused will be afforded 
a meaningful opportunity to prepare and present a defense, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and in some cases, the fulfillment of that promise may require the 
prosecution to allow some pretrial discovery of its case against the accused. 
Indeed, this Court has recognized that due process sometimes may require that the accused upon 
timely request be afforded a meaningful opportunity to have critical evidence against him 
examined by his own lawyers and experts. For instance, we held in Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 18 
(6) (1981), that due process demanded that the accused be afforded an opportunity to have paint 
samples tested by an expert of his choosing. We explained that the State had used an expert 
comparison of those paint samples to identify the accused as the perpetrator of several acts of 
vandalism, that the paint samples were, therefore, “critical evidence,” and that the evidence was 
by its nature “subject to varying expert opinion.” Id. at 17-18 (6).  
Likewise, we held in Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 204-206 (1977), that one accused of 
unlawfully possessing marijuana generally must be afforded an opportunity to have the substance 
that the prosecution has identified as marijuana tested by an expert of his choosing, at least in a 
case in which the accused disputes the prosecution's identification of the substance and makes a 
timely and reasonable request for testing. 
To the extent that due process requires the prosecution to disclose or make evidence available to 
the accused, it does not “necessarily require disclosure of evidence in a specific form or 
manner.” And even when due process demands that the accused be afforded an opportunity 
before trial to have critical evidence tested by an expert of his choosing, it does not always 
require that the prosecution simply surrender the evidence to the custody and control of the 
accused and his defense team.  
Indeed, in Patterson, although we held that one accused of possessing marijuana may be 
constitutionally entitled to have the suspected marijuana examined by his own expert, we 
explained that “the defendant does not have an absolute, unqualified right to examine such 
evidence.” 238 Ga. at 206. We recognized the need for “appropriate safeguards to ensure that the 
evidence is unchanged and preserved for evidentiary use at the trial,” and we said that 
appropriate safeguards “would generally require that the defendant's expert be allowed to 
examine the substance in the state laboratory under the control and supervision of the state rather 
than [the prosecution] relinquishing custody and possession of the substance to him.”  
Id. Likewise, in Sabel, we explained that, even when due process demands an opportunity for a 
defense expert to test critical evidence before trial, “such evidence should remain in the state's 
control and supervision even if the testing, due to more sophisticated equipment elsewhere, is 
conducted away from the state laboratory.” 248 Ga. at 68 (6). 
 
State v. Charbonneau, 281 Ga. 46 (2006). 
To obviate the need for the statutorily-required notice contravenes the very purpose of 
Georgia's Criminal Procedure Discovery Act (“Act”), OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq., which is 
to establish a closely symmetrical scheme of discovery in criminal cases that maximizes the 
presentation of reliable evidence, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on 
incomplete or misleading evidence, and fosters fairness and efficiency in criminal proceedings. 
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Dickerson, 273 Ga. 408, 410 (2001). Certainly, 
fairness or efficiency in the trial of a criminal case is not promoted by permitting a defendant to 
surprise the State at trial with a claim of alibi. The need for a defendant to provide notice under 
OCGA § 17-16-5(a) exists even in the situation, like the present, in which the State ostensibly is 
already aware that the defendant is claiming to be elsewhere on the day of the crime. The fact of 
prejudice to the State, or lack thereof, or the availability of other remedies is irrelevant. This is so 
because the statute provides no exception for such prior knowledge, and because common sense 
dictates that the mere claim to be elsewhere when confronted by authorities, as in this case, is a 
far cry from intending to present the legal defense of alibi. See OCGA § 16-3-40.2. 
 
State v. Dickerson, 273 Ga. 408 (2001). 
Rufus Joe Dickerson was indicted for rape. Dickerson made the pretrial election to 
proceed under the provisions of the Act, thereby imposing reciprocal disclosure of discovery 
upon both the State and the defense. See State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361(1) (1999). Pursuant to 
OCGA § 17–16–8(a), the State furnished Dickerson with a list of witnesses it intended to call at 
trial. Several witnesses named on the list lacked information concerning their dates of birth. 
Dickerson filed a motion to compel discovery of the criminal history records of these witnesses, 
or their dates of birth, in sufficient time to request and receive that information from the Georgia 
Crime Information Center (“GCIC”). The trial court denied the motion and subsequent motion 
for reconsideration, ruling that the State could not be compelled to produce information not 
within its possession. 
The defense contacted one of the listed witnesses in an attempt to obtain information 
concerning her criminal history; however, she refused to discuss the case. One business day prior 
to the commencement of trial, the witness furnished her date of birth to the defense. Although 
Dickerson used that information to request the witness' criminal history from the GCIC, he did 
not receive a response at the time the witness was called to testify for the State. Nevertheless, 
defense counsel proceeded with cross-examination; a continuance was not requested. A response 
to the GCIC request was received after the conclusion of trial. It revealed that the witness had 
been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, a fact which Dickerson submits could have been 
used to impeach her testimony. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the State has a duty to produce the information 
listed in OCGA § 17–16–8(a); but that the defense in this case waived its right to assert error on 
appeal by failing to request a continuance during trial. We granted cross-petitions for review 
brought by the parties. We affirm both rulings. 
1. When a defendant opts into reciprocal discovery under the Act, OCGA § 17–16–8(a) 
requires that the prosecuting attorney “shall” furnish to defense counsel “not later than ten days 
before trial ... the names, current locations, dates of birth, and telephone numbers of [the State's] 
witnesses.” The obligation then becomes reciprocal—the defendant's attorney is required to 
furnish the same information within a specified time period. Id. The requirement is excused only 
“for good cause” shown. Id. 
The purpose of the Act is to establish 
a closely symmetrical scheme of discovery in criminal cases that maximizes the 
presentation of reliable evidence, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated 
on incomplete or misleading evidence, and fosters fairness and efficiency in criminal 
proceedings. 
Lucious, supra at 363. Any imbalance is to favor the defendant. Id. 
Consistent with those objectives and recognizing that OCGA § 17–16–8(a) is written in 
mandatory language, we hold that a party charged with producing the statutorily required 
information may not rest solely on the fact that it is not within their possession. Instead, the 
statute imposes an affirmative duty on the producing party to attempt to acquire the information. 
Otherwise, a defendant who invokes the provisions of the Act is afforded an empty right. If, after 
a diligent effort to obtain the information, a party has demonstrated an inability to do so, the trial 
court is authorized to exercise its discretion in deciding whether good cause has been shown for 
nondisclosure and in fashioning a remedy under OCGA § 17–16–6.3. See also White v. State, 
271 Ga. 130(3) (1999). Both the obligations under § 17–16–8(a) and the sanctions and remedies 
under § 17–16–6 are mutually imposed. Therefore, the State may seek the same remedy as the 
defense for nondisclosure. See Thompson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 466(3) (1999) (where defense 
failed to provide information required under OCGA § 17–16–8(a) and nondisclosure was 
prejudicial to the State, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defense witness). 
Compare Hill v. State, 232 Ga.App. 561 (1998) (absent a showing of prejudice to the State, 
exclusion of a defense witness resulting from violations of OCGA § 17–16–8(a) was an abuse of 
discretion). 
As was aptly stated in the concurring opinion of the Court of Appeals, Dickerson, supra, 
Blackburn, P.J., concurring at p. 599, 526 S.E.2d 443: 
As the statute obligates the State to give the [specified] information to the defendant, it 
has a duty to attempt to obtain the information about its witnesses. The State cannot 
fulfill its obligation by simply looking in its file. The statute clearly requires the parties to 
provide four pieces of information, and only in the rarest of circumstances should the 
information truly be unavailable.... That burden is the cost to the parties of receiving the 
benefits of the discovery process. The legislature intended for both sides to comply with 
the law, and the statute contemplates a reasonable effort by both sides to meet their 
statutory obligations. 
“If compliance can be so easily avoided, the discovery statute is rendered meaningless.” Id. at 
598, 526 S.E.2d 443. 
2. Generally a defendant has a duty to request a continuance to cure any prejudice which 
may have resulted from the State's failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 17–16–1 
et seq. See Franklin v. State, 224 Ga.App. 578(2) (1997); Bell v. State, 224 Ga.App. 191 (1997). 
And if the defendant has demonstrated that he used due diligence, the trial court is authorized to 
grant the request. OCGA § 17–8–20. 
Had Dickerson requested and obtained a continuance until such time as he received a 
response from the GCIC, any potential prejudice could have been cured. See Knight v. State, 271 
Ga. 557(3) (1999). Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Dickerson 
waived the right to assert error on appeal by his failure to seek a continuance. See generally 
Watts v. State, 265 Ga. 888(2) (1995) (defendant procedurally barred from complaining of failure 
to order a continuance where no motion therefor was made); Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga.App. 
547(3)(a) (1998) (failure to move for continuance precludes defendant from asserting he was not 
afforded ample time to investigate admissibility of evidence). 
 
Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 202 (2001) 
After a witness for the State testified regarding a telephone conversation she had with 
Brown after his arrest, Brown moved for a mistrial based on the State's failure to supply the 
defense with the witness's statement. 
  Brown's motion relied primarily on the reciprocal discovery provisions of OCGA § 17-
16-1 et seq., and the trial court denied the motion because Brown had not opted in to those 
reciprocal discovery provisions. 
Brown argues on appeal that he should be deemed to have opted in to the reciprocal discovery 
because the State's promise of an “open file” led trial counsel to believe he would not need to 
formally opt in. 
  At trial, however, defense counsel told the trial court that he accepted the State's offer 
because it would be better than the reciprocal discovery process in that he would be permitted to 
view evidence the State would not be required to provide under the reciprocal discovery statute. 
Having chosen not to provide the written notice required by OCGA § 17-16-2(a), Brown was not 
entitled to have the other provisions of the reciprocal discovery process applied to his case. 
Wright v. State, 226 Ga.App. 848(4) (1997). The trial court did not err in ruling that Brown's 
failure to opt in to reciprocal discovery rendered inapplicable the sanctions provided for in 
OCGA § 17-16-6. State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361(4) (1999). 
 
Jury Instructions 
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. What are jury instructions?  
2. What is purpose of jury instructions? 
3. How should they be formatted? 
4. When should an objection be made to a jury charge? 
5. What recourse is available if you don’t object? 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 10.3 
All requests to charge shall be numbered consecutively on separate sheets of paper and submitted 
to the court in duplicate by counsel for all parties at the commencement of trial, unless otherwise 
provided by pre-trial order; provided, however, that additional requests may be submitted to 
cover unanticipated points which arise thereafter. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, in all civil cases, no party may complain 
of the giving or the failure to give an instruction to the jury unless he objects thereto before the 
jury returns its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. 
Objection need not be made with the particularity formerly required of assignments of error and 
need only be as reasonably definite as the circumstances will permit. This subsection shall not 
apply in criminal cases. 
(b) In all cases, at the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may present to the court written requests that it instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth therein. Copies of requests shall be given to opposing counsel for their 
consideration prior to the charge of the court. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed 
action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury but shall instruct the jury after the 
arguments are completed. The trial judge shall file with the clerk all requests submitted to him, 
whether given in charge or not. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code section, the appellate courts shall consider 
and review erroneous charges where there has been a substantial error in the charge which was 
harmful as a matter of law, regardless of whether objection was made hereunder or not. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-56 
(a) The judges of the superior, state, and city courts shall, when the counsel for either party 
requests it before argument begins, write out their charges and read them to the jury; and it shall 
be error to give any other or additional charge than that so written and read. 
(b) The charge so written out and read shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which it was 
given and shall be accessible to all persons interested in it. The clerk shall give certified copies of 
the charge to any person applying therefor, upon payment of the usual fee. 
(c) This Code section shall not apply when there is an official stenographer or reporter of the 
court in attendance thereon who takes down in shorthand and writes out the full charge of the 
trial judge in the case upon the direction of court. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58 
(a) Any party who objects to any portion of the charge to the jury or the failure to charge the jury 
shall inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury 
retires to deliberate. Such objections shall be done outside of the jury's hearing and presence. 
(b) Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this Code section shall preclude 
appellate review of such portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge 
constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties. Such plain error may be 
considered on appeal even if it was not brought to the court's attention as provided in subsection 
(a) of this Code section. 
 
Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680 (2012). 
In a criminal case, a verdict form is erroneous when 
the form would mislead jurors of reasonable understanding, or the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, the 
possible verdicts that could be returned, or how the verdict should be entered on the 
printed form. 
Rucker v. State, 270 Ga. 431, 435(5) (1999). A preprinted verdict form is treated as part of the 
jury instructions which “are read and considered as a whole in determining whether there is 
error.” Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 330(2) (2008) (Citations and punctuation omitted.). Here, 
the trial court's oral instructions informed the jury that the defendant was innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the burden of proof is upon the State and never shifts 
to the defendant. Nonetheless, this Court has recognized that “ ‘the presence of ... written 
instructions in the jury room ... serve[s] to enlighten, rather than confuse, the jury.’ [Cit.]” 
Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 745(3) (2011). When, as here, the written instructions that the jury 
has with it in the jury room are infirm, the expected result is not enlightenment, but confusion. 
Compare Arthur v. Walker, 285 Ga. 578, 579–580 (2009), in which correct written instructions 
were with the jury during deliberations. We conclude that the verdict form would mislead jurors 
of reasonable understanding as to the presumption of innocence and the proper burden of proof 
for the jury's consideration, Rucker, supra, and that this constituted error despite the inclusion of 
proper language elsewhere in the jury instructions when taken as a whole. See also Laster v. 
State, 276 Ga. 645, 649–650(5) (2003), in which the court's instructions regarding the verdict 
form gave improper guidance as to completing the verdict if the jury found that the State failed 
to meet its burden of proof and were found to be reversible error, requiring a new trial. 
However, at trial, Cheddersingh did not raise any objection to the verdict form. Thus, he 
failed in his duty to “inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection 
before the jury retire[d] to deliberate.” OCGA § 17–8–58(a). Nonetheless, he argues that the 
verdict form constituted plain error, and that under OCGA § 17–8–58(b), the asserted error must 
therefore be reviewed. See Sapp v. State, 290 Ga. 247, 249–250(2) (2011). 
We first note that the language of OCGA § 17–8–58 refers to the jury “charge.” We 
conclude that the statute applies not only to instructions given orally to the jury, but necessarily 
must apply to any written instructions given to the jury. See generally Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 
47, 50–51(6)(7) (2009). Preprinted verdict forms have been treated as a portion of the jury 
instructions. See Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 330(2) (2008). Use of such a form is intended to 
assist the jury in arriving at a lawful verdict, see Rucker, supra at 434–435(5), and a party is 
necessarily obligated to raise any objection to such a form as set forth in OCGA § 17–8–58(a). 
Accordingly, when objection is not made, error is reviewed as provided in OCGA § 17–8–58(b). 
In State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32–33(2)(a) (2011). . .we set forth the test for determining 
whether there is plain error in jury instructions under OCGA § 17–8–58(b) as follows. 
First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal rule—that has 
not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. 
Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, 
the error must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means 
he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and 
finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy 
the error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 
Id. at 33(2)(a) (Citations and punctuation omitted.). 
As noted above, the verdict form used here must be considered erroneous. As to an 
affirmative waiver of that error, at trial, the court asked: “Is the verdict form acceptable to the 
defense?” Counsel for Cheddersingh responded: “I believe so. Let me look at it one more time.” 
No objection was made. But, to constitute an affirmative waiver under Kelly, supra, a “deviation 
from a legal rule” must have been “intentionally relinquished or abandoned.” As stated in United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733(II)(A) (1993), upon which Kelly particularly relied, “[w]aiver 
is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ [Cits.]” The 
exchange with the trial court does not show that Cheddersingh intentionally relinquished his 
right to have the burden of proof properly stated in the verdict form; rather, the failure to object 
is more appropriately described as a forfeiture of the right. Nor can we discern any tactical 
reason on the part of the defense to embrace such a burden-shifting verdict form. Accordingly, 
the error in the verdict form was not intentionally waived under Kelly. 
Regarding the second prong of the Kelly test, the error was also obvious and not subject 
to reasonable dispute. “Nothing is more fundamental to the jury's consideration of a criminal 
case than its understanding and application of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Jones v. State, 252 Ga.App. 332, 334(2)(a) (2001). And, this Court has repeated the 
correct standards regarding the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof on numerous 
occasions. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘[p]lain’ is synonymous with 
‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’ ” Olano, supra at 734. Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has said that plain error includes that which is “so ‘plain’ the trial judge and prosecutor 
were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.” 
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163(III)(A) (1982). Here, near the end of the instructions 
to the jury, the court said: “This is your verdict form. It says: Count one, Murder. As to the 
offense of murder, we the jury, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty.” We believe that this verbalization of the written charge should have alerted 
both the trial court and the prosecutor, as well as defense counsel, to the error, which should have 
provided an opportunity for the court to promptly correct it. 
The third prong of the Kelly test is that “the error must have affected the appellant's 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the 
outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Kelly, supra at 33(2)(a) (Punctuation omitted). By using 
a verdict form that advised the jury that it was empowered to state that it “beyond a reasonable 
doubt find[s] the Defendant [not guilty],” the trial court actively removed the presumption of 
innocence from Cheddersingh's trial. “ ‘The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in 
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at 
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ [Cit.]” Tillman, supra at 292–293(1). 
That principle is 
a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice, and the right to a 
fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Cit.] The 
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof are the 
fundamental doctrines of American criminal jurisprudence and the bedrock of 
determining guilt or innocence in a criminal case. [Cit.] 
Id. at 293, 637 S.E.2d 720 (Punctuation omitted.). Accordingly, under all the circumstances of 
this case, the error presented here must be considered to have affected Cheddersingh's 
“substantial rights” such that the third prong of the Kelly test is met. 
As to the fourth prong of the Kelly test, in which our discretion to remedy the error 
“ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,” supra at 33(2)(a) (Punctuation omitted.), the necessity of 
doing so is beyond dispute. The presumption of innocence is fundamental to a fair trial and a 
conviction resulting from a procedure in which the trial court misinformed the jury regarding the 
effect of that presumption affects not only the fairness of that proceeding itself, but public 
confidence in the judicial process as a whole. See Tillman, supra at 295(2). 
Cheddersingh must be awarded a new trial. 
 
White v. State, 355 Ga. App. 89, 91 (2020). 
White claims that the trial court erred in its jury instructions on malice and self-defense. White 
acknowledges that he did not object to those instructions at trial, so we review them only for 
plain error. In reviewing for plain error, “the proper inquiry is whether the instruction was 
erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it likely affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.” Manning v. State, 303 Ga. 723, 727 (3) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 
(a) Malice instruction. 
In response to a question from the jury, the trial court gave the jury the following pattern 
definition of malice for the offense of aggravated battery: 
Malice is not ill will or hatred. For the purpose of this [C]ode section, malice means an 
actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, that is, bodily harm, without 
justification or excuse. Malice is also the wanton and willful doing of an act with an 
awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such particular harm may result. Intention 
may be shown by the circumstances connected with the offense. 
(Emphasis supplied.) White contends that the use of the phrase “the offense,” as emphasized 
above, presumed the existence of a crime and thus constituted an improper comment on the 
evidence by the trial court. We disagree. 
OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) provides that “[i]t is error for any judge, during any phase of any 
criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge's opinion as to whether a fact at issue 
has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” But “[t]hat statute is violated only 
when the court's charge assumes certain things as facts and intimates to the jury what the judge 
believes the evidence to be.” Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 414 (6) (c) (2000) (citation and 
punctuation omitted). “And in order to determine whether a trial court has improperly expressed 
an opinion in its charge as to what has or has not been proved, the whole charge may be 
considered.” Hartzler v. State, 332 Ga. App. 674, 681-682 (4) (2015) (citations and punctuation 
omitted). 
Considering the jury charge as a whole, “we find that the trial court did not intimate its 
opinion that the evidence showed that [an offense had been committed]. The trial court merely 
stated [the definition of malice for aggravated battery].” Buffington v. State, 171 Ga. App. 919, 
923-924 (8) (1984) (rejecting claim that jury charge defining murder improperly expressed 
court's opinion that crime had in fact been committed). The use of the phrase “the offense” 
within that definition referred to the charged crime and “did not assume or seem to assume[ the 
existence of an offense], as contended.” McMullen v. State, 199 Ga. 521, 525 (1) (1945) 
(punctuation omitted). 
Furthermore, ... we note that the trial judge [had] specifically instructed the jury that 
‘‘[b]y no ruling or comment that the court has made during the progress of the trial [has the 
court] intended to express any opinion [up]on the facts of [this] case, [upon] the credibility of the 
witnesses, [upon] the evidence[,] or [upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant].’’ Thus, the 
trial court did not err by referring to [“the offense”] in [the definition of malice]. 
Hartzler, 332 Ga. App. at 682 (4) (citations and punctuation omitted). Since “we [have] 
conclude[d] that the charge regarding malice did not improperly comment on the evidence,” 
Carter v. State, 269 Ga. 891, 893 (6) (1998), it follows that there was no plain error. 
(b) Self-defense instruction. 
White claims that the jury charge on self-defense was insufficient because it did not include the 
principle of law that the state had the burden of disproving such a defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. While that principle was not set forth in the court's self-defense charge, it was included at 
another point in the jury instructions. During its charge on the state's burden of proof, the court 
instructed the jury that White bore no burden of proof and that “[w]hen a defense is raised by the 
evidence, the burden is on the [s]tate to negate or disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, 
considering the jury instructions as a whole, “[w]e find no error, as the court gave a charge that 
adequately covered the same principle[ ] of law as the [suggested] charge.” Carver v. State, 258 
Ga. 824, 825 (3) (1989).   
Viewed as a whole, it is apparent that the court's jury charge properly instructed the jury 
on the malicious intent required for the indicted offense of aggravated battery. Under these 
circumstances, White has not shown deficient performance since an objection to a correct 
statement of the law would have been meritless, and he has not shown prejudice because there is 
no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel 
made the suggested objection. “Consequently, we cannot find [White's] lawyer[ ] ineffective for 
failing to object to the ... jury instruction[ ] on [general] intent.” Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 
574 (4) (b), 783 S.E.2d 622 (2016). 
 
Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992). 
Our holding requires some precision in the charge to the jury where the evidence would 
authorize a conviction for felony murder or voluntary manslaughter. A sequential charge 
requiring the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if they have considered and found the 
defendant not guilty of malice murder and felony murder is not appropriate where there is 
evidence that would authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter. The “sequential” charge 
eliminates the jury's full consideration of voluntary manslaughter because, if it concludes a 
felony murder occurred, it would not then go on to consider evidence of provocation or passion 
which might authorize a verdict for voluntary manslaughter. Instead, the trial court should 
instruct the jury so as to ensure adequate consideration of charges for both forms of homicide.  
 
Pleas and Sentencing  
At the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer these questions: 
1. When can a judge accept a plea? 
2. Who can engage in plea discussions? 
3. How may a sentence be structured? 
4. How must a sentence be structured? 
5. What are the differences between concurrent and consecutive sentences? 
6. What is a split sentence? 
7. What is probation? 
8. Is a nolo contendre plea the same as a guilty plea? 
9. What is the recidivism statute and how does it work? 
10. When can fines and fees be attached to a sentence? 
11. How does service of time in custody get calculated? 
12. When can someone use First Offender? 
13. When can someone use Conditional Discharge? 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 33.1 
(A) A defendant may plead guilty, not guilty, or in the discretion of the judge, nolo contendere. 
A plea of guilty or nolo contendere should be received only from the defendant personally in 
open court, except when the defendant is a corporation, in which case the plea may be entered by 
counsel or a corporate officer. 
(B) A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the judge. Such a plea 
should be accepted by the judge only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the 
interest of the public in the effective administration of justice. Procedurally, a plea of nolo 
contendere should be handled under these rules in a manner similar to a plea of guilty. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.2 
(A) A defendant shall not be called upon to plead before having an opportunity to retain counsel, 
or if defendant is eligible for appointment of counsel, until counsel has been appointed or right to 
counsel waived. A defendant with counsel shall not be required to enter a plea if counsel makes a 
reasonable request for additional time to represent the defendant's interest, or if the defendant has 
not had a reasonable time to consult with counsel. 
(B) A defendant without counsel should not be called upon to plead to any offense without 
having had a reasonable time to consider this decision. When a defendant without counsel 
tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an offense, the court should not accept the plea 
unless it is reaffirmed by the defendant after a reasonable time for deliberation, following the 
advice from the court required in section 33.8. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.3 
(A) In cases in which it appears that the interests of the public in the effective administration of 
criminal justice (as stated in section 33.6) would thereby be served, the prosecuting attorney may 
engage in plea discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement. The prosecuting 
attorney should engage in plea discussions or reach a plea agreement with the defendant only 
through defense counsel, except when the defendant is not eligible for or does not desire 
appointment of counsel and has not retained counsel. 
(B) The prosecuting attorney, in reaching a plea agreement, may agree to one or more of the 
following, as dictated by circumstances of the individual case: 
(1) to make or not to oppose favorable recommendations as to the sentence which should 
be imposed if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; 
(2) to seek or not to oppose dismissal of the offense charged if the defendant enters a plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere to another offense reasonably related to defendant's conduct; 
or, 
(3) to seek or not to oppose dismissal of other charges or potential charges against the 
defendant if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.4 
(A) Defense counsel should conclude a plea agreement only with the consent of the defendant, 
and should ensure that the decision to enter or not enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is 
ultimately made by the defendant. 
(B) To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after appropriate investigation, 
should advise the defendant of the alternatives available and of considerations deemed important 
by him in reaching a decision. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.5 
(A) The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions. 
(B) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached, upon request of the parties, the trial judge 
may permit the parties to disclose the tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of 
the time for the tendering of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney 
and defense counsel whether the judge will likely concur in the proposed disposition if the 
information developed in the plea hearing or presented in the presentence report is consistent 
with the representations made by the parties. If the trial judge concurs but the final disposition 
differs from that contemplated by the plea agreement, then the judge shall state for the record 
what information in the presentence report or hearing contributed to the decision not to sentence 
in accordance with the plea agreement. 
(C) When a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is tendered or received as a result of a plea 
agreement, the trial judge should give the agreement due consideration, but notwithstanding its 
existence, must reach an independent decision on whether to grant charge or sentence leniency 
under the principles set forth in section 33.6 of these rules. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.6 
(A) It is proper for the judge to grant charge and sentence leniency to defendants who enter pleas 
of guilty or nolo contendere where the interests of the public in the effective administration of 
criminal justice are thereby served. Among the considerations which are appropriate in 
determining this question are: 
(1) that the defendant by entering a plea has aided in ensuring the prompt and certain 
application of correctional measures; 
(2) that the defendant has acknowledged guilt and shown a willingness to assume 
responsibility for conduct; 
(3) that the leniency will make possible alternative correctional measures which are better 
adapted to achieving rehabilitative, protective, deterrent or other purposes of correctional 
treatment, or will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the form of conviction; 
(4) that the defendant has made public trial unnecessary when there are good reasons for 
not having the case dealt with in a public trial; 
(5) that the defendant has given or offered cooperation when such cooperation has 
resulted or may result in the successful prosecution of other offenders engaged in equally 
serious or more serious criminal conduct; 
(6) that the defendant by entering a plea has aided in avoiding delay (including delay due 
to crowded dockets) in the disposition of other cases and thereby has increased the 
probability of prompt and certain application of correctional measures to other offenders. 
(B) The judge should not impose upon a defendant any sentence in excess of that which would 
be justified by any of the rehabilitative, protective, deterrent or other purposes of the criminal 
law merely because the defendant has chosen to require the prosecution to prove the defendant's 
guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.7 
The judge shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining, on the 
record, that the plea is voluntary. By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the 
judge should determine whether the tendered plea is the result of prior plea discussions and a 
plea agreement, and, if it is, what agreement has been reached. If the prosecuting attorney has 
agreed to seek charge or sentence leniency which must be approved by the judge, the judge must 
advise the defendant personally that the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. The judge should then address the defendant personally and determine 
whether any other promises or any force or threats were used to obtain the plea. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.8 
The judge should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a defendant without first: 
(A) Determining on the record that the defendant understands the nature of the charge(s); 
(B) Informing the defendant on the record that by entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
one waives: 
(1) the right to trial by jury; 
(2) the presumption of innocence; 
(3) the right to confront witnesses against oneself; 
(4) the right to subpoena witnesses; 
(5) the right to testify and to offer other evidence; 
(6) the right to assistance of counsel during trial; 
(7) the right not to incriminate oneself; and that by pleading not guilty or remaining silent 
and not entering a plea, one obtains a jury trial; 
(C) Where a defendant is not represented by counsel, informing the defendant of his right to be 
assisted by counsel in entering the plea, as well as at trial, and that the defendant is knowingly 
and voluntarily waiving that right; and 
(D) Informing the defendant on the record: 
(1) of the terms of any negotiated plea; 
(2) that a plea of guilty may have an impact on his or her immigration status if the 
defendant is not a citizen of the United States; 
(3) of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that possible from 
consecutive sentences and enhanced sentences where provided by law; and/or 
(4) of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge. 
This information may be developed by questions from the judge, the prosecuting attorney or the 
defense attorney or a combination of any of these. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.9 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, judgment should not be entered upon such 
plea without such inquiry on the record as may satisfy the judge that there is a factual basis for 
the plea. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.10 
If the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement, the trial court shall, on the record, inform 
the defendant personally that (1) the trial court is not bound by any plea agreement; (2) the trial 
court intends to reject the plea agreement presently before it; (3) the disposition of the present 
case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement; and 
(4) that the defendant may then withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right. If the plea is 
not then withdrawn, sentence may be pronounced. 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.11 
A verbatim record of the proceedings at which a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere shall be made and preserved. The record should include: 
(A) The inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea (as required in section 33.7); 
(B) The advice to the defendant (as required in section 33.8); 
(C) The inquiry into the accuracy of the plea (as required in section 33.9), and, if applicable; 
(D) The notice to the defendant that the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement and the 
defendant's right to withdraw the guilty plea before sentence is pronounced. [In State Court, see 
State Court Rule 33.11.] 
 
Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R.33.12 
(A) After sentence is pronounced, the judge should allow the defendant to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves 
that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 
(B) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a 
defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once 
sentence has been pronounced by the judge. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-3 
The terms of court for the superior courts for each of the judicial circuits shall commence as 
follows [in this statute]. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93 
(a) Upon the arraignment of a person accused of committing a crime, the indictment or 
accusation shall be read to him and he shall be required to answer whether he is guilty or not 
guilty of the offense charged, which answer or plea shall be made orally by the accused person or 
his counsel. 
(b) If the person pleads “guilty,” the plea shall be immediately recorded on the minutes of the 
court by the clerk, together with the arraignment; and the court shall pronounce the judgment of 
the law upon the person in the same manner as if he or she had been convicted of the offense by 
the verdict of a jury. At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may 
withdraw the plea of “guilty” and plead “not guilty.” 
(c) In addition to any other inquiry by the court prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court 
shall determine whether the defendant is freely entering the plea with an understanding that if he 
or she is not a citizen of the United States, then the plea may have an impact on his or her 
immigration status. This subsection shall apply with respect to acceptance of any plea of guilty to 
any state offense in any court of this state or any political subdivision of this state. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-94 
If the person accused of committing a crime, upon being arraigned, pleads “not guilty” or stands 
mute, the clerk shall immediately record upon the minutes of the court the plea of “not guilty,” 
together with the arraignment; and the arraignment and plea shall constitute the issue between 
the accused and the state. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95  
(a) The defendant in all criminal cases other than capital felonies in any court of this state, 
whether the offense charged is a felony or a misdemeanor, may, with the consent and approval of 
the judge of the court, enter a plea of nolo contendere instead of a plea of guilty or not guilty. 
(b) Should the judge allow a plea of nolo contendere to be entered, he shall thereupon be 
authorized to impose such sentence as may be authorized by law as to the offense charged. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, a plea of nolo contendere shall not be used against the 
defendant in any other court or proceedings as an admission of guilt or otherwise or for any 
purpose; and the plea shall not be deemed a plea of guilty for the purpose of effecting any civil 
disqualification of the defendant to hold public office, to vote, to serve upon any jury, or any 
other civil disqualification imposed upon a person convicted of any offense under the laws of 
this state. The plea shall be deemed and held to put the defendant in jeopardy within the meaning 
of Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVIII of the Constitution of this state after sentence has been 
imposed. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1  
(a) 
(1) 
(A) Except in cases in which life imprisonment, life without parole, or the death 
penalty may be imposed, upon a verdict or plea of guilty in any case involving a 
misdemeanor or felony, and after a presentence hearing, the judge fixing the 
sentence shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of months or 
years which shall be within the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by 
law as the punishment for the crime. The judge imposing the sentence is granted 
power and authority to suspend or probate all or any part of the entire sentence 
under such rules and regulations as the judge deems proper, including service of a 
probated sentence in the sentencing options system, as provided by Article 6 of 
Chapter 3 of Title 42, and including the authority to revoke the suspension or 
probation when the defendant has violated any of the rules and regulations 
prescribed by the court, even before the probationary period has begun, subject to 
the conditions set out in this subsection; provided, however, that such action shall 
be subject to the provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-6.2. 
(B) When a defendant with no prior felony conviction is convicted of felony 
offenses or is charged with felony offenses and is sentenced pursuant to 
subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2 or Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, 
and the court imposes a sentence of probation or not more than 12 months of 
imprisonment followed by a term of probation, the court shall include a 
behavioral incentive date in its sentencing order that does not exceed three years 
from the date such sentence is imposed. Within 60 days of the expiration of such 
incentive date, if the defendant has not been arrested for anything other than a 
nonserious traffic offense as defined in Code Section 35-3-37, has been compliant 
with the general and special conditions of probation imposed, and has paid all 
restitution owed, the Department of Community Supervision shall notify the 
prosecuting attorney and the court of such facts. The Department of Community 
Supervision shall provide the court with an order to terminate such defendant's 
probation which the court shall execute unless the court or the prosecuting 
attorney requests a hearing on such matter within 30 days of the receipt of such 
order. The court shall take whatever action it determines would be for the best 
interest of justice and the welfare of society. 
(2) 
(A) Active probation supervision shall terminate in all cases no later than two 
years from the commencement of active probation supervision unless specially 
extended or reinstated by the sentencing court upon notice and hearing and for 
good cause shown; provided, however, that in those cases involving: 
(i) The collection of restitution, the period of active probation supervision 
shall remain in effect for so long as any such obligation is outstanding, or 
until termination of the sentence, whichever first occurs; 
(ii) A conviction under Chapter 15 of Title 16, the “Georgia Street Gang 
Terrorism and Prevention Act,” the period of active probation supervision 
shall remain in effect until the termination of the sentence, but shall not 
exceed five years unless as otherwise provided in this paragraph; or 
(iii) A conviction that requires the defendant to register on the state sexual 
offender registry pursuant to Code Section 42-1-12, the period of active 
probation supervision shall remain in effect until the court orders 
unsupervised probation, or until termination of the sentence, whichever 
first occurs. 
(B) Probation supervision shall not be required for defendants sentenced to 
probation while the defendant is in the legal custody of the Department of 
Corrections or the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. 
 
(3) 
(A) Any part of a sentence of probation revoked for a violation other than a 
subsequent commission of any felony, a violation of a special condition, or a 
misdemeanor offense involving physical violence resulting in bodily injury to an 
innocent victim which in the opinion of the trial court constitutes a danger to the 
community or a serious infraction occurring while the defendant is assigned to an 
alternative probation confinement facility shall be served in a probation detention 
center, probation boot camp, weekend lock up, or confinement in a local jail or 
detention facility, or other community correctional alternatives available to the 
court or provided by the Department of Corrections. 
(B) A parolee or probationer charged with a misdemeanor involving physical 
injury or an attempt to commit physical injury or terroristic threats or with a new 
felony shall not be entitled to bond pending a hearing on the revocation of his or 
her parole or probation, except by order of a judge of the superior, state, or 
magistrate court wherein the alleged new offense occurred after a hearing and 
upon determination of the superior, state, or magistrate court that the parolee or 
probationer does not constitute a threat to the community; provided, however, that 
this subparagraph does not authorize state or magistrate court judges to grant bail 
for a person charged with any offense listed in subsection (a) of Code Section 17-
6-1. 
(4) In cases of imprisonment followed by probation, the sentence shall specifically 
provide that the period of probation shall not begin until the defendant has completed 
service of the confinement portion of the sentence. No revocation of any part of a 
probated sentence shall be effective while a defendant is in the legal custody of the State 
Board of Pardons and Paroles. 
(5) 
(A) When a defendant has been sentenced to probation, the court shall retain 
jurisdiction throughout the period of the probated sentence as provided for in 
subsection (g) of Code Section 42-8-34. Without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, the court may shorten the period of active probation supervision or 
unsupervised probation on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, or upon 
the request of a community supervision officer, if the court determines that 
probation is no longer necessary or appropriate for the ends of justice, the 
protection of society, and the rehabilitation of the defendant. Prior to entering any 
order for shortening a period of probation, the court shall afford notice to the 
victim or victims of all sex related offenses or violent offenses resulting in serious 
bodily injury or death and, upon request of the victim or victims so notified, shall 




(1) As used in this subsection, the term: 
(A) “Developmental disability” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code 
Section 37-1-1. 
(B) “Indigent” means an individual who earns less than 100 percent of the federal 
poverty guidelines unless there is evidence that the individual has other resources 
that might reasonably be used without undue hardship for such individual or his 
or her dependents. 
(C) “Significant financial hardship” means a reasonable probability that an 
individual will be unable to satisfy his or her financial obligations for two or more 
consecutive months. 
(D) “Totally and permanently disabled” shall have the same meaning as set forth 
in Code Section 49-4-80. 
(2) In determining the financial obligations, other than restitution, to impose on the 
defendant, the court shall consider: 
(A) The defendant's financial resources and other assets, including whether any 
such assets are jointly controlled; 
(B) The defendant's earnings and other income; 
(C) The defendant's financial obligations, including obligations to dependents; 
(D) The period of time during which the probation order will be in effect; 
(E) The goal of the punishment being imposed; and 
(F) Any other factor the court deems appropriate. 
(3) In any case involving a violation of local ordinance, misdemeanor, or felony in which 
the defendant has been punished in whole or in part by a fine, the court shall be 
authorized to allow the defendant to satisfy such fine or any fee imposed in connection 
with probation supervision through community service as set forth in Article 3 of Chapter 
3 of Title 42. One hour of community service shall equal the dollar amount of one hour of 
paid labor at the minimum wage under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, in 
effect on January 1, 2018, unless otherwise specified by the court. A defendant shall be 
required to serve the number of hours in community service which equals the number 
derived by dividing the amount owed by the defendant, including moneys assessed by a 
provider of probation services, by the federal minimum hourly wage or by the amount 
specified by the court. If the court orders educational advancement, the court shall 
determine the numbers of hours required to be completed. Prior to or subsequent to 
sentencing, a defendant, or subsequent to sentencing, a community supervision officer, 
may request that the court make all or any portion of the amount owed by the defendant 
be satisfied under this subsection. 
(4) At the time of sentencing, the court may waive the imposition of a fine, exclusive of 
the payment of statutory surcharges, upon a determination that a defendant has a 
significant financial hardship or inability to pay or other extenuating factors exist that 
prohibit payment or collection of such fine. When determining significant financial 
hardship, the court may consider whether the defendant is indigent and whether the 
defendant or his or her dependents has a developmental disability or is totally and 
permanently disabled. If the court waives the imposition of a fine under this paragraph, it 
shall instead impose a theoretical fine and the defendant shall be required to pay the 
statutory surcharges associated therewith. 
(c) In any case involving a felony in which the defendant previously appeared before a juvenile 
court, the records of the dispositions of the defendant as well as any evidence used in any 
juvenile court hearing shall be available to the district attorney, the defendant, and the superior 
court judge in determining sentencing as provided in Code Section 15-11-703. 
(d) Within one year of the date upon which the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after 
receipt by the sentencing court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judgment after direct 
appeal, whichever is later, the court imposing the sentence has the jurisdiction, power, and 
authority to correct or reduce the sentence and to suspend or probate all or any part of the 
sentence imposed. The time periods prescribed in this subsection require the defendant to file a 
motion within such time periods; however, the court shall not be constrained to issue its order or 
hear the matter within such time periods. Prior to entering any order correcting, reducing, or 
modifying any sentence, the court shall afford notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the 
prosecuting attorney. Any order modifying a sentence which is entered without notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing as provided in this subsection shall be void. This subsection shall not 
limit any other jurisdiction granted to the court in this Code section or as provided for in 
subsection (g) of Code Section 42-8-34. 
(e) 
(1) 
(A) In sentencing a defendant convicted of a felony to probated confinement, the 
sentencing judge may make the defendant's participation in a work release 
program operated by a county a condition of probation, provided that such 
program is available and the administrator of such program accepts the inmate. 
(B) Any defendant accepted into a county work release program shall thereby be 
transferred into the legal custody of the administrator of said program; likewise, 
any defendant not accepted shall remain in the legal custody of the Department of 
Corrections. 
(2) Work release status granted by the court may be revoked for cause by the sentencing 
court in its discretion or may be revoked by the state or local authority operating the work 
release program for any reason for which work release status would otherwise be 
revoked. 
(3) The provisions of this subsection shall not limit the authority of the commissioner to 
authorize work release status pursuant to Code Section 42-5-59 or apply to or affect the 
authority to authorize work release of county prisoners, which shall be as provided for in 
Code Sections 42-1-4 and 42-1-9 or as otherwise provided by law. 
(4) This subsection shall not apply with respect to any violent felony or any offense for 
which the work release status is specifically prohibited by law, including but not limited 
to serious violent felonies as specified in Code Section 17-10-6.1. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.3  
(a) In determining whether to probate all or any part of any sentence of confinement in any 
felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation case, the sentencing court shall be authorized to 
make inquiry into whether the person to be sentenced is lawfully present in the United States 
under federal law. 
(b) If the court determines that the person to be sentenced is not lawfully present in the United 
States, the court shall be authorized to make inquiry into whether the person to be sentenced 
would be legally subject to deportation from the United States while serving a probated sentence. 
(c) If the court determines that the person to be sentenced would be legally subject to deportation 
from the United States while serving a probated sentence, the court may: 
(1) Consider the interest of the state in securing certain and complete execution of its 
judicial sentences in criminal and quasi-criminal cases; 
(2) Consider the likelihood that deportation may intervene to frustrate that state interest if 
probation is granted; and 
(3) Where appropriate, decline to probate a sentence in furtherance of the state interest in 
certain and complete execution of sentences. 
(d) This Code section shall apply with respect to a judicial determination as to whether to 
suspend all or any part of a sentence of confinement in the same manner as this Code section 
applies to determinations with respect to probation. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.4  
(a) As used in this Code section, the term “split sentence” means any felony sentence that 
includes a term of imprisonment followed by a term of probation. 
(b) In any case where a judge on or after July 1, 2015, sentences a defendant to a split sentence, 
post-incarceration supervision of the defendant shall be conducted exclusively by the 
Department of Community Supervision and not by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 
regardless of whether the defendant has served the full period of incarceration ordered in the 
sentence or has been released prior to the full period of incarceration by parole, conditional 
release, or other action of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, every crime declared to be a misdemeanor shall be 
punished as follows: 
(1) By a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or by confinement in the county or other jail, 
county correctional institution, or such other places as counties may provide for 
maintenance of county inmates, for a total term not to exceed 12 months, or both; 
(2) By confinement under the jurisdiction of the Board of Corrections in a state probation 
detention center pursuant to Code Section 42-8-35.4 for a determinate term of months 
which shall not exceed a total term of 12 months; or 
(3) If the crime was committed by an inmate within the confines of a state correctional 
institution, by confinement under the jurisdiction of the Board of Corrections in a state 
correctional institution or such other institution as the Department of Corrections may 
direct for a term which shall not exceed 12 months. 
(b) Either the punishment provided in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of this Code section, 
but not both, may be imposed in the discretion of the sentencing judge. Misdemeanor 
punishment imposed under either paragraph may be subject to suspension or probation. The 
sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend, or probate sentences 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section at any time, but in no instance shall 
any sentence under the paragraph be modified in a manner to place a county inmate under the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Corrections, except as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of 
this Code section. 
(c) In all misdemeanor cases in which, upon conviction, a six-month sentence or less is imposed, 
it is within the authority and discretion of the sentencing judge to allow the sentence to be served 
on weekends by weekend confinement or during the nonworking hours of the defendant. A 
weekend shall commence and shall end in the discretion of the sentencing judge, and the 
nonworking hours of the defendant shall be determined in the discretion of the sentencing judge; 
provided, however, that the judge shall retain plenary control of the defendant at all times during 
the sentence period. A weekend term shall be counted as serving two days of the full sentence. 
Confinement during the nonworking hours of a defendant during any day may be counted as 
serving a full day of the sentence. 
(d) In addition to or instead of any other penalty provided for the punishment of a misdemeanor 
involving a traffic offense, or punishment of a municipal ordinance involving a traffic offense, 
with the exception of habitual offenders sentenced under Code Section 17-10-7, a judge may 
impose any one or more of the following sentences: 
(1) Reexamination by the Department of Driver Services when the judge has good cause 
to believe that the convicted licensed driver is incompetent or otherwise not qualified to 
be licensed; 
(2) Satisfactory completion of a defensive driving course or defensive driving program 
approved by the Department of Driver Services; 
(3) Within the limits of the authority of the charter powers of a municipality or the 
punishment prescribed by law in other courts, imprisonment at times specified by the 
court or release from imprisonment upon such conditions and at such times as may be 
specified; or 
(4) Probation or suspension of all or any part of a penalty upon such terms and conditions 
as may be prescribed by the judge. The conditions may include driving with no further 
motor vehicle violations during a specified time unless the driving privileges have been 
or will be otherwise suspended or revoked by law; reporting periodically to the court or a 
specified agency; and performing, or refraining from performing, such acts as may be 
ordered by the judge. 
(e) Any sentence imposed under subsection (d) of this Code section shall be reported to the 
Department of Driver Services as prescribed by law. 
(f) The Department of Community Supervision shall lack jurisdiction to supervise misdemeanor 
offenders, except when the sentence is made concurrent to a probated felony sentence or as 
provided in Code Section 42-8-109.5. Except as provided in this subsection, the Department of 
Corrections shall lack jurisdiction to confine misdemeanor offenders. 
(g) This Code section will have no effect upon any offender convicted of a misdemeanor offense 
prior January 1, 2001, and sentenced to confinement under the jurisdiction of the Board of 
Corrections or to the supervision of the Department of Corrections. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7  
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (b.1) of this Code section, any person who, 
after having been convicted of a felony offense in this state or having been convicted under the 
laws of any other state or of the United States of a crime which if committed within this state 
would be a felony and sentenced to confinement in a penal institution, commits a felony 
punishable by confinement in a penal institution shall be sentenced to undergo the longest period 
of time prescribed for the punishment of the subsequent offense of which he or she stands 
convicted, provided that, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may, in his or her 
discretion, probate or suspend the maximum sentence prescribed for the offense. 
(b) 
(1) As used in this subsection, the term “serious violent felony” means a serious violent 
felony as defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 17-10-6.1. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (e) of Code Section 17-10-6.1, any person who has 
been convicted of a serious violent felony in this state or who has been convicted under 
the laws of any other state or of the United States of a crime which if committed in this 
state would be a serious violent felony and who after such first conviction subsequently 
commits and is convicted of a serious violent felony for which such person is not 
sentenced to death shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without parole. Any such 
sentence of life without parole shall not be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or 
withheld, and any such person sentenced pursuant to this paragraph shall not be eligible 
for any form of pardon, parole, or early release administered by the State Board of 
Pardons and Paroles or for any earned time, early release, work release, leave, or any 
other sentence-reducing measures under programs administered by the Department of 
Corrections, the effect of which would be to reduce the sentence of life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole, except as may be authorized by any existing or future 
provisions of the Constitution. 
(b.1) Subsections (a) and (c) of this Code section shall not apply to a second or any subsequent 
conviction for any violation of subsection (a), paragraph (1) of subsection (i), or subsection (j) of 
Code Section 16-13-30. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (b.1) of this Code section and subsection 
(b) of Code Section 42-9-45, any person who, after having been convicted under the laws of this 
state for three felonies or having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the 
United States of three crimes which if committed within this state would be felonies, commits a 
felony within this state shall, upon conviction for such fourth offense or for subsequent offenses, 
serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge based upon such conviction and 
shall not be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served. 
(d) For the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate 
counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations 
consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction. 
(e) This Code section is supplemental to other provisions relating to recidivous offenders. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-8  
(a) In a felony case, when a statutory fine amount is not set by law, upon conviction, the court 
may impose a fine not to exceed $100,000.00. 
(b) In any case when probation is revoked, the defendant shall not be entitled to any rebate or 
refund of any part of the fine paid. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-8.1  
In any case in which a defendant receives legal defense services pursuant to Chapter 12 of Title 
17 where the defendant has not paid the application fee required by Code Section 15-21A-6 and 
the court has not waived such fee at the time of sentencing, the court shall impose such fee as a 
condition of probation. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10  
(a) Where at one term of court a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation, 
or on more than one count thereof, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served 
concurrently unless otherwise expressly provided therein. 
(b) Where a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation at separate terms of 
court, or in different courts, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served 
concurrently, one with the other, unless otherwise expressly provided therein. 
(c) This Code section shall apply alike to felony and misdemeanor offenses. 
(d) This Code section shall govern and shall be followed by the Department of Corrections in the 
computation of time that sentences shall run. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-11  
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, upon conviction for an offense, a 
person shall be given full credit for each day spent in confinement in any penal institution or 
facility and in any institution or facility for treatment or examination for a disability, as such 
term is defined in Code Section 37-1-1, infirmity, or other physical condition, including: 
(1) Pretrial confinement, for any reason, since the date of arrest for the offense which is 
the subject of the sentence; and 
(2) Posttrial confinement awaiting the remittitur from an appellate court or transfer to the 
Department of Corrections or other court ordered institution or facility. 
(b) The court may exclude credit for time served in pretrial confinement when its sentence: 
(1) Requires the person to complete a program at a probation detention center as set forth 
in Code Section 42-8-35-4; 
(2) Allows the person to participate in a work release program as set forth in Code 
Section 42-1-4; or 
(3) Is for a misdemeanor offense for time spent in confinement in a jurisdiction other than 
the one in which the arrest for such offense occurred. 
(c) The credit or credits set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be applied toward 
the convicted person’s sentence and shall be considered by the State Board of Pardons and 
Paroles in determining the eligibility of such person for parole. 
(d) This Code section shall apply to sentences for all crimes, whether classified as violations, 
misdemeanors, or felonies, and to all courts having criminal jurisdiction located within the 
boundaries of this state. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-13 
The punishments prescribed by this Code shall be assessed only after a legal adjudication of guilt 
in a court having jurisdiction. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 
(a) When a defendant has not been previously convicted of a felony, the court may, upon a guilty 
verdict or plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before an adjudication of guilt, without entering 
a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant, defer further proceedings and: 
(1) Place the defendant on probation; or 
(2) Sentence the defendant to a term of confinement. 
(b) The court shall not sentence a defendant under the provisions of this article unless the court 
has reviewed the defendant's criminal record as such is on file with the Georgia Crime 
Information Center. 
(c) When a court imposes a sentence pursuant to this article, it: 
(1) Shall state in its sentencing order the prospective effective date of the defendant being 
exonerated of guilt and discharged as a matter of law, assuming the defendant 
successfully complies with its sentencing order, provided that such date may not have 
taken into account the awarding of credit for time served in custody; and 
(2) May limit access to certain information as provided in subsection (b) of Code Section 
42-8-62.1. 
(d) The court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed to sentence the defendant as 
otherwise provided by law when the: 
(1) Defendant violates the terms of his or her first offender probation; 
(2) Defendant is convicted for another crime during the period of his or her first offender 
sentence; or 
(3) Court determines that the defendant is or was not eligible for first offender sentencing 
under this article. 
(e) A defendant sentenced pursuant to this article shall be exonerated of guilt and shall stand 
discharged as a matter of law as soon as the defendant: 
(1) Completes the terms of his or her probation, which shall include the expiration of the 
sentence by virtue of the time frame of the sentence passing, provided that such sentence 
has not otherwise been tolled or suspended; 
(2) Is released by the court under Code Section 42-8-37, 42-8-103, or 42-8-103.1 prior to 
the termination of the period of his or her probation; or 
(3) Is released from confinement and parole, provided that the defendant is not serving a 
split sentence. 
(f) The court shall not sentence a defendant under the provisions of this article who has been 
found guilty of or entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere for: 
(1) A serious violent felony as such term is defined in Code Section 17-10-6.1; 
(2) A sexual offense as such term is defined in Code Section 17-10-6.2; 
(3) Trafficking of persons for labor or sexual servitude as prohibited by Code Section 16-
5-46; 
(4) Neglecting disabled adults, elder persons, or residents as prohibited by Code Section 
16-5-101; 
(5) Exploitation and intimidation of disabled adults, elder persons, and residents as 
prohibited by Code Section 16-5-102; 
(6) Sexual exploitation of a minor as prohibited by Code Section 16-12-100; 
(7) Electronically furnishing obscene material to a minor as prohibited by Code Section 
16-12-100.1; 
(8) Computer pornography and child exploitation as prohibited by Code Section 16-12-
100.2; 
(9) 
(A) Any of the following offenses when such offense is committed against a law 
enforcement officer while such officer is engaged in the performance of his or her 
official duties: 
(i) Aggravated assault in violation of Code Section 16-5-21; 
(ii) Aggravated battery in violation of Code Section 16-5-24; or 
(iii) Obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection (b) 
of Code Section 16-10-24, if such violation results in serious physical 
harm or injury to such officer. 
(B) As used in this paragraph, the term “law enforcement officer” means: 
(i) A peace officer as such term is defined in paragraph (8) of Code 
Section 35-8-2; 
(ii) A law enforcement officer of the United States government; 
(iii) An individual employed as a campus police officer or school security 
officer; 
(iv) A game warden; and 
(v) A jail officer employed at a county or municipal jail; or 
(10) Driving under the influence as prohibited by Code Section 40-6-391. 
(g) When a defendant has not been previously convicted of a felony, the court may, after an 
adjudication of guilt, sentence the defendant pursuant to this article as provided in Code Section 
42-8-66 or modify a sentence as provided in subsection (f) of Code Section 17-10-1 so as to 
allow a sentence pursuant to this article. 
(h) A defendant shall not avail himself or herself of this article on more than one occasion. 
 
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2 
(a) Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under Article 2 
or Article 3 of this chapter or of any statute of the United States or of any state relating to 
narcotic drugs, marijuana, or stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drugs, pleads guilty to or is 
found guilty of possession of a narcotic drug, marijuana, or stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic drug, the court may without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of 
such person defer further proceedings and place him on probation upon such reasonable terms 
and conditions as the court may require, preferably terms which require the person to undergo a 
comprehensive rehabilitation program, including, if necessary, medical treatment, not to exceed 
three years, designed to acquaint him with the ill effects of drug abuse and to provide him with 
knowledge of the gains and benefits which can be achieved by being a good member of society. 
Upon violation of a term or condition, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed 
accordingly. Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court shall discharge the person 
and dismiss the proceedings against him. Discharge and dismissal under this Code section shall 
be without court adjudication of guilt and shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of this 
Code section or for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction 
of a crime. Discharge and dismissal under this Code section may occur only once with respect to 
any person. 
(b) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, any person who is charged with possession of 
marijuana, which possession is of one ounce or less, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and 
punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed 12 months or a fine not to exceed 
$1,000.00, or both, or public works not to exceed 12 months. 
(c) Persons charged with an offense enumerated in subsection (a) of this Code section and 
persons charged for the first time with nonviolent property crimes which, in the judgment of the 
court exercising jurisdiction over such offenses, were related to the accused's addiction to a 
controlled substance or alcohol who are eligible for any court approved drug treatment program 
may, in the discretion of the court and with the consent of the accused, be sentenced in 
accordance with subsection (a) of this Code section. The probated sentence imposed may be for a 
period of up to five years. No discharge and dismissal without court adjudication of guilt shall be 
entered under this subsection until the accused has made full restitution to all victims of the 
charged offenses. Discharge and dismissal under this Code section shall be without court 
adjudication of guilt and shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of this Code section or 
for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime. 
Discharge and dismissal under this Code section may not be used to disqualify a person in any 
application for employment or appointment to office in either the public or private sector. 
(d) 
(1) As used in this subsection, the term: 
(A) “Criminal history record information” shall have the same meaning as set 
forth in Code Section 35-3-30. 
(B) “Restrict” or “restriction” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code 
Section 35-3-37. 
(2) 
(A) At the time of sentencing, the defendant may seek to limit public access to his 
or her sentencing information, and the court may, in its discretion, order that: 
(i) The defendant's records shall be restricted in accordance with Code 
Section 35-3-37; 
(ii) The criminal file, docket books, criminal minutes, final record, all 
other records of the court, and the defendant's criminal history record 
information in the custody of the clerk of court, including within any 
index, be sealed and unavailable to the public; and 
(iii) The defendant's criminal history record information of arrest, 
including any fingerprints or photographs taken in conjunction with such 
arrest, be restricted by law enforcement agencies, jails, or detention 
centers. 
(B) When considering the defendant's request under this paragraph, the court shall 
weigh the public's interest in the defendant's criminal history record information 
being publicly available and the harm to the defendant's privacy and issue written 
findings of fact thereupon. 
(C) The court shall specify the date that such prohibited dissemination, sealing, 
and restrictions will take effect. 
 
Beasley v. State, 345 Ga. App. 247 (2018). 
Keith Malik Beasley was indicted for felony theft by shoplifting. He appeals the denial of 
his motion to quash and special demurrer, arguing that his prior nolo contendere plea to 
shoplifting was not a conviction for purposes of the sentencing provision of the shoplifting 
statute and therefore that he cannot be found guilty of a felony in this case. We agree and 
reverse. 
Beasley was charged with theft by shoplifting and giving a false name and date of birth. 
The indictment informed Beasley that he was being charged with felony theft by shoplifting 
under OCGA § 16–8–14 (b) (1) (C) because he had three prior convictions of theft by 
shoplifting. Beasley filed a motion to quash and special demurrer, arguing that he could not be 
charged with felony theft by shoplifting because one of his prior charges was resolved by a plea 
of nolo contendere. The trial court denied Beasley’s motion. We granted Beasley’s application 
for interlocutory appeal, and this appeal followed. 
Beasley does not contest that he has two prior shoplifting convictions for purposes of the 
statute. But he argues that his plea of nolo contendere cannot be used as a third conviction since 
the shoplifting statute does not explicitly allow the use of a plea of nolo contendere. We agree. 
Beasley’s argument is supported by the plain language of the statutes at issue. 
Our analysis turns on current and former versions of the presentence hearing, recidivism, 
and nolo contendere statutes. The relevant parts of those statutes are set out in the margin. The 
nolo contendere statute directs: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a plea of nolo contendere 
shall not be used against the defendant in any other court or proceedings as an admission of guilt 
or otherwise or for any purpose....” OCGA § 17–7–95 (c). The sentencing provision in the theft 
by shoplifting statute does not otherwise provide: “Upon conviction of a fourth or subsequent 
offense for shoplifting, where the prior convictions are either felonies or misdemeanors, or any 
combination of felonies and misdemeanors, as defined by this Code section, the defendant 
commits a felony....” OCGA § 16–8–14 (b) (1) (C). So the relevant sentencing provision does 
not provide that a plea of nolo contendere counts as a conviction. 
The applicable statutory definition of “conviction” does not otherwise provide either. The 
definition of “conviction” generally applicable under Title 16, Crimes and Offenses, provides, “ 
‘Conviction’ includes a final judgment of conviction entered upon a verdict or finding of guilty 
of a crime or upon a plea of guilty.” There are, as detailed in the margin, additional or 
superceding definitions of “conviction” in the statutes regarding a number of offenses. But 
“conviction” does not appear in the definitions provision of the statutes regarding theft, OCGA 
§§ 16–8–1 through 16–8–23. 
So under the plain language of the applicable statutes, a nolo contendere plea does not 
count as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes under the theft by shoplifting statute. See 
Corbitt v. State, 190 Ga. App. 509, 509 (1) (1989) (under the plain language of the nolo 
contendere statute, a defendant’s plea of nolo contendere cannot be admitted as a similar 
transaction); Beal v. Braunecker, 185 Ga. App. 429, 432 (2) (1987) (under the plain language of 
the nolo contendere statute, a defendant’s plea of nolo contendere is not admissible to support a 
plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages). 
While we “have sanctioned the use of past nolo contendere pleas for sentencing purposes 
under recidivist statutes, we have not approved such use when proof of the prior conviction is an 
element of the crime.” Blackmon v. State, 266 Ga. App. 877, 879 (2004) (citation omitted). But 
the first clause of that sentence is inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court of Georgia 
authority. The qualification in Blackmon is the controlling principle today. Our Supreme Court 
has since clarified that “any fact that serves to enhance a mandatory minimum sentence is an 
element of the crime....” Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 718 (3) (2015) (overruling prior decision 
that held that “the family violence aspect of [an] aggravated assault—which elevates the 
mandatory minimum sentence from one year to three years—was merely a sentencing factor and 
not an element of the aggravated assault offense”) (citations and emphasis omitted). 
So the prior shoplifting convictions that would elevate Beasley’s mandatory minimum 
sentence—to a year’s imprisonment from 30 days imprisonment, 120 days confinement in a 
community correctional facility, or 120 days house arrest (compare subsections (b) (1) (B) and 
(b) (1) (C) of OCGA § 16–8–14)—are not merely sentencing factors but are an element of the 
shoplifting offense. Because “we have not approved [the use of nolo contendere pleas] when 
proof of the prior conviction is an element of the crime,” Blackmon, supra, 266 Ga. App. at 879, 
the state may not use Beasley’s nolo contendere plea to shoplifting to elevate the current case to 
a felony. 
 
Coleman v. State, 352 Ga. App. 45 (2019). 
Anthony Coleman appeals his conviction for making a false statement, arguing that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion for an order of exoneration and restriction of access to his 
criminal records under Georgia's First Offender Act because his sentence was ambiguous. For 
the reasons set forth infra, we affirm. 
Following a jury trial, Coleman was convicted of one count of making a false statement, 
but acquitted of the remaining counts in the indictment. And on May 16, 2016, Coleman was 
sentenced to five years of probation and a fine of $1,000. Then, on August 22, 2018, Coleman 
filed a “Motion to Terminate Probation and Enter an Order of Exoneration and a Motion 
Pursuant to [OCGA] § 42-8-62.1[1] to Restrict Access to the Criminal Records in the Above-
Styled Case.” In the motion, Coleman alleged that he had completed his required community 
service, paid $750 of the fine and was prepared to pay the balance, and had been released for 
active probation supervision. Coleman also claimed that he had no prior criminal record before 
the sentence imposed in this case, and that he had faithfully performed the statutory requirements 
necessary for the court to grant his requests. In sum, Coleman contended that his “probation 
should be terminated and a conditional discharge/first offender should be entered pursuant to 
[OCGA] § 42-8-60 as ‘not guilty[,]’ ” and “[a]ccess to the conditional discharge/first[-]offender 
sentence should be restricted pursuant [to OCGA] § 42-8-62.1 (b) (1).” 
The trial court held a hearing on Coleman's motion, at which the State did not oppose his 
request to terminate probation. But Coleman's other requests were based on his alleged status as 
a first offender, and the State disputed that he was sentenced as a first offender. In response, 
Coleman argued that his sentencing order was ambiguous as to whether he was adjudicated 
guilty or sentenced as a first offender and that this ambiguity must be resolved in his favor. The 
State disagreed, contending, inter alia, that the sentencing form was not ambiguous and the court 
was not authorized to sentence Coleman as a first offender because he was ineligible for such 
status at the time his sentence was entered. Ultimately, the trial court granted Coleman's request 
to terminate his probation, but denied his other requests. This appeal follows. 
Coleman's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
an order of exoneration and restriction of access to his criminal records under the First Offender 
Act because his sentence was ambiguous and should be construed in his favor. We disagree. 
As indicated by the title of the First Offender Act, defendants are not entitled to be 
sentenced as a first offender more than once. And here, while Coleman alleged in his motion that 
he had no prior criminal record, at his 2016 sentencing hearing, his trial counsel informed the 
court, without prompting, that Coleman was ineligible for first-offender status.  
Specifically, in his closing argument, Coleman's counsel stated: “I don't know how many 
times [Coleman] got arrested, but he's got one prior conviction. Unfortunately[,] he used his first 
offender in that, so he's not eligible for first offender. So by this sentence[,] ... he would be a 
convicted felon.” Thus, Coleman admitted that the trial court was not authorized to sentence him 
under the Act because he had been given first-offender status in a prior proceeding. But 
regardless of whether Coleman qualified for first-offender status, his sentencing form 
unambiguously shows that he was not sentenced as a first offender. 
Turning to the merits of his argument on appeal, Coleman is correct that sentences for 
criminal offenses should be “certain, definite, and free from ambiguity; and [when] the contrary 
is the case, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused.” And here, Coleman contends 
that the following language on the sentencing form creates an ambiguity as to whether he was 
sentenced as a first offender: “The Defendant is adjudged guilty or sentenced under First 
Offender/Conditional Discharge for the above-stated offense(s) ....” But this sentence merely 
establishes that Coleman was either being adjudged guilty or sentenced as a first offender, not 
both. Moreover, this statement is entirely consistent with Georgia law because when a defendant 
is sentenced as a first offender, “there is no adjudication of guilt [and] there is no conviction.” 
Additionally, the sentencing form indicates, in bold print, that the “[d]isposition” of the charged 
offense is “Guilty.” And while the box on the form indicating the defendant was being sentenced 
as a repeat offender is not checked, neither is the box indicating the defendant was a first 
offender. In sum, because a first-offender sentence is not an adjudication of guilt and Coleman's 
sentencing form indicates that he was being convicted of the charged offense, the form was not 
ambiguous as to whether Coleman received first-offender status, as it made clear that he did not. 
For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Coleman's motion for an order 
of exoneration and to restrict access to his criminal record.9 
 
State v. Langley, 855 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). 
In this case, we must determine whether the trial court may probate a sentence imposed 
under OCGA § 16-11-131 (b), which makes it unlawful for a person on probation to possess a 
firearm. The trial court concluded that it had the discretion to probate a portion of the sentence, 
and the State appealed. After considering the relevant statutory language, we conclude that the 
trial court lacked the discretion to impose the probated sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the 
sentence, and remand the case for resentencing. 
The facts are undisputed. In 1987, Dennis Mark Langley was convicted of murder. 
Following his release from incarceration, he began his term of probation. In 2019, the 
department of community supervision conducted a search of his home, as permitted by the terms 
of his probation, and discovered several firearms. As a result, Langley was charged with 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). He pled 
guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to serve six months in prison with the 
remainder on probation. The State now appeals, arguing that Langley's sentence is void because 
the trial court lacked the discretion to impose a probated sentence under the plain language of the 
sentencing statute. We agree. 
“The interpretation of a statute is, of course, a question of law, which is reviewed de novo 
on appeal. Indeed, when only a question of law is at issue, as here, we owe no deference to the 
trial court's ruling and apply the ‘plain legal error’ standard of review.” (Citations and 
punctuation omitted.) Mays v. State, 345 Ga. App. 562, 563 (2018). 
Where the trial court imposes a sentence the law does not allow, that sentence is void. 
Wilder v. State, 343 Ga. App. 110, 112 (2017). In determining whether the statutory language 
vested the trial court with the discretion to impose a probated sentence, we turn to the rules of 
statutory construction. 
When interpreting any statute, we necessarily begin our analysis with familiar and 
binding canons of construction. In considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an 
appellate court is to presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 
meant. Toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, 
consider the text contextually, read the text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary 
speaker of the English language would, and seek to avoid a construction that makes some 
language mere surplusage. Further, when the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to 
only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly. 
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mays, 345 Ga. App. at 564; see also Major v. State, 301 Ga. 
147, 150 (1) (2017). 
Here, Langley was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation 
of OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). That statute provides, in relevant part, that “if the felony for which 
the person is on probation or has been previously convicted is a forcible felony, then upon 
conviction of receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm, such person shall be imprisoned 
for a period of five years.” (Emphasis supplied.). The term “forcible felony” includes Langley's 
prior conviction for murder. OCGA § 16-11-131 (e). Nevertheless, 
trial courts generally have the discretion to fashion sentences that fit the crimes for which 
the defendant is convicted, so long as the sentences fall within the statutory ranges. It is, 
however, within the power of the legislature to direct the punishment to be prescribed for 
second offenders and to leave no discretion to the trial judge. 
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 828 (4) (2018); see also 
OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) (2018) (“The judge imposing the sentence is granted power and 
authority to suspend or probate all or any part of the entire sentence under such rules and 
regulations as the judge deems proper[.]”). 
To resolve the issue before us in this appeal, we therefore must determine whether the 
specific provision of OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) abrogates the trial court's general discretion under § 
17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) to impose a probated sentence. Because we are faced with the interplay of 
these two statutes, we note that statutory interpretation principles require that a specific statute 
control over a general statute unless there is a contrary legislative intent. State v. Jones, 265 Ga. 
App. 493, 494 (2) (2004). 
The legislative intent here is unambiguous given the plain language of OCGA § 16-11-
131 (b), and thus, that specific statute prevails over OCGA § 17-10-1. Here, our search for the 
legislature's intent is short: the plain language of the statute requires the trial court to impose a 
term of imprisonment “for a period of five years,” and its use of the term “shall” mandates that 
the defendant serve all of that term in prison. OCGA § 16-11-131 (b); Jones, 265 Ga. App. at 
494 (2) (the statutory language “shall be imprisoned for not less than ten years” meant that the 
trial court lacked discretion to probate a portion of the ten-year sentence). The trial court's 
imposition of a probated sentence directly contravened the legislature's intent as set forth in the 
plain language of the statute. Id. Thus, the trial court lacked the discretion to impose the sentence 
that it did because the sentence was void. Accordingly, we must vacate the sentence and remand 
the case for resentencing. 
 
Huynh v. State, 855 S.E.2d 63, 64–66 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). 
This is the second appearance of this case in this Court. In Huynh v. State, 347 Ga. App. 
XXVII (Aug. 1, 2018) (unpublished), we vacated Nghia Van Huynh's sentence because the 
Superior Court of Gwinnett County erred in sentencing Huynh to two 20-year terms in 
confinement for two counts of child molestation (Counts 4 and 13) without including a 
probationary term in the sentences. See OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) (2012); State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63 
(2017). On remand, the trial court resentenced Huynh to two 15-year terms to serve 10 years in 
confinement on Counts 4 and 13.1 Huynh now appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion 
to modify the sentences he received on resentencing, apparently arguing that he had been 
released from custody and could not lawfully be resentenced. We affirm. 
In the first appearance of this case, we noted that 
[o]n April 13, 2012, Huynh entered an Alford plea to three counts of child molestation 
and received an aggregate sentence of 40 years, with 25 years in confinement. The 
sentence was structured as twenty years to serve on Count 4; twenty years with the first 
five in confinement on Count 10, and twenty years to serve on Count 13. The sentence on 
Count 10 ran consecutively to that on Count 4, and the sentence on Count 13 ran 
concurrently with the other two counts.[2] 
(Footnotes omitted.) Acting pro se, Huynh appealed from the denial of his motion to 
correct a void sentence, asserting that former OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) required that his 
sentences on Counts 4 and 13 include at least one year of probation. We agreed, vacated 
Huynh's sentences on Counts 4 and 13, and remanded the case to the trial court for 
resentencing. 
During a September 14, 2018 resentencing hearing, Huynh attempted to raise arguments 
outside the scope of resentencing, including a claim that his original plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. The trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to address Huynh's 
additional arguments, and instead sentenced Huynh in an October 3, 2018 resentencing order to 
fifteen years with the first ten in confinement each on Counts 4 and 13. The sentence for Count 
13 ran consecutively to the sentence for Count 10, which itself ran consecutively to the sentence 
for Count 4. 
On June 25, 2019, Huynh filed a timely pro se motion to modify his new sentences, 
contending that “some of the charges should have merged” and that “there is additional and 
relevant information that the court did not hear prior to sentencing.” During the hearing on his 
motion, however, Huynh did not address these arguments; rather, he claimed that he “didn't do 
anything to the children” and that he was released from custody on August 29, 2018 but was 
immediately and unlawfully arrested again by Gwinnett County officers. The trial court denied 
Huynh's motion in a December 10, 2019 order, and this appeal followed. 
In two related enumerations of error, Huynh contends that he was released by the 
Department of Corrections “for specific crimes” and taken to Gwinnett County to be resentenced 
on those same crimes “without implementing all aspects of due process of law, including arrest, 
formal charging, arraignment, etc.” He further questions whether a resentencing under such 
circumstances would be a “legally valid sentence.” We conclude that the trial court correctly 
denied Huynh's motion to modify his sentence. 
“Whether to grant a motion to correct a sentence under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) lies within 
the discretion of the trial court. So long as the sentence imposed by the court falls within the 
parameters prescribed by law, we will not disturb it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) 
Patterson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 105, 107 (1) (2018). Relevant to this case, “a person convicted 
of a first offense of child molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five 
nor more than 20 years....” OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (1). 
Here, the trial court resentenced Huynh to two terms of fifteen years with ten years to 
serve in confinement each on Counts 4 and 13. The trial court also directed that Huynh's 
sentence for Count 13 run consecutively to the sentence for Count 10, and that the sentence for 
Count 10 run consecutively to the sentence for Count 4, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 40 
years to serve 25 years in confinement. As a threshold matter, then, these sentences fall within 
the statutory range of sentences for the offense of child molestation. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (1). 
Moreover, it was within the trial court's discretion to impose consecutive sentences for Huynh's 
separate offenses of child molestation. See, e.g., OCGA § 17-10-10 (a) (“Where at one term of 
court a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation, or on more than one 
count thereof, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served concurrently unless 
otherwise expressly provided therein.”) (emphasis supplied); Dowling v. State, 278 Ga. App. 
903, 904 (2006) (“a trial court has discretion to impose consecutive sentences for separate 
offenses”). 
And while Huynh's aggregate sentence was the same, the sentences for each individual 
offense were less severe than his original sentences. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 
499 (2010) (“Due process prohibits the imposition of a more severe sentence as a result of 
vindictiveness against a defendant for successfully attacking his conviction.”) (citation and 
punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Huynh's new sentences raise no due process concerns. See, 
e.g., Fair v. State, 281 Ga. App. 518, 519 (1) (2006) (“a concurrent sentence may be converted 
into a consecutive sentence without being considered ‘more severe’ ”); Alvarado v. State, 248 
Ga. App. 810, 811 (1) (2001) (affirming resentencing order where trial court “converted [the 
defendant's] existing sentence from a concurrent sentence into a consecutive one without 
increasing the length of the sentence”). Huynh's remaining vehicle in pursuit of a remedy, if any 
he has, is a petition for habeas corpus. See OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.; Patterson, 347 Ga. App. at 
109 (1) (“An extraordinary motion for new trial is not a remedy available to [Huynh] because he 
pled guilty. Construing [Huynh's] pleading as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a motion in 
arrest of judgment is equally ineffectual because both sorts of motions must be filed within the 
same term of court at which the guilty plea or judgment being challenged was entered.”) (citation 
and punctuation omitted). 
In sum, because the trial court's sentences fall within the statutory range of punishment 
for the offense of child molestation, the trial court did not err in its resentencing order. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's order denying Huynh's motion to modify his sentence. 
 
Griggs v. State, 314 Ga. App. 158 (2012). 
Nathaniel Griggs appeals from the trial court's grant of the State's motions to correct a 
void sentence and to clarify a clerical error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
After a jury trial, Griggs was convicted of Count 1—aggravated battery,1 Count 2—
aggravated battery, Count 4—burglary, and Count 5—kidnapping with bodily injury. At 
sentencing, the trial court merged the first count of aggravated battery with the kidnapping 
conviction and sentenced Griggs to life imprisonment for Kidnapping, and 20 years each on 
Counts 2 and 4. The written verdict form indicated that both Counts 2 and 4 were to run 
consecutive to Count 5. This Court affirmed Griggs's conviction on appeal. 
Subsequent to his conviction, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided the case of Garza v. 
State, and based on the holding in that case, Griggs filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the 
habeas court granted by voiding his conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury. The State 
moved for correction of a void sentence in the trial court because the State argued that Count 1 
(aggravated battery), which originally was merged with the now voided kidnapping charge, 
required imposition of a sentence of a specific number of years. Simultaneously, the State moved 
for the trial court to correct a clerical error in order for the written sentence to conform to the oral 
pronouncement at the original sentencing hearing. The State maintained that the court's oral 
pronouncement of the original sentence was for Griggs to serve life imprisonment on the merged 
Counts 1 and 5, followed by a consecutive sentence of 20 years for Count 2, followed by a 
consecutive sentence of 20 years for Count 4, rather than life imprisonment followed by 
concurrent 20–year sentences. 
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Griggs to 20 years on each count to 
be served consecutively to each other. On appeal, Griggs challenges the trial court's sentence, 
arguing that the trial court was without authority to clarify its written sentence by pronouncing 
that Counts 2 and 4 would run consecutive to each other in addition to running consecutive to 
Count 1, which required a specific sentence after the life sentence for his kidnapping charge was 
voided. He also argues that the resulting sentence was vindictive. For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm. 
 1. “Under OCGA § 17–10–1(a)(1), the sentencing judge shall prescribe a determinate 
sentence for a specific number of months or years and in conformity with other statutory 
sentencing requirements.” In this case, after the kidnapping conviction was voided, the trial court 
was authorized to sentence Griggs to a term of years on Count 1, which for aggravated battery 
could consist of up to 20 years. Thus, it was not erroneous for the trial court to impose a sentence 
of 20 years for Count 1. 
2. Moreover, the trial court did not err by correcting its written sentence to conform with 
its oral pronouncement. “Except as provided by statute, a sentencing court has no power to 
modify a valid sentence of imprisonment after the term of court in which it was imposed has 
expired.” Nevertheless, a sentencing court also possesses “inherent power to correct its records at 
any time to show the true intent of the sentencing court at the time the original sentence was 
imposed.” Here, the trial court was authorized to correct the clerical error appearing in its written 
sentence as compared to its original oral pronouncement. The trial court, after reviewing the 
original transcript, determined that its original pronouncement and intent was for Counts 2 and 4 
to be served consecutive to each other as well as to Count 1 (previously the voided Count 5 with 
which Count 1 was merged). Accordingly, there was no error in the trial court's correction of that 
portion of Griggs's sentence. 
3. Finally, because the final sentence of 60 years to serve is not longer than the original 
sentence of life followed by additional terms of years, we find no merit in Griggs's argument that 
the trial court was vindictive in imposing the new sentence as it did. 
 
State v. Lin, 268 Ga. App. 702 (2004). 
This appeal regards Lin's misdemeanor conviction and sentencing for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
The State contends, and Lin agrees, that, following Lin's entry of a guilty plea, the trial 
court erred in illegally sentencing Lin to a term of incarceration and probation totaling less than 
12 months, thereby violating the statutory sentencing requirements of the Georgia DUI statute. 
As the court erred in sentencing Lin, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for 
resentencing pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E). 
Georgia's DUI statute, OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E), provides explicitly that, after the first 
conviction for driving under the influence, the defendant shall be sentenced to, among other 
penalties, “a period of probation of 12 months less any days during which the defendant is 
actually incarcerated.” (Emphasis supplied.) Based on this mandate, the legislature's clear 
purpose was to ensure that anyone convicted of DUI would serve an actual sentence of 12 
months of combined confinement and probation, regardless of the fact that there may be factors 
which would reduce the confinement time which a defendant might serve. Even if the 
confinement time is reduced, such period of reduction is automatically included under the 
probation sentence. 
In this case, the record shows that, on January 20, 2004, Lin, a political refugee from and 
legal citizen of Burma, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and one 
count of disobedience of a traffic control device. After the trial court accepted his plea, Lin asked 
the trial court “to allow him to be sentenced to 11 months and 29 days as opposed to 12 months 
so as not to endanger him with [U.S. I]mmigration.” 
In an apparent attempt to accommodate Lin's request, the trial court executed a standard 
sentencing form, the language of which does not track the mandatory sentencing requirements of 
OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E). The trial court did not sentence Lin to 12 months probation less any 
time actually served, as required by OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E). Instead, the trial judge 
sentenced him to confinement for 11 months and 29 days. 
In a subsequent “Provided that” section of the form, the judge then added, in reference to 
the initial sentence just imposed, that Lin is to “serve 79 hours of this sentence in confinement 
and may serve the remainder of 11 months and 29 days on probation.” (Emphasis supplied.) 
Clearly, a proper reading of the language involved, while not intended, provides that Lin was 
sentenced to confinement for 11 months 29 days under the initial sentence, with credit against 
such sentence for the 79 hours that he had already served, with the remainder of 11 months 29 
days to be served on probation. Such a sentence is void, as it violates the maximum 12-month 
sentence for a misdemeanor conviction under Georgia law. 
While it has been argued that the language of the sentence form provides a sentence to 
Lin of 79 hours confinement, plus 11 months 29 days probation, which sentence would be in 
excess of 12 months, this is not a reasonable construction of the language involved. Even if the 
sentence did so provide, then it would be void, as it also violates the maximum 12-month 
sentence for a misdemeanor conviction under Georgia law. 
It is likely that the trial court actually intended to impose a total sentence of 11 months 29 
days, as requested by Lin, with confinement to be limited to the 79 hours that Lin had already 
served, with the remaining balance to be served on probation. A proper construction of the 
language used, however, does not allow this interpretation, and even if it did, such a sentence 
would be error, as it would violate the sentencing requirements of OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E). 
While the standard sentencing form used here, along with verbiage errors, greatly contributed to 
the improper sentence, the major error was the attempt to avoid the application of the sentencing 
requirements of OCGA § 40-6-391(c)(1)(E), which the court could not do. 
For the above reasons, we must vacate the sentence here, and remand the case to the trial 
court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
Where to Find Examples and Forms of These Documents 
1. Examples 
a. Most of these will be behind a paywall, but you can sometimes see the language 
and you can sometimes access the whole document 
b. Athens-Clarke County 
i. https://www.athensclarkeclerkofcourt.com/WebCaseSearch/mainpage.asp
x 
c. Fulton County  
i. https://publicrecordsaccess.fultoncountyga.gov/Portal/ 
d. Cobb County  
i. https://ctsearch.cobbsuperiorcourtclerk.com 
1. Records -> Search by Case Type 
2. Select Criminal 
3. Use dropdown menu 
e. https://typographyforlawyers.com/sample-documents.html 
2. Forms 
a. CourtTrax Fines and Fees Calculator 
i. https://www.courttrax.org/calculator/calculator.aspx 
b. Family Violence/Protective Order Forms 
i. https://www.gsccca.org/file/family-violence-forms 
ii. https://www.gasupreme.us/superior-court-standard-forms/ 




d. Summons, Sheriff’s Entry of Service, Service by Publication, Notice of 
Publication 
i. https://www.gasupreme.us/superior-court-standard-forms/ 








h. Writ of Habeas Corpus 
i. https://southernjudicialcircuit.com/self-help-forms/criminal-law/ 
i. Motion to Seal Record of First Offender 
i. https://southernjudicialcircuit.com/self-help-forms/criminal-law/ 
j. Motion to Modify Sentence 
i. https://southernjudicialcircuit.com/self-help-forms/criminal-law/ 
k. Pardon/Restoration of Civil Rights 
i. https://southernjudicialcircuit.com/self-help-forms/criminal-law/ 
l. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 
i. https://southernjudicialcircuit.com/self-help-forms/criminal-law/ 






n. Notice of Hearing 
i. https://www.southernjudicialcircuit.com/selfhelp/miscforms/Notice.pdf 
ii. https://southernjudicialcircuit.com/self-help-forms/miscellaneous-forms/ 










q. Record Restriction (forms within presentation) 
i. https://cccdn.blob.core.windows.net/cdn/Files/Courts/forms/Superior%20
Forms/Forms/Record%20Restrictions.pdf 




s. Indigent Defense Application 
i. https://www.gwinnettcourts.com/superior/forms-and-documents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
